Musa v. Shaltoni

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 8, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-1946
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 251946-U SIXTH DIVISION

May 8, 2026

No. 1-25-1946

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ RIMA MUSA, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) ) v. ) No. 20 D 929 ) MOHAMMED SHALTONI, ) Honorable ) Andrea M. Webber, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Gamrath concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s modification of a parenting plan to adjust a travel bond and increase electronic communication between appellant and his children.

¶2 This case arises from a modification of the parenting plan between appellant Mohammed

Shaltoni and appellee Rima Musa involving their three minor children. Through a series of motions No. 1-25-1946

in early summer 2025, Shaltoni sought to amend the plan to increase the travel bond Musa had to

pay to travel with the children to Jordan, require Musa to drop a case she had pending against

Shaltoni in Jordan, and to facilitate greater electronic communication between Shaltoni and the

children. Across two orders, the circuit court agreed to increase the bond, but only from $2500 to

$3500 and not until 2026, and granted Shaltoni increased communication, but not to an extent

satisfactory to Shaltoni. Shaltoni appeals, and we affirm.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Musa filed her “verified petition for legal separation” on January 31, 2020, wherein she

represented that she and Shaltoni were married in Jordan in 2008 and had three minor children,

ages nine, seven, and two. She cited irreconcilable differences as the reason for the separation.

¶5 On June 14, 2022, the circuit court entered a “Parenting Plan and Allocation of Parental

Responsibilities Judgment (the Plan),” pursuant to which Musa was “designated as the parent

having substantial parenting time.” The Plan prohibited relocating the children more than 25 miles

from Shaltoni’s residence in Orland Park, Illinois, without court approval or the written consent

of both Musa and Shaltoni. As to electronic communication, the Plan stated, “Musa may contact

the minor children on Saturdays at 1:00 pm when they are in the physical possession of Shaltoni.

Shaltoni may contact the minor children on Saturday’s at 11:00 a.m. when they are in the physical

possession of Musa. If a parent needs to adjust a time for the communication, that parent shall

contact the other parent by 9:00 p.m. on Friday.” The Plan also noted that the court would resolve

the issue of travel to Jordan, the couple’s home country, at a later date.

¶6 Following a trial, the circuit court entered a dissolution order on September 9, 2022. The

order updated the Plan by addressing the Jordania travel issue. Specifically, the order allotted Musa

30 consecutive days with the children during their summer vacation from school, allowing her to

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travel with them to Jordan. The order noted there was “extensive testimony” regarding Musa’s

past travel to Jordan with the children. The court further found that during any such trips, Musa

had to make the “children available for Facetime daily” and post a $2500 travel bond “with the

Clerk of the Court when traveling to Jordan or any non-[Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects

of International Child Abduction] (the “Hague Convention”) countries.” The Hague Convention,

to which the United States is a signatory, but Jordan is not, “seeks to secure the prompt return of

children wrongfully removed to or retained in any signatory state.” In re Marriage of Krol and

Kubala, 2015 IL App (1st) 140976, ¶ 17. “A central purpose of the Convention is to ‘discourage

parents from crossing international borders in search of a more sympathetic forum’ in which to

litigate custody issues.” Id. (quoting In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 217 (S.D. N.Y. 2011)).

Based on Musa’s past travel to Jordan with the children, the court allowed the current travel so

long as Musa abided by the order.

¶7 On March 7, 2025, Musa filed a petition for relocation, asking the circuit court’s permission

to relocate with the children to Jordan. Therein, she contended that she had traveled with the

children to Jordan on multiple occasions after her separation from Shaltoni, they had extended

family there, and “the children have a social life there, and many relatives the same age as them.”

Musa also cited her preference for educating the children in Jordan, a lower cost of living, and

Shaltoni’s frequent parenting time cancellations.

¶8 In response, Shaltoni argued that because Jordan was not a signatory to the Hague

Convention, there was “a significant risk the children may not be returned to the United States.”

He argued that if Musa wanted to relocate to Jordan permanently, the circuit court should grant

him primary custody. Shaltoni also requested that the Plan be adjusted to require Musa to post a

$25,000 travel bond for any temporary travel to Jordan. Before the court ruled on Musa’s motion,

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Shaltoni filed an Emergency Motion to Bar Unauthorized International Travel, requesting that the

court order Musa not to travel to Jordan without court approval, and to increase the travel bond to

$50,000 bond if the court approved any such travel. Shaltoni relayed that Musa informed him she

had purchased round trip tickets to Jordan for June 23 to July 23, 2025, while the relocation motion

was still pending. He argued this posed the obvious risk that Musa would travel with the children

to Jordan and remain there, outside of the court’s authority.

¶9 The circuit court denied Musa’s relocation request on June 12, 2015. In its written order,

the court relayed that the parties testified Shaltoni “cannot travel to Jordan based on [Musa’s]

action of filing a lawsuit in that country, asking for unpaid monies from [Shaltoni] related to their

wedding.” The order continued, “The evidence does not support that [Shaltoni] has the financial

ability to pay for the travel for the minor children and himself for purposes of parenting time. This

would impair the parent-child relationship between [Shaltoni] and the children.” Finally, it

emphasized that Jordan was a not a signatory to the Hague Convention, and as such the court

would “have no power to enforce orders or rule on the best interest of the children” if it permitted

relocation there.

¶ 10 In the same order, the circuit court denied Shaltoni’s Emergency Motion to Bar Travel,

explaining that its international travel finding in the Plan came after “a lengthy trial with multiple

witnesses,” during which Shaltoni testified that he would agree to Musa and the children traveling

to Jordan under certain circumstances. In the present motion, the court found, Shaltoni failed to

establish a change in circumstances that justified alteration of this provision as Shaltoni proposed.

The court further noted Musa had previously paid the $2500 travel bond. The court did not deny

Shaltoni relief entirely, however, as the order increased the travel bond to $3500 for travel to

Jordan from 2026 and onwards, and found that, also starting in 2026, Musa “must show there are

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no restrictions in place prohibiting [Shaltoni]’s ability to travel [to] Jordan” before she could travel

there with the children.

¶ 11 On June 13, 2025, Shaltoni filed an “Emergency Motion to Enforce Emergency Access

Rights and Require Legal Clearance for International Travel,” arguing that the court should not

have delayed Musa’s obligation to remove the “procedural barriers” preventing Shaltoni from

traveling to Jordan until 2026 because a problem might arise during Musa’s 2025 trip. He again

requested that the court order Musa to drop the Jordanian case before the trip. Prior to the court

entering an order on this motion, Shaltoni also filed a “Motion to Reconsider Travel Bond Order,”

wherein he again asked the court to raise the travel bond for 2025 to $50,000, and once again asked

that the court require Musa to remove the “legal restrictions” against his travel to Jordan.

¶ 12 Musa responded, arguing that since the entry of the Plan and dissolution order, she had

traveled to Jordan with the children on multiple occasions, and returned each time. She further

argued that Shaltoni could resolve the case in Jordan against him simply by paying a debt he owed

of “5500 Jordanian dinars.”

¶ 13 Aside from the Jordanian travel issue, Shaltoni also sought to modify the Plan’s provisions

regarding his contact with the children. Specifically, on May 13, 2025, he filed a “Motion to

Facilitate Direct Telephonic and Electronic Communication with Minor Children,” arguing that

Musa interrupted and monitored his conversations with the children, pressured the children to end

or shorten calls with Shaltoni, and generally engaged in “a pattern of conduct that obstructs

consistent and meaningful father-child communication.” He requested that the court modify the

Plan to allow “direct, private communication.” Musa responded on June 16, 2025, complaining

that Shaltoni called the children “many days during the week without a scheduled time,” counter

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to the Plan. She also denied that she interrupted or monitored Shaltoni’s phone calls with their

children, and “disagreed” that she pressured the children regarding their contact with him.

¶ 14 On September 12, 2025, the circuit court denied Shaltoni’s motions regarding international

travel but granted his motion to facilitate communication in part. On electronic communications,

the court ordered that Musa not prevent the children from freely communicating with Shaltoni,

“restrict the phone usage as a way to circumvent this order,” and that she provide the children’s

cell phone numbers to Shaltoni. It further ordered that Musa “ensure the children are available in

a private setting to Facetime their father on Saturday’s at 5:00 p.m.” On travel, the court wrote that

Shaltoni, “consented to [Musa’s] travel as memorialized by the Judgment,” and had failed to

satisfy the requirements of a motion for reconsideration by pointing out new evidence, changes in

the law, or a court error in applying existing law. Shaltoni filed his notice of appeal on September

24, 2025.

¶ 15 Shaltoni attempted to certify two bystander’s reports for proceedings from (1) September 8,

2022, and (2) September 12, 2025. The circuit court never certified either report. Specifically

regarding the September 12, 2025 hearing, the court clarified in an October 29, 2025 order that

because the “parties both submitted their proposed bystander report and were unable to enter into

any stipulations or agreements *** [n]either parties Bystander reports were certified.” Instead, the

court explained, “This report is submitted for inclusion in the record on appeal concerning the

proceedings held on September 12, 2025,” and stated that its “findings and directions stated in

open court are reflected in the Court’s September 12, 2025 order.”

¶ 16 JURISDICTION

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¶ 17 The circuit court entered its order modifying the Plan on September 12, 2025, and Shaltoni

filed his notice of appeal on September 24, 2025, giving this court jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rules 303 (eff. July 1, 2017) and 304(b)(6) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

¶ 18 ANALYSIS

¶ 19 On appeal, Shaltoni challenges two aspects of the circuit court’s September 12, 2025 order:

(1) the court’s refusal to increase the travel bond and force Musa to drop the Jordanian case against

Shaltoni immediately, and (2) the court’s electronic communications modification, on the basis

that it effectively permits Musa to limit Shaltoni’s communications to the Saturday Facetime

interaction.

¶ 20 Shaltoni’s claims arise from the circuit court’s modification of a parenting plan. Under

section 610.5(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (“the Act”) (750 ILCS

5/610.5(c) (West 2024)), a circuit court may modify a parenting plan “when necessary to serve the

child’s best interests if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that on the basis of

facts that have arisen since the entry of the existing parenting plan or allocation judgment *** a

substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or of either parent and that a

modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests.” We will not reverse a court’s

determination of what is in a child’s best interests unless the decision is against the manifest weight

of the evidence. See In re Marriage of Royer, 2025 IL App (2d) 240378, ¶ 35 (citing In re Marriage

of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 515 (2004)). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence

where “the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not

based on the evidence presented.” Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350-51 (2006). Because the circuit

court is in a superior position to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence, we will not

substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court when making this determination. Id.

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¶ 21 We start with Shaltoni’s claim regarding the travel to Jordan. The record shows that in

deciding the international travel provision of the Plan in June and September 2022, the circuit court

considered the testimony of multiple witnesses, and fashioned a compromise that required Musa

to post a travel bond. This compromise took into consideration the fact that Jordan was not a

signatory to the Hague convention, the expense of travel, and Shaltoni’s testimony on the issue. It

is undisputed that Musa then traveled to Jordan on multiple occasions while abiding by the

restrictions and returning without incident. The record further shows that in 2025, the court denied

Musa’s attempt to relocate the children to Jordan in express consideration of the impact this would

have on Shaltoni’s relationship with them. The court also agreed to increase the travel bond, though

only starting in 2026 and not to the amount Shaltoni requested. The court did this over Shaltoni’s

additional objection based on his difficulty entering Jordan due to a pending legal case there

brought by Musa. The court’s June 12, 2025 order expressly acknowledged this issue, and required

Musa, starting in 2026, to show Shaltoni had no restrictions on his travel to Jordan before she could

travel there with the children.

¶ 22 Confusingly, Shaltoni’s argument on appeal centers on section 609.2(g) of the Act (750

ILCS 5/609.2) (West 2024), which he contends requires Illinois courts to fashion “appropriate

safeguards” before permitting a custodial parent to travel internationally with their children.

Unfortunately for Shaltoni, this section simply does not support the proposition. Instead, the

section only deals with relocation, not international travel, and does not contain the phrase

“appropriate safeguards.” 750 ILCS 5/609.2 (West 2024). Without any specific statutory basis,

Shaltoni’s argument can only be understood as a general contention that the circuit court erred by

finding it was not in his children’s best interest to increase the travel bond in light of Musa’s desire

to relocate to Jordan, and the case pending there against Shaltoni.

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¶ 23 We find that the circuit court’s refusal to modify the Plan by increasing the travel bond to

$50,000 or force Musa to immediately drop the Jordanian case was not against the manifest weight

of the evidence. Shaltoni has not met his burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence

that Musa’s relocation motion and the Jordanian case against him represented such substantial

changes in circumstances that modification of the Plan was necessary to serve his children’s best

interests. See In re Marriage of Yabush, 2021 IL App (1st) 201136, ¶ 31.

¶ 24 The record is clear that the court specifically considered the proffered changes in conditions

Shaltoni cites, but did not conclude that they outweighed the benefits to the children of the initial

arrangement, with the increased bond to $3500, such that additional modification was appropriate.

This was a reasonable conclusion, given the evidence on both sides. There is no doubt that Musa’s

attempt to relocate to Jordan with the children is a relevant consideration. This fact, along with the

travel complications Shaltoni experienced as a result of the Jordanian case and Jordan’s status as

a non-signatory to the Hague Convention, constitute reasonable bases for concern regarding

international travel. But the record also shows that Musa had traveled to Jordan with the children

and returned without incident on multiple occasions. Additionally, Shaltoni provides no indication

that Musa had a history of disobeying court orders or would be likely to disobey such orders in the

future. Given these facts, the record could reasonably support a decision for either party.

Accordingly, Shaltoni’s argument on this appeal constitutes a request that this court substitute its

judgment for that of the circuit court and reweigh the evidence in his favor, something our standard

of review does not permit. See Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 350-51.

¶ 25 Shaltoni’s citation to In re Marriage of Saheb and Khazal, 377 Ill. App. 3d 615 (2007), fails

for the same reason as his invocation of section 609.2 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/609.2 (West 2024)).

As relevant here, Saheb mentions that the circuit court in that case ordered a $100,000 travel bond

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because one spouse sought visitation with the couple’s children in the United Arab Emirates, a

country that is also a non-signatory to the Hague Convention. Saheb, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 621. The

court then analyzed whether visitation in, or removal from, a non-Hague country complied with

750 ILCS 5/607 (visitation) (West 2006) and 750 ILCS 5/609 (removal) (West 2006). Id. at 621-

26. The problems with Shaltoni’s citation to Saheb are that (1) his case does not involve visitation

or removal, and (2) both statutory sections discussed in Saheb were repealed well before the issues

in the present case arose. Shaltoni does not address either issue or explain Saheb’s continued

relevance; accordingly, we reject his argument based on that decision. See Ill. S. Ct. R 341(h)(7)

(eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 26 Shaltoni also contends the circuit court failed to consider the new circumstances at issue in

its September 12, 2025 order, specifically that his initial consent predated Musa’s motion to

relocate. This argument is belied by the record, which demonstrates the court considered Musa’s

relocation desire as reflected in its decision to add additional travel strictures in its June 12, 2025

order denying the relocation motion.

¶ 27 Shaltoni’s second claim on appeal is that the circuit court’s decision to modify the Plan to

grant him additional electronic communication with his children was counter to their best interest

because the order only provided free contact on its face, while in practice Musa would likely limit

the children’s willingness to freely communicate with him because the children “remain fearful”

of doing so. The record shows that the court granted Shaltoni’s motion to modify the Plan to

increase his electronic communication with the children by requiring Musa to permit free

telephonic communication and by scheduling an unsupervised weekly Facetime on Saturdays.

¶ 28 We find that the circuit court’s modification of the Plan on this issue was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. The court granted the relief Shaltoni requested, and in doing so

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apparently credited his version of events over Musa’s, as evidenced by the court’s instructions to

Musa in the September 12, 2025 order not to interfere with the children’s ability to generally

communicate electronically with Shaltoni. Shaltoni does not point to any evidence to support that

Musa will disobey the court’s order going forward beyond his own pure speculation that she is

likely to do so. Speculation is an improper basis for a court to use when making a fact-based

determination, as its use is grounds for reversal on a manifest weight of the evidence review. See

Burmood v. Anderson, 2023 IL App (2d) 230092, ¶¶ 36-38. Just as it would have been improper

for the circuit court to rely on Shaltoni’s speculation of Musa’s potential to disobey its order

moving forward in fashioning its modification, it is improper for this court on appeal to reverse

the circuit court’s order without any substantive basis in the record to support such a decision.

¶ 29 In closing, we note that Shaltoni cites two bystander reports in his brief, one purporting to

be from September 8, 2022, and the other from September 12, 2025. The record is clear that the

circuit court never certified these reports, and thus they are not properly included in the record on

appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 30 CONCLUSION

¶ 31 The circuit court’s decisions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we

affirm accordingly.

¶ 32 Affirmed.