Murray v. King County Court

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 SARA MURRAY, CASE NO. 24-cv-00239 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 KING COUNTY COURT ET AL. , 11 Defendants. 12 13 The Court raises this matter on its own accord. 14 Plaintiff Sara Murray (“Murray”) proceeds in forma pauperis (IFP). Dkt. No. 15 26. As such, Section 1915 requires the Court to dismiss Murray’s action if the Court 16 determines the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which 17 relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 18 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 19 On August 13, 2024, the Court issued an Order (1) explaining why Murray’s 20 Third Amended Complaint was deficient under Section 1915, (2) directing her to file 21 an amended complaint by September 12, 2024, and (3) denying her motion for 22 appointment of pro bono counsel. Dkt. No. 34. On September 6, 2024, Murray 23 1 moved for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of her request for pro bono counsel. 2 Dkt. No. 35. On September 11, 2024, Murray filed her Fourth Amended Complaint.

3 Dkt. No. 37. On the same day, the Court issued an Order granting Murray’s motion 4 for reconsideration, directing the District Coordinator of the Pro Bono Panel to try 5 to locate counsel for Murray, and striking the September 12 filing deadline for 6 Murray’s amended complaint. Dkt. No. 38. In granting this relief, the Court 7 expressly noted that “the Court cannot guarantee representation to Murray,” “[t]he 8 Court’s power, on granting this motion to reconsider, is limited to making a request

9 for representation via the pro bono panel,” and “[a]ppointment will be contingent on 10 the panel’s capacity to locate counsel willing to voluntarily represent Murray pro 11 bono.” Id. at 7 (emphasis original).1 On September 12, 2024, the Court issued a 12 minute order stating that the Court would not review Murray’s Fourth Amended 13 Complaint while the referral to the Pro Bono Panel was pending. Dkt. No. 39. 14 In the intervening period, the District Coordinator of the Pro Bono Panel 15 tried to secure counsel for Murray. The District Coordinator’s search has been

16 exceptionally time-intensive and extensive, contacting and vetting at least 10 17 potential attorneys.2 Yet, the District Coordinator has been unable to locate pro 18 bono counsel willing to take on this representation. In part, the difficulty stems 19 1 See U.S. v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that 20 Section 1915 permits a court to “request” counsel, not to compel representation).

21 2 The Court can take judicial notice of these facts because “[i]t is well established that a court may take judicial notice of its own records.” United States v. Author 22 Servs., Inc., 804 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1986), amended, 811 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1987), and overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 23 1997) (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 157 (1969)). 1 from the unusually large number of defendants Murray has sued, including 2 numerous government agencies, individual judges, and administrators. This broad

3 pool of defendants raises many conflicts of interest throughout the community of 4 lawyers and law firms to whom the Pro Bono Panel targets outreach, precluding 5 representation. As a result, the Court’s referral to the Pro Bono Panel has been 6 unsuccessful and is no longer pending. 7 If Murray wishes to pursue this case, she must secure private counsel or else 8 proceed pro se. Given the relative sophistication of Murray’s filings to-date, Murray

9 has shown an ability to articulate her claims pro se in a manner that facilitates 10 effective adjudication. But as the Court previously noted, “the sprawling complexity 11 and lack of factual clarity in [Murray’s] pleadings to-date have hindered the Court’s 12 assessment of her claims.” See Dkt. No. 38 at 6. This holds true for Murray’s Fourth 13 Amended Complaint, which is over 400-pages long. Dkt. No. 37. Her latest 14 complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8 and is subject to dismissal on that basis alone. 15 Benshoof v. Fauci, No. C22-1281-LK, 2022 WL 4465782, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26,

16 2022). 17 As such, the Court renews its earlier instruction that “Murray must file an 18 amended complaint within 30 days of this order that provides a short, plain, and 19 concise statement of the factual basis for each of the claims as required by Fed. R. 20 Civ. P. 8.” See Dkt. No. 34 at 10 (emphasis added). To ensure a focused and concise 21 effort, the Court instructs Murray that her Fifth Amended Complaint should be no

22 longer than FIFTEEN (15) pages. This page limit should be sufficient for Murray to 23 provide a short, plain statement of the basis of her claims. The Court takes to heart 1 its duty to construe her pleadings liberally when evaluating their sufficiency under 2 Section 1915. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). If Murray fails

3 to file a proper amended complaint as directed, the Court will construe Murray’s 4 Fourth Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 37, as the operative complaint for purposes of 5 determining the sufficiency of her pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 28 U.S.C. § 6 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court warns that this outcome would likely result in dismissal of 7 Murray’s action without prejudice. 8 In sum, the Court ORDERS as follows:

9 • Murray must file an amended complaint within 30 days of this Order that 10 provides a short, plain, and concise statement of the factual basis for her 11 claims. 12 • This complaint should be no longer than FIFTEEN (15) pages. 13 • If Murray does not comply with this Order, the Court will construe the 14 Fourth Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 37, as the operative complaint for 15 purposes of determining the sufficiency of Murray’s pleadings under

16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 17 It is so ORDERED. 18 Dated this 27th day of December, 2024. 19 a 20 Jamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 21 22 23