Murray v. Geithner

763 F. Supp. 2d 860, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3788, 2011 WL 124480
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJanuary 14, 2011
DocketCivil 08-15147
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 763 F. Supp. 2d 860 (Murray v. Geithner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Murray v. Geithner, 763 F. Supp. 2d 860, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3788, 2011 WL 124480 (E.D. Mich. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment [dkt. 57], Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [dkt. 66/67], 1 and Plaintiffs mo *862 tion to strike [dkt. 79]. The parties have fully briefed the motions. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the parties’ papers such that the decision process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the motions be resolved on the briefs submitted. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is DENIED, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs motion to strike is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

The basic facts surrounding the government’s assistance to American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) are a matter of public record. In the fall of 2008, what the parties describe as a largescale economic crises erupted, purportedly threatening the liquidity and stability of financial institutions both domestically and abroad. At that time, AIG was one of the world’s largest and most complex financial institutions, prompting officials from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board of Governors”), in consultation with the United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury Department”), to conclude that AIG’s failure would be “catastrophic” for the United States and the world economy.

On September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”), with authorization from the Board of Governors, agreed to create a credit facility that enabled AIG to draw up to $85 billion for general corporate purposes, including as a liquidity source, pursuant to the “unusual and exigent circumstances clause” of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (“FRA”), 12 U.S.C. § 343 — purportedly the only mechanism then available for providing government financial assistance to institutions such as AIG. In return for the credit facility, AIG signed a trust agreement whereby it agreed to pay interest and fees to the FRBNY and to issue Series C preferred stock to a trust — the AIG Credit Facility Trust (“Trust”) — that would hold the stock for the benefit of the Treasury Department. The trust agreement provided that holders of Series C preferred stock were entitled to 79.9% (subsequently reduced to 77.9%) of the dividend payments and 79.9% (subsequently reduced to 77.9%) of the aggregate voting power of the common stock. The trust agreement permitted the Board of Governors to terminate or amend the Trust pursuant to its authority under the FRA.

In AIG’s Form 8-K filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in March 2009, AIG reported the transfer of the preferred shares of its stock to the Trust. The filing stated that “[a]s a result of the Transaction, a change in control of AIG has occurred. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, AIG and AIG’s Board of Directors are obligated to work in good faith with the Trust to ensure corporate governance arrangements satisfactory to the Trust.” In AIG’s annual report to the SEC, it explained that “the Trust, which is overseen by three independent trustees, will hold a controlling interest in AIG, [and] AIG’s interests and those of AIG’s minority shareholders may not be the same as those of the Trust or the United States Treasury.”

On October 3, 2008, Congress enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5201 et seq., with the following stated purpose:

[T]o immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States ... in a manner that (A) protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life savings; (B) preserves homeownership and promotes *863 jobs and economic growth; (C) maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United States; and (D) provides public accountability for the exercise of such authority.

12 U.S.C. § 5201.

To accomplish this purpose, the EESA provides the Secretary of the Treasury Department (“Secretary”) with the authority “to establish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (or ‘TARP’) to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary.” 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1). The EESA defines “troubled assets” as, inter alia, “financial instrumentes] that the Secretary, after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability.” 12 U.S.C. § 5202(9)(B). In exercising this authority, the Secretary must “take into consideration” several goals, including, inter alia, “protecting the interests of taxpayers,” “providing stability and preventing disruption to financial markets in order to limit the impact on the economy and protect American jobs, savings, and retirement security,” and “ensuring that all financial institutions are eligible to participate in the program, without discrimination based on size, geography, form of organization, or the size, type, and number of assets eligible for purchase.” 12 U.S.C. § 5213.

Despite the credit given to AIG under the FRA, the Board of Governors believed that AIG remained extremely vulnerable to an ongoing and intensifying financial crisis due to falling asset prices and substantial losses on its balance sheet. On November 25, 2008, the Secretary exercised the authority granted to him under the EESA to purchase $40 billion of newly issued AIG Series D preferred stock on the condition that AIG use the proceeds solely to pay down it’s indebtedness to the FRBNY. The Treasury Department paid the $40 billion purchase price for the Series D preferred stock directly to the FRBNY.

On March 2, 2009, when AIG reported a net loss of $61.7 billion for the fourth quarter of 2008, the Treasury Department announced that it would further restructure the government’s assistance to AIG. Accordingly, on April 17, 2009, the Secretary entered into an agreement to purchase AIG Series F preferred shares (“Seríes F SPA”) pursuant to the EESA. The Series F SPA created an equity capital commitment (“Commitment”) of just under $30 billion, which allows AIG to draw capital from the Commitment over time. As of the date of Plaintiffs summary judgment motion, AIG had drawn down approximately $7.5 billion from the Commitment.

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763 F. Supp. 2d 860, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3788, 2011 WL 124480, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murray-v-geithner-mied-2011.