Murray v. Charleston

96 U.S. 432, 24 L. Ed. 760, 1877 U.S. LEXIS 1683

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: April 18, 1878
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Strong

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff, a resident of Bonn, in Germany, was, prior to the first'day of January, 1870, and- he still is, the holder and owner of $35,262.35 of what is called stock of the city of Charleston. The stock is in reality a debt of the city, the -evidence of which is certificates, whereby the city promises to pay to the-owners thereof the sums of money therein mentioned, together with six per cent interest, payable quarterly. One-third of the interest due the plaintiff on the first days of April, July, and October, 1870, and January and July, 1871, having been retained by the pity, this suit was brought to recover the sums so retained; and the answer to the complaint admitted the retention charged, but attempted to justify it under city ordinances of March 20, 1870, and March 21, 1871. By these ordinances, set out in full in the answer, the city appraiser was- directed to assess a tax of two cents, upon the dollar of the value of all real and personal property in the city o'f Charleston, for the .purpose of meeting the expenses of the city government; and the third section' of each ordinance declared that the taxes assessed on city stock should be retained by the city treasurer out of the interest thereon, when the same is due and payable. On these pleadings the case was submitted to the court for trial without*.a jury; and the.court .made a special finding of facts, substantially as set forth in the coinplaint and averred in the answer, upon which judgment was given for the defendant. This judgment was subsequently-affirmed by the Supreme Court, and the record is .now before us, brought here by writ of' error. It is objected that we have no jurisdiction of the case, because, it is said, no Federal- question was raised of..record, or decided in the Court of Common' Pleas, where the suit was commenced.

The city of' Charleston was incorporated in 17-83, before the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Among other- powers Conferred upon the city council was one to “ make such assessments on the inhabitants.of Charleston, or those who hold taxable property within the same, for the safety, convenience, benefit, and advantage of the city, as shall appear to them expedient.” ¡It was under this authority, repeated in subsequent legislation, the city ordinances of 1870 and 1871 were made. It may well be doubted whether' the acts of the legislature were intended to empower the city to. tax for its own benefit the debts it might owe to .its creditors, especially to its nonresident creditors. . Debts are not. property. A non-resident creditor cannot be said to-be, in.virtue of a debt .due to him, a holder property within the city; and the city council was authorized to make assessments only upon the inhabitants of Charleston, or those holding taxable property within .the same.' To that extent the Supreme Court of the State has decided the city has power to assess for taxation. That decision we have no authority to review. But neither the charter itself, nor any subsequent acts of legislation, directly or expressly interfered with any debts due by the city, or gave to the city any power over them. They simply gave limited legislative power to the city council. It was -not until the ordinances- 'were passed under the supposed authority of the legislative act that their provisions became the law of the State. It was only when the ordinances assessed, a tax - upon the city debt, and required, a part of it to be withheld from the creditors, that it became the law of the State that such a withholding could be made. The validity of the authority- given by the State, as well as the validity of the ordinances themselves, was necessarily before the Court of' Common Pleas when this case was tried-; and no judgment could- have been given for the defendants without determining that the ordinances w'ere laws of the State, not impairing the obligation of the contracts made by the city with the plaintiff. And when the case was removed into the Supreme Court of the State, that court understood a Federal question to be before it. One of the grounds- of tbe notice of the appeal was “that such a tax is a violation o'f good faith in .the contract of loan, impairs the obligation of said contract, and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void.” It is plain, therefore, that both .in the Common Pleas and in the Supreme Court of the State a Federal question was presented by the pleadings and was decided, — decided in favor of the State legislation, and against a right the plaintiff claims he has under the Constitution of the United States. ■ The city ordinances were in question on the ground of their repugnancy to the inhibition upon-the States to make any law impairing the obligation of contracts; and the decision was in favor of their validity. Nothing else was presented for decision, unless it be the question whether 'the acts of the State legislature authorized the ordinances; and that was ruled affirmatively. The jurisdiction of this court over the judgments of the highest courts of the States is not to be avoided by the mere absence of express reference to some provision of the Federal Constitution. Wherever rights acknowledged and protected by that instrument are 'denied or invaded under the shield of State legislation, this court is authorized to interfere. • The form and mode in which the Federal question is raised in thé State court is of minor importance, if, in fact, it was raised and decided. ' The act of Congress of 1867 gives jurisdiction to -this court over final judgments in the highest courts of a State in suits “ where is drawn in' question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity.” Not a word is said respecting the mode in which it shall be made to appear that such'a question was presented for decision. In the present case, it was necessarily involved, without any formal reference to any clause in the Constitution, and it is difficult to see how any such reference could have been made to appear expressly.

In questions relating to our jurisdiction, undue importance is often attributed to tbe inquiry'whether the pleadings in the State court expressly» assert a right under' the Federal,Consti- • tution. The true test is not whether the record exhibits an express statement that a Federal' question was presented, -but whether such a question was decided, and decided adversely to the Federal right. Everywhere in our decisions it has been held that we may review the judgments of • a State court when the determination or judgment of that court could not have been given without deciding upon a right or authority claimed to exist under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and deciding against that right. Yery little importance has been attached to the inquiry whether the Federal question was formally raised. In Crowell v. Randall (10 Pet. 368), 't was laid down, after a review of almost all our previous decisions, “ that it is not necessary the question should appear on the record to have been raised, and the decision made in direct and positive terms, in ipsissimis verbis, but that it is sufficient' if it appears by clear and necessary intendment that the question must have been raised, and must have'been decided, in order to have induced the judgment.” This case was followed by Armstrong et al. v. The Treasurer of Athens County (16 id. 281), where it was held sufficient to give this court jurisdiction if it appear from the record-of the State court that the Federal question was necessarily involved in'the decision, and that the court could not have given the judgment or decree which they passed without deciding it. See also Bridge Proprietors v. The Hoboken Company, 1 Wall. 116, and Furman v. Nichol, 8 id. 44.

That involved in the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and in that of the Supreme Court of the State was a decision that the city ordinances' of Charleston were valid, that they did control the contract of the city with the plaintiff, and. .that they did not .impair.its obligation, is too plain for argument. The plaintiff complains that the city has not fully performed its contracts according to their terms, that it has paid only four per .cent interest instead of six per cent, which it promised to pay, and that it has retained two per cent of the interest for its own use. The city admits all this; but attempts to' justify its retention of one-third of what it promised to pay by pleading its own ordinances directing its officer to withhold the two per cent of the interest promised whenever it became due and payable according to the stipulations of the contract, calling the amount .detained a tax. Of course, the question is directly presented whether the ordinances are a justification; whether they can and do relieve the debtor from full compliance with the promise; in other words, whether, the ordinances are valid and may lawfully be applied- to the contract. The court gave judgment for the defendant, which would have been impossible had it not been held that they have the force of law, notwithstanding the Constitution of the Uriited States, and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Our jurisdiction, therefore, is manifest.

We come, then, to the question whether the ordinances decided by the court to be valid did impair the obligation of the city’s contract with the plaintiff. The solution of this question depends upon a correct understanding of what that obligation was. By the certificates of stock, or city loan, held by the plaintiff, the city assumed to pay to him the sum mentioned in them, and to pay six per cent interest in quarterly payments. The obligation undertaken, therefore, was both to pay the interest at the rate specified, and to pay it to the plaintiff. Such was the contract, and such was the whole contract. It contained no reservation or restriction of the duty described. But the city ordinances, if they can ■ have any force, change both the form and effect of the .undertaking. They are the language of the promisor. In substance., they say to the creditor : “ True, our assumption was to pay to you quarterly a sum of money equal to six per cent per annum on the debt we owe you. Such was our express engagement. But we now lessen our obligation. Instead of paying all the interest to you, we retain a part for ourselves, and substitute the part retained for a part of what we expressly promised you.” Thus applying the ordinances to the contract, it becomes a very different thing from what it was when it was made; and the change is effected by legislation, by ordinances of the city, enacted Under the asserted authority of laws passed by the legislature. That by such legislation the obligation of the contract is impaired is manifest enough, unless it can be held there was some implied reserNation of a right in the, creditor to change its terms, a right reserved when the contract was made, —unless some power was • withheld, not expressed or disclosed, but which entered into and limited the express undertaking. But how that can be,— how an express contract can contain an implication, or consist with a reservation directly .contrary to the words of the instrument, has never yet been discovered.

It has been strenuously argued on behalf of the defendant that the State of South Carolina and the city council of Charleston possessed the power of taxation when the .contracts were made, that by the contracts the city did not surrender this power, that, therefore, the contracts were subject to its possible exercise, and that the city ordinances were only an exertion of it. We’ are told the power of a State to impose taxes upon subjects within its jurisdiction is unlimited (with some' few exceptions), and that it extends to every thing that exists by its -authority or is introduced by its permission. Hence it is inferred that the contracts of the city of Charleston were made with reference, to this power, and in subordination to it.

All this, may be admitted, but it does not meet the case of the defendant. We do no.t question the existence of a State power to levy taxes as claimed, nor the subordination of contracts to it, so far as it is unrestrained by constitutional limitation. But the power is not without limits, and one of its limitations is found in the clause of the Federal Constitution, that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. A change of the expressed stipulations of a contract, or a relief of a debtor from strict and literal compliance with its requirements, can no more be effected by an exertion of the taxing power than it can be by the exertion of any other power of a State legislature. The constitutional provision against impairing contract obligations is a limitation upon the taxing power, as well as upon all legislation, whatever form it may assume. Indeed, attempted State taxation is the mode most frequently adopted to affect contracts contrary to the constitutional inhibition. It most frequently calls for the exercise of our supervisory power. It may, then, safely be affirmed that no State, by virtue of’its taxing power, can say to a debtor, “ You need not pay to your creditor all of what you have promised.to him. You may satisfy your duty to him by retaining a part for yourself, or'for some municipality, or for the State treasury.” Much less can a city say,We will tax our debt to you, and in virtue of the tax withhold a part for our own use.”

.What, then, is meant by the doctrine that co'ntracts are made with reference to the taxing power resident in the State, and in subordination to it ? Is it meant that when a person lends money to a State, or to a municipal division of the State, having the power of taxatipn. there is in the contract a tacit reservation of a right in the debtor to raise contributions out of -the money promised to be paid before payment ? That cannot be, because if it could, the contract (in the language of Alexander Hamilton) would “ involve two contradictory things: ■ an obligation to do, and a right not to do; an obligation to pay ■a certain sum, and a right to retain it in the shape of a tax. It is against the rules, both of law and ,of reason, to admit by implication in the construction of a contract a principle which goes in destruction of it.” The truth is, States and cities, when they'borrow money and contract to • repay it-with interest, are not acting as sovereignties. They come down to the level of ordinary individuals. Their contracts have the same meaning as that of similar contracts between private persons. Hence, instead of there being in the undertaking of a State or city to pay, a reservation of a sovereign right to withhold payment, the contract should be regarded as an assurance that such a right will not bé exercised. A promise to pay, with a reserved right to deny or change the effect of the promise, is an absurdity.

Is, then, property, which.consists in the promise of a-State, or of a municipality of a State, beyond the reach of- taxation ? We do not affirm that it is. A State may undoubtedly tax any of its creditors within; its jurisdiction.for the debt due to him, and regulate the amount of the tax by.the rate of interest the debt bears, if its promise be left unchanged. A tax thus laid impairs no obligation assumed. It leaves the' contract untouched. But until payment of the debt or interest has been made, as stipulated, we think no act of State sovereignty can work an exoneration from what has been promised to the creditor; namely, payment to him, without a violation of the Constitution. “ The true rule of every case of property founded on contract with the government is this: It must first be reduced into possession, and then it will .become subject, in common with other similar property, to the right of the government to raise contributions upon it. It may be said that the government may fulfil this principle by paying the interest with one hand, and.taking back the amount of the tax with the other. But to this the answer is, that, to comply truly with the rule, the tax must be upon all the. money .of the community, not upon the-particular portion of it which is paid to the'public creditors, and it ought besides to be so regulated as not to include a liep of the tax upon the fund. The creditor should b%. no otherwise acted upon than as every other possessor of money; and, consequently, the money he receives from' the public can then only be a fit subject of taxation when it is entirely separated’’.(from-the contract), “and thrown undistinguished into the common mass.” 3 Hamilton, Works, 514 et seq. Thus only can contracts with the State be allowed to have the same meaning as all other similar contracts have.

.Such limitations of the power, of State taxation we have heretofore recognized. We have held property in one stage of its ownership not to be taxable, and in a succeeding stage to be taxable. Those decisions are not without some analogy to the rule we. have mentioned. Thus, in Brown v. Maryland (12 Wheat. 419-441), where it was held that á State tax could not be levied,- by the requisition of a license, upon, importers of merchandise by the bale or package, or upon other persons selling the goods imported by the bale or package,'Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, considering both the prohibition upon States against taxing imports, and their general power to tax persons and property, said: “ Where the importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass' of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the State.” Vide also Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 id. 284. A tax on income derived from contracts, if it does not prevent the reebipt of the income,, cannot be said to vary or lessen the debtor’s obligation imposed by the contracts.

In opposition to the conclusion we have reached we are referred to Champaign County Bank v. Smith (7 Ohio St. 42), and People v. Home Insurance Co. (29 Cal. 533), in which it is said the powerof a State to tax its own bonds was sustained. We do not, however, regard those cases as in conflict with the opinion we now hold; and, if they were, they would not control our judgment when we are called upon to determine the meaning and extent of the Federal Constitution. In the former, it appeared that' the tax collected was in virtue of an assessment of State bonds belonging to the bank, but deposited with the auditor of State as security for the circulating notes of the company. The tax thus assessed having been carried into the duplicate, the collector seized and appropriated the banknotes and money of the bank, and suit was brought to recover the amount so taken. In sustaining a demurrer to the petition, the court held, it is true, that a State has power to tax its own bonds equally with other property, and that, the exercise of such a power involves no violation óf a contract. But it was not held that the State could collect the tax by withholding from the creditor any part of what the State had assumed to pay. The tax was laid not upon the debt,, but upon the creditor; and it was collected not out of what the State owed, but out of the general property of the bank. Neither by the assessment nor in the collection was there any interference with the contract. In People v. Home Insurance Company, the question was whether bonds of the State of California, belonging to a New York insurance company, but deposited and kept in the State, as required by an act to tax and regulate foreign insurance companies doing business in the State, were assessable for taxation there. It was ruled that they were. This case, no more than the former, meets the question we have before us. - It certainly does not hold that a State or a city, by virtue of its taxing power, can convert its undertaking to pay a debt béaring six per cent interest 'into one bearing only four.

These are the only cases cited to us as directly sustaining the judgment we. have now in view. How far short of sustaining it they are .must be apparent, And we know of none that are more in point. It seems incredible that there can be any, for, as we said in Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania (15 Wall. 300), “ the law which requires the treasurer of the company (indebted) to retain five per cent of the interest due to the non-resident bondholder is not . . ; a legitimate exercise of the taxing power. It is a law which interferes. between the company and the bondholder, and, under the pretence of levying a tax, commands the company to withhold a portion of the stipulated interest and pay it over to the State. It is a law which thus impairs the obligation of the contract' between the parties. The obligation of a contract depends upon its terms and the means which the law in existence at the time affords for its enforcement. A law which alters the terms of a contract, by imposing new conditions, or dispensing with those expressed; is a law which impairs its obligation; for such a law .. . . relieves the parties from the moral duty of performing the original stipulations of the contract, and it prevents their legal enforcement.” This was said, it is true, in a case where the question was, whether a tax thus imposed upon a non-resident holder of bonds issued by a company chartered by the State was warranted by the Constitution. But, so far as it speaks of what constitutes impairing the contract obligation, it is applicable, in its fullest extent, to all legislation affecting contracts, no matter who may be the parties.

We do not care now to enter upon the consideration of the question whether a State can tax a debt due by one of its citi- ' zens or municipalities to a non-resident creditor, or whether it has any jurisdiction over such a creditor, or over the credit he owns. Such a discussion is not necessary, and it may be doubtful whether the question' is presented to us by this record.

It is enough for the present case that we hold, as we do, that no municipality of a State can, by its Own ordinances, under the guise of taxation, relieve itself from performing. to the letter all that it has expressly promised to its creditors.

There is no more important provision in the Federal Constitution than the one which prohibits States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and it is one of the highest duties of th,is court to take care the prohibition shall neither be evaded nor frittered away. Complete effect must be given to it in all its spirit. The inviolability of contracts, and the. duty of' performing them, as made, are foundations of all web-ordered society, and to prevent the removal or disturbance of these foundations was one of the great objects for which the Constitution was framed.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina will be reversed, and the record remitted with instructions to pro-peed in accordance with this opinion; and it is

So ordered.