Murray Co. v. Continental Gin Co.

149 F. 989, 79 C.C.A. 499, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4086
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJanuary 6, 1907
DocketNo. 20
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 149 F. 989 (Murray Co. v. Continental Gin Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Murray Co. v. Continental Gin Co., 149 F. 989, 79 C.C.A. 499, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4086 (3d Cir. 1907).

Opinion

CROSS, District Judge.

The bill of complaint in this cause relates to letters patent No. 472,607, 488,446, and 644,532, and alleges that they have been infringed by the defendant. As to No. 488,446, however, counsel for the complainant has, since the commencement of the suit, abandoned all claim for relief thereunder, and it will, therefore, require no further mention. No. 472,607 was issued April 12, 1892, to Stephen D. Murray, assignor to William Burr and John H. Deems, for new and'useful improvements in apparatus for elevating, distributing, and feeding seed-cotton to gins, and the bill of complaint alleges that the defendant has infringed claims Nos. 1, 2, 9, and 12 thereof, which are as follows:

“(1) In apparatus for elevating, distributing, and feeding seed-cotton to gins, the combination, with a suction pipe or tube, of a box or casing having side air-passages and a central screened space and a chute or feeder communicating with said space, substantially as described.
“(2) In apparatus for elevating, distributing, and feeding seed-cotton to gins, the combination, with a suction pipe or tube formed in its under side with an opening of a box or casing having a central space communicating with said pipe or tube and provided with side air-passages having inner screen-walls and a chute or feeder communicating with said central space, substantially as described.”
“(9) In apparatus for elevating, distributing, and feeding seed-cotton to gins, the combination, with the chute or feeder, of a set of feed-rollers supported at the bottom of said chute or feeder and means for regulating the feed of said rollers, substantially as described.”
“(12) The combination, with a suction-pipe, of the box or casing constructed of two or more central spaces and provided with the screened air-passages and a chute or feeder suspended beneath each of said central spaces, substantially as described.”

Before discussing the merits of the case, we will first briefly consider the point made on behalf of the defendant, that the complainant has not shown title to this patent. Several alleged' defects are set forth in the brief, but the only one urged at the oral argument was that notwithstanding the assignments, so far as appears, were duly executed and delivered at the times they were respectively dated, they nevertheless, having been acknowledged, several years subsequently, only took effect, in the absence of strict proof of the assignments as at common law, from the dates of their acknowledgment, and that under the evidence no infringement of the patent was shown between those [991]*991dates and the time of filing the bill of complaint herein. In volume 1 of Am. & Eng. En. of Law, title “Acknowledgments,” p. 524, the following rule is laid down:

“In tlie absence of a statute designating the period within which acknowledgments must he made, it is izmuatcrial when a deed is acknowledged. The acknowledgment may be made after bringing suit when the instrument is offered in evidence.”

It is true that in the case of Hollingsworth v. Flint, 101 U. S. 591, 25 L. Ed. 1028, where the acknowledgment and privy examination of a married woman was made after the commencement of the suit, it was held that the deed could not be offered in evidence; but, the decision was put by Mr. Justice Harlan expressly upon the ground that at the time of the commencement of the suit the deed had not been acknowledged as required by the Texas statute in order to pass the title of a married woman under the law of that state. In Doe v. Dugan, 8 Ohio, 87, 31 Am. Dec. 432, a deed executed by a sheriff while in office was acknowledged by him after his term of office had expired, and it was held that such acknowledgment related back to the time of the execution of the deed. In Lanning v. Dolph et al., Fed. Cas. No. 8,073, a deed was offered in evidence in an action in ejectment, and objection was made to its admission because the deed was acknowledged and recorded after the suit was brought. Mr. Justice Washington, who tried the case, held the objection invalid, since the acknowledgment and recording related back to the execution of the deed. An acknowledgment is nothing more or less than a substitute method of proving a deed, and does not affect its validity in the least. Section 4898 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by Act- March 3, 1897, c. 391, 29 Stat. 692 U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3387], simply provides a new method of proof. The evident intent of the act was to substitute proof of execution by acknowledgment, instead of by the production of the subscribing witness, if there were one, or' proof of the handwriting of the assignor, if there were no subscribing witness. In De Laval Separator Co. v. Vermont Farm Mach. Co. (C. C.) 109 Fed. 813, it was held that assignments which were acknowledged before the passage of that act were admissible in evidence thereunder, and that the act referred “to the time,” to use the language of the court, “when the acknowledgment is produced in evidence, rather than to the time when it was taken.” The rule thus laid down was approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Brown et al., 115 Fed. 150, 53 C. C. A. 354. The complainant in this case had in his possession, and produced at the hearing, assignments of the patent in suit acknowledged by the assignors, which showed at least a prima facie title thereto in the complainant.

On the part of the defendant it is maintained that the Munger patent, No. 308,790, dated December 2, 1884, the Sailor patent, No. 362,041, dated April 26, 1887, and the Schulze patent, No. 478,473, dated July 5, 1892, narrowed the art to such an extent that the complainant’s patent, No. 472,607, must be narrowly and strictly construed in order to maintain its validity, and that thus construed the defendant’s ap[992]*992paratas did not infringe claims 1, 2, and 12 thereof. It is unnecessary to consider at any considerable length in this connection the Hunger or the Sailor patent, although they both disclose a pneumatic cotton elevator, since the former has only a belt distributor, and the latter valves or deflectors, as the patentee calls them, whereby the passage of the cotton into the different vacuum boxes, arranged in series, is regulated, not automatically, but by hand. The Schulze patent undoubtedly represents the highest development of the art prior to the Murray patent under consideration, and it was upon that patent that counsel for the defendant mainly relied to show anticipation. It is quite true that the Schulze and Murray machines are in some respects alike, and from a mere cursory examination they might seem to be so much alike that very little, if anything, of novelty or invention could be discovered in the Murray patent; but, when carefully examined, it will appear that, while the elements embodied in the Murray patent are old, they are, nevertheless, combined and organized in such a way as to accomplish a new and decidedly useful result. What Murray more especially claims by his patent is an automatic valve produced by the seed-cotton itself, so that, when the cotton becomes choked in the chrtte and fills it to the top. of the screen-walls, the air suction is entirely cut off, and the delivery of cotton to that particular chute is suspended until the stoppage in the chute is overcome, or, adopting the language of the patentee:

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Bluebook (online)
149 F. 989, 79 C.C.A. 499, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4086, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murray-co-v-continental-gin-co-ca3-1907.