Murphy v. Schaible, Russo & Company, C.P.A.'s, L.L.P.

District Court, D. Colorado·Decided May 10, 2022·No. 1:19-cv-02808·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Judge William J. Martínez

Civil Action No. 19-cv-2808-WJM-NYW

DIANNA CHRISTINE MURPHY,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCHAIBLE, RUSSO & COMPANY, C.P.A.’S, L.L.P., and THOMAS SCHAIBLE,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION IN LIMINE

Plaintiff Dianna Christine Murphy sues her brother-in-law, Thomas Schaible, and Schaible, Russo & Company, C.P.A.’s L.L.P. (“SRC”) (jointly, “Defendants”) for breach of fiduciary duty. Familiarity with the extensive procedural history and the parties’ respective versions of events, recounted elsewhere (e.g., ECF Nos. 208, 232), is presumed. Before the Court is Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine (“Defendants’ Motion”), filed April 15, 2022. (ECF No. 268.) Plaintiff responded on April 25, 2022. (ECF No. 275.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (“Plaintiff’s Motion”), filed April 15, 2022. (ECF No. 266.) Defendants responded April 25, 2022. (ECF No. 277.) For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ Motion is denied, and Plaintiff’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part. I. LEGAL STANDARDS “The admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1086 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Golden, 671 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1982) (“Trial judges have discretion to decide whether an adequate foundation has been laid for the admission of evidence.”).

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Relevant evidence is generally admissible and should only be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 402. II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE (ECF No. 268) Defendants argue that the Court should preclude evidence and argument on the following topics: (1) whether Plaintiff’s damages in this case include the money that

Michael Schaible transferred from assets in U.S. accounts to Mexico; (2) Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs; and (3) exemplary damages. (ECF No. 268.) A. Evidence Regarding Plaintiff’s Damages Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiff from presenting any evidence or argument that her damages in this case include the assets that Michael Schaible transferred from the couple’s U.S. accounts to Mexico. (ECF No. 268 at 4.) They contend that Plaintiff filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in the Larimer County, Colorado District Court on June 2, 2017 and that on February 24, 2019, the Larimer County District Court issued the “Permanent Orders nunc pro tunc to January 31, 2019” (the “Permanent Orders”). (Id.) Defendants represent that, among other things, the Larimer County District Court allocated the investment accounts in the U.S. to Plaintiff as her sole and separate property and allocated the accounts in Mexico to Michael Schaible as his sole

and separate property. (Id. at 5.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s contention that her damages for Defendants’ alleged breach of fiduciary duty include “some or all of the $2.5 million transferred in March 2017 and some or all of the value of the Voya annuity” would require the jury to impermissibly speculate. The Permanent Orders confirm that the money Michael Schaible transferred to accounts in Mexico was an asset of the marital estate that the [Larimer County] District Court included in its allocation. The only avenue for the jury to find that Defendants’ alleged breach of fiduciary duty resulted in Plaintiff’s failure to receive some or all of the money Michael transferred to the accounts in Mexico would be for the jury to speculate that the [Larimer County] District Court would have allocated the investment accounts to her even if Michael had not transferred the $2.5 million and $749,752.94 Voya proceeds to Mexico. This theory is speculative per se and prohibited under Colorado law.

(Id. at 6.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff did not endorse an expert to testify regarding how Michael Schaible’s transfer of marital assets to Mexico impacted the Larimer County District Court’s allocation of marital assets to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff does not have the personal knowledge to testify about whether the Larimer County District Court would have allocated to Plaintiff some or all of the money Michael Schaible transferred to Mexico. (Id. at 8–9.) As an initial matter, as Plaintiff points out, this portion of Defendants’ Motion is a thinly-veiled motion for summary judgment because it seeks a ruling that some or all of Plaintiff’s damages are unavailable as a matter of law. The Court could deny this portion of Defendants’ Motion on this basis alone. (See WJM Revised Practice Standard III.G.1. (“A motion in limine that is a veiled motion for summary judgment may also be denied out of hand.”).)

At any rate, Defendants’ argument misses the mark. The jury will be asked to determine whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff in 2017, and, if so, the amount she was harmed by Defendants’ actions. How the Larimer County District Court allocated assets belonging to the couple two years later does not meaningfully affect this analysis. As the Court has already recognized in the context of determining whether Plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact: On the allegations, however, Plaintiff has suffered an economic loss at the hands of Thomas [Schaible]; the fact that Michael [Schaible] has been ordered to remedy such loss is of no moment. . . . While Plaintiff would perhaps lack standing had Michael [Schaible] actually paid Plaintiff her equitable share of the wrongfully transferred funds, it is uncontested in this litigation that Michael [Schaible] has failed to make any payments to Plaintiff pursuant to the divorce court’s permanent orders.

. . .

The Court can redress Plaintiff’s injury by awarding her damages in the amount of her equitable share of the funds that were transferred to Mexico. Should Michael [Schaible] ultimately pay Plaintiff pursuant to the divorce court’s permanent orders, a [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 60(b)(5) amendment of judgment would likely be appropriate. (ECF No. 82 at 13–14, 17–18.) This analysis applies with equal force to the present evidentiary dispute. As Plaintiff points out, she still has not received any of the required payments from Michael Schaible pursuant to the Permanent Orders. (ECF No. 275 at 3.) As such, if the jury determines that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff, the jury will be also entitled to consider whether—and the extent to which—Plaintiff was harmed as a result of Defendants’ conduct. Any amount that she would receive in such a scenario would come from Defendants, not Michael Schaible.

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Murphy v. Schaible, Russo & Company, C.P.A.'s, L.L.P., (D. Colo. 2022).

Murphy v. Schaible, Russo & Company, C.P.A.'s, L.L.P. (Murphy v. Schaible, Russo & Company, C.P.A.'s, L.L.P.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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