Murphy v. Marshall

159 S.W.2d 741, 203 Ark. 986, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 164
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedMarch 9, 1942
Docket4-6666
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 159 S.W.2d 741 (Murphy v. Marshall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Murphy v. Marshall, 159 S.W.2d 741, 203 Ark. 986, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 164 (Ark. 1942).

Opinion

Smith, J.

On or about January 1, 1925, the incorporated town of Lepanto was organized into an improvement district for the purpose of furnishing water to that municipality, and on the same date a second district was organized to furnish sewerage facilities to the municipality. Each district embraced the entire town, and each had its own board of commissioners. About July 1,1939, the affairs of both improvement districts were placed in the hands of a single board entitled Board of Public Utilities of the Incorporated Town of Lepanto. The members of the boards of commissioners of the two improvement districts were displaced and a different personnel took charge of the Board of Public Utilities.

After taking office the new Board caused an audit of the finances of the two improvement districts from July 1, 1937, to July 5, 1939, to be made, from which audit it appeared that appellee, Mabel Marshall, was indebted to the two districts in the total sum of $530.07. Mrs. Marshall had been secretary of both improvement districts and the tax collector for each of them.

After the shortage was discovered, a complete audit of the finances of both districts was made, which disclosed a- much larg’er shortage, the items of which will later be discussed.

Mrs. Marshall lived with her daughter Gertrude who for a period of years had made contributions to her mother’s support. Gertrude married Cantrell May 7, 1939, and as a wedding present Mrs. Marshall gave her daughter a deed to her home in the town of Lepanto and to a farm of eighty acres. Mrs. Marshall had acquired the land through her husband, Gertrude’s father. This deed was not filed for record until September 13, 1939. On the date of the execution and delivery of this deed the first audit had not been made.

The purpose of the audit was to set up a new bookkeeping system, as the books had previously been irregularly kept. Indeed, Mrs. Marshall testified that no books had been furnished her for keeping the accounts of the two districts of which she was secretary and for which she had collected the taxes.

It was prayed that.the deed from Mrs. Marshall to her daughter be canceled as having been executed in fraud of the new Board as a creditor. This is very strenuously denied by both Mrs. Marshall and her daughter. On the contrary, Mrs. Marshall insists that she was not indebted to either of the improvement districts, not even for the $530.07 which she paid. She testified that she paid this sum only because she was sick and unable to go through her administration of her offices of secretary and collector, which involved many transactions beginning in 1925, and that she paid the sum in full acquittance of all demands* against her for the benefit of both of the improvement districts. In addition, Mrs. Marshall pleaded the statute of limitations.

It does not definitely appear which of these pleas was sustained; but it is fairly inferable that the decree dismissing the complaint as being without equity was based upon the finding that Mrs. Marshall was not indebted to either district in any sum.

As has been stated, this suit is predicated upon the theory that Mrs. Marshall is short in her accounts, and, in arriving at what is claimed to be the amount of the shortage, the auditor proceeded upon the theory that appellee was entitled to a credit of only $25 per month for her services as secretary of the two districts, with an additional salary of $25 per month for four months while engaged in collecting taxes, making a total salary of $400 per year.

It appears that Mrs. Marshall’s salary, whatever it may have been, was paid in full to April 30,1926. Thereafter it was paid at irregular intervals, and at times when the districts had funds available for that purpose. Generally, the revenues of the districts were used in paying maturing- bonds, interest thereon and operating-expenses, so that appellee’s salary was not paid regularly, although she took credit therefor and was paid when funds were available.- Mrs. Marshall served the two districts from the date of their organization to July 9,1939, and the amount of her salary from April 30, 1926, to July 9, 1939, is the principal question of fact in the case.

She was originally employed at a salary of $25 per month,'which was increased by $25 per month for four months while taxes were being- collected. But the business and finances of both districts had become much involved, taxes were paid at irregular intervals and by many landowners not at all. Numerous delinquencies occurred, and there were mány foreclosures of the districts’ taxes, with sales to the districts for a lack of bidders. Commissioners of the old districts testified that it was their policy to offer inducements to property owners to redeem their lands so that they might be returned to the tax books.' There was no fixed or limited time within which taxes should be paid. The tax books were kept continuously open. Mrs. Marshall was furnished no office, and used her home for that purpose. She became the factotum- for both districts. Complaints about service were made to her, and much of her time was occupied in remedying them. The commissioners directed Mrs. Marshall to place a telephone in her office at the expense of the district.

Unquestionably,'when Mrs. Marshall was first employed, her salary was fixed at $25 per month; but equally unquestioned is the fact' that it was soon raised $25 additional for four months, during which time the taxes were supposed to be collected; and we think the testimony establishes very clearly that it was agreed that as the tax books were kept open all the time she should have an additional $25 per month for the entire year. Such was the testimony of a majority of the members of both old boards, and no member of either of the old boards definitely disputed that fact.

As has been said, this is the principal item in controversy as the auditor’s report was based upon the assumption that Mrs. Marshall was entitled to an additional $25 credit for only four months each year. The commissioners of the improvement districts testified that they held regular monthly meetings at which time Mrs. Marshall submitted reports of her collections and disbursements which showed that she was charging the $25 per month for the entire year, and her reports were approved.

A commissioner who had served as such during nearly the whole course of Mrs. Marshall’s employment, testified that all kinds of compromises were made Avith the taxpayers to induce them to pay taxes. Many deeds were executed to persons who had permitted their lands to be sold to the districts under decrees foreclosing the lien for delinquent taxes. Mrs. Marshall paid notary fees on these deeds amounting to $150. The auditor charged Mrs. Marshall in his report with the total recited consideration of all these deeds.

It appears that through private subscription a deep well had been drilled which the district had taken over, and in several instances credits for taxes were allowed to the extent of the contributions to the drilling of the well made by owners of lands in the district. Mrs. Marshall makes the showing that considerations recited in the deeds amounting to $708.22 were not paid to her.

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Bluebook (online)
159 S.W.2d 741, 203 Ark. 986, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 164, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murphy-v-marshall-ark-1942.