Murphy v. Automated Accounts Inc

E.D. Washington

Murphy v. Automated Accounts Inc

District Court, E.D. Washington·Decided May 28, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00030·Unknown

Opinion

FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON May 28, 2021

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON JACLYN MURPHY, No. 2:20-cv-00030-SMJ Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AUTOMATED ACCOUNTS, INC., Defendants.

Before the Court, without oral argument, is Defendant Automated Accounts, Inc.’s Motion to for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 19. Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim and that there is no genuine issue of material fact whether Defendant made a material misrepresentation. Id. The Court is fully informed and denies the motion. Plaintiff owed a debt for legal services, to which Defendant, a debt collector, was assigned. ECF No. 23 at 1–2. Plaintiff called Defendant twice to discuss the debt, which she disputed. Id. at 2. During the second call, Plaintiff alleges, Defendant told her that it had reported the debt to consumer reporting agencies. Id. She alleges that this representation caused her emotional distress. ECF No. 25 at 1. That week, Plaintiff alleges she ran her credit report, and the debt did not appear. ECF No. 23 at 2. Defendant contends this is because, although it had designated the

debt for reporting before the phone call, the system it used at the time did not upload until the end of each month, at which time “active reporting time” would begin. ECF No. 22 at 2. About six months later, a monitoring service informed Plaintiff

that Automated Accounts stopped reporting the debt to Transunion, one of the major consumer reporting agencies. ECF No. 23 at 3. Courts must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it could affect the suit’s outcome under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party based on the undisputed evidence. Id. The moving party bears the “burden of establishing the nonexistence of a ‘genuine issue.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). “This burden has two distinct components: an initial burden

of production, which shifts to the nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and an ultimate burden of persuasion, which always remains on the moving party.” Id.

Under Rule 56(c), “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court will consider only admissible evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir.

2002). The nonmoving party may not defeat a properly supported motion with mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. The court must take as true the nonmoving party’s evidence and draw “all justifiable inferences” in the nonmoving party’s favor. Id. at 255. That said, the “mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence” will not defeat summary judgment. Id. at 252. A. Standing

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action because she does not identify an injury in fact. ECF No. 19 at 2–7. The Court must first address this threshold issue. 1. Legal Standard

The Constitution limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const Art. III § 2. Without a case or controversy, courts may not hear the matter and must dismiss it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),

(h)(3). The Supreme Court has identified three requirements that constitute the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. at 561. At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff “can no longer rest on . . . ‘mere allegations’ but must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific evidence.’” Id. There is no standing when the alleged violations of a consumer protection statute are purely procedural or technical or when the violations of those provisions do not tend to create a risk of concrete harm. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.” Id. at 1548. In other words, it must be “‘real’ and not ‘abstract.’” Id. “‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’ Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, . . . intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.” Id. at 1549. An injury, for standing purposes, need not be large nor precisely quantifiable. United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973). To determine whether

an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, courts analyze whether the alleged harm has a “close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts” as well as the history

and judgment of Congress. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 2. Analysis In its motion, Defendant mischaracterizes the nature of Plaintiff’s grievance.1 The source of Plaintiff’s alleged harm does not stem from the fact that Defendant

had not reported her debt—indeed, as it points out, that would be to Plaintiff’s benefit. Instead, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s false statement caused her injury.

Under the FDCPA, A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . .

1 This mischaracterization continues in its reply. Defendant states that “[t]he entire premise that someone could suffer severe emotional distress from the lack of credit reporting is ludicrous.” ECF No. 30 at 3. Again, the distress alleged stems from Defendant telling Plaintiff it had reported the debt—not the lack of reporting. (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI