Muro v. Gipson

District Court, S.D. California·Decided April 25, 2022·No. 3:22-cv-00550·Unknown

Opinion

ANTONIO MURO, Case No.: 22cv0550 LL (JLB)

Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING CASE v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND NOTICE OF OPTIONS DUE TO CONNIE GIPSON, et al., FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE Respondents. COURT REMEDIES Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2019 San Diego County Superior Court conviction in case number SCE383359, for which Petitioner was sentenced to 26 years to life. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the habeas action without prejudice. Petitioner has not paid the $5.00 filing fee and has not filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Because this Court cannot proceed until Petitioner has either paid the filing fee or qualified to proceed in forma pauperis, the Petition is subject to dismissal without prejudice. See Rule 3(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. /// /// FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION AS TO ALL CLAIMS IN PETITION Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison must first exhaust state judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“[A] state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”) “A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement if: (1) he has ‘fairly presented’ his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it,” which in this case is the California Supreme Court, “or (2) [s]he demonstrates that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”) Additionally, the claims presented in the federal courts must be the same as those exhausted in state court and must also allege, in state court, how one or more of his federal rights have been violated. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 276 (“Only if the state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies. Accordingly, we have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.”); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.”) In the instant Petition, Petitioner indicates Ground One was raised in the petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court, which was denied by the state supreme court on December 30, 2020 (see ECF No. 1 at 2, 6), while Ground Two has been raised in a habeas petition filed on March 21, 2022, which currently remains pending before the California Supreme Court. (See id. at 4, 7, 10.) It appears Petitioner has filed a “mixed” petition, that is, a petition which presents both exhausted and unexhausted claims. In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that a mixed petition is subject to dismissal because it violates the “total exhaustion rule” required in habeas petitions brought pursuant to § 2254, but that a petitioner must be permitted an opportunity to cure that defect prior to dismissal. Id. at 514-20. Having preliminarily determined the Petition contains both an exhausted and an unexhausted claim, the Court notifies Petitioner of his options. i) First Option: Demonstrate Exhaustion Petitioner may file further papers with this Court to demonstrate that he has in fact exhausted all of the claims in the Petition. If Petitioner chooses this option, these papers are due no later than June 21, 2022. Respondent may file a reply by July 21, 2022. ii) Second Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claim. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition containing only exhausted claims. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21 (stating that a petitioner who files a mixed petition may dismiss his petition to “return[] to state court to exhaust his claims”). If Petitioner chooses this second option, he must file a pleading with this Court no later than June 21, 2022. Respondent may file a reply by July 21, 2022. Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year from when his conviction became final to file his federal petition, unless he can show that statutory or equitable “tolling” applies. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).1 The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.”); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a state application for post-conviction relief which is ultimately dismissed as untimely was neither “properly filed” nor “pending” while it was under consideration by the state court, and therefore does not toll the statute of limitations), as amended 439 F.3d 993. However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations continues to run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-82. /// ///

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