Murdock v. Scheffel

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-1899
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ZANE MURDOCK,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:24-cv-1899 (ACR) v.

SAVILE INVESTMENTS PTY. LTD,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Zane Murdock filed suit against Defendants Savile Investments Pty. Ltd., Dowd

Scheffel PLLC, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) asserting claims

under the Lanham Act and common law. Dkt. 16. The Court dismissed the claims against Dowd

Scheffel and the USPTO; it also dismissed Plaintiff’s extortion claim against all Defendants.

Minute Order (Apr. 30, 2025). Plaintiff’s dispute with the remaining Defendant, Savile

Investments, arises from Defendant’s use of the HUCK mark. Plaintiff contends he was the first

to use the mark and argues that Defendant’s subsequent use and trademark registration for

HUCK constitute trademark infringement and fraud. Dkt. 16 at 3–4.

Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for failure to state a

claim. Dkt. 30. Having considered the parties submissions and relevant case law, the Court

GRANTS Defendant’s Motion, id., and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Dkt. 16,

with prejudice.

Pleadings by pro se litigants are subject to “less stringent standards[.]” Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even under the liberal pleading standard, however, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim for federal trademark infringement, common-law

trademark infringement, or fraud.

To prevail on his federal trademark infringement claim, Plaintiff “must show (1) that he

owns a valid trademark, (2) that his trademark is distinctive or has acquired a secondary

meaning, and (3) that there is a substantial likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff’s mark

and the alleged infringer’s mark.” Globalaw Ltd. v. Carmon & Carmon L. Offs., 452 F. Supp. 2d

1, 26 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation modified). Even if the Court assumes Plaintiff has sufficiently

plead the first element, his claim nonetheless fails on the remaining two. Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint alleges no facts to establish that his trademark is distinctive or has acquired secondary

meaning, and he has not pled that there is substantial likelihood of confusion between his mark

and Defendants. Therefore, the Court must dismiss his federal trademark infringement claim.

The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s common-law trademark infringement claim.

Common-law trademark infringement is evaluated under the same standard as federal trademark

infringement. See Ward One Democrats, Inc. v. Woodland, 898 A.2d 356, 361 (D.C. 2006).

Because Plaintiff’s federal law claim fails, so too must his common-law claim.

Plaintiff’s fraud claim fares no better. “[U]nder District of Columbia law, 1 a plaintiff

claiming fraud must prove that (1) the defendant made a false representation; (2) in reference to

material fact; (3) with knowledge of its falsity; (4) with the intent to deceive the plaintiff; (5) the

plaintiff acted in reasonable reliance on that representation; (6) which consequently resulted in

provable damages.” Cordoba Initiative Corp. v. Deak, 900 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 (D.D.C. 2012)

(citation modified). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains “[t]hreadbare” and “conclusory

statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009). Plaintiff merely states that Defendant

1 Since none of the trademark provisions that Plaintiff relies on identifies a statutory basis for his fraud claim, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s cause of action as common-law fraud. 2 “had prior knowledge of Plaintiff when [Defendant] commenced business.” Dkt. 16 at 4. This,

alone, is not enough to “allow[] the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. And because Plaintiff does not

“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud,” he cannot prevail on his claim.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Greensburg, 581 F. Supp. 3d 176, 189

(D.D.C. 2022).

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and this case with prejudice. 2 The Court also

GRANTS Defendant’s request for leave to file a motion for an award of attorney’s fees. See id.

at 33. Pursuant to this District’s procedures on motions for attorney’s fees, the Court ORDERS

“the parties to confer and to attempt to reach agreement on fee issues.” LCvR 54.2(a). The

parties shall contact the Courtroom Deputy to schedule a status conference on or before January

12, 2026, and shall file a joint status report updating the Court on the progress of this matter at

least four days before the conference. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum

Opinion shall issue this day.

Date: November 12, 2025 _________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge

2 The Court believes an amendment at this stage would be futile and prejudicial to Defendant. Also, Plaintiff has stated that he “will not be filing a second amended complaint.” Dkt. 29 at 1. 3