Muntaser Judeh v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 01-24-00770-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued July 9, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00770-CR ——————————— MUNTASER JUDEH, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 230th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1763638

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant, Muntaser Judeh, guilty of burglary of a habitation with

intent to commit assault. The jury assessed punishment at eighteen years’

confinement. In his sole issue on appeal, Judeh argues that the evidence is insufficient to

sustain his conviction. He contends that the evidence did not show his intent to

commit assault at the time he entered the apartment. In so arguing, he relies on his

testimony and version of events—rather than the victim’s.

But the jury is the judge of credibility of witnesses; it was not required to

believe his version of events over the victim’s. And under the standard of review, on

this record, we conclude that the evidence sufficed. We thus affirm.

BACKGROUND

On March 13, 2022, Judeh went to the apartment of his girlfriend, Zayra

Hernandez-Cacho. Hernandez-Cacho’s sister, Wendy Luna, was inside the

apartment preparing for a barbecue. Judeh and Luna dispute the details of what

happened when Judeh arrived at the apartment. But it is undisputed that Judeh

assaulted Luna that day.

Judeh fled prior to police arrival. He was later apprehended and ultimately

indicted for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit assault.

The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Judeh guilty. Judeh was

sentenced to eighteen years in prison with an enhancement charge for a past offense.

Judeh appealed.

2 DISCUSSION

Judeh argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for burglary

because it fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the intent to commit

assault at the time of entry. On this record, and under the applicable standard of

review, we disagree and affirm.

A. Standard of Review and Background Law

The standard of review here is well settled. In a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge like this one, “we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences

therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007).

Importantly here, we defer to the jury to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh

evidence, and draw reasonable inferences. Id. The jury, as the sole judge of the facts

and the credibility of the witnesses, may choose to believe or disbelieve any witness

or any portion of their testimony—and we may not substitute in our views for theirs.

Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); see TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. arts. 36.13, 38.04 (jury is exclusive judge of facts and weight a witness’s

testimony should be given). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we

3 presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that

determination.” Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a

defendant’s guilt—and circumstantial evidence can be sufficient. Carrizales v. State,

414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). If the cumulative force of all the

incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction, each fact need

not point directly and independently to guilt. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

“The key question is whether ‘the evidence presented actually supports a

conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.’” Morgan v.

State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Williams v. State, 235

S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

B. Law Governing the Offense

A person commits burglary if, without the owner’s effective consent, he enters

a habitation not open to the public with intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.02(a)(1). A person enters a habitation if any part of the body

intrudes into the building. Id. § 30.02(b)(1). A person acts with intent “when it is his

conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Id.

§ 6.03(a).

Intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault is an essential element of a burglary

offense; it must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Coleman v. State,

4 832 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d). Mere

speculation or surmise is insufficient to establish intent. Id.

Here, the dispute centers on whether evidence showed beyond a reasonable

doubt that Judeh entered with an intent to commit assault. A person commits an

assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1). “Bodily injury means physical pain . . . or any

impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8).

Under settled Texas law, the intent element necessary to establish burglary

must be present at the time of entry into the house. LaPoint v. State, 750 S.W.2d

180, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). “If the intent relied upon by the State is formed

after the entry, the crime of burglary has not been shown.” Coleman, 832 S.W.2d at

413.

In proving intent, direct evidence is not necessary. “As a question of fact for

the jury . . . , intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.” LaPoint,

750 S.W.2d at 182.

C. The evidence is legally sufficient to support Judeh’s conviction.

The question in this appeal is whether the evidence permitted a rational jury

to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Judeh intended to commit assault at the time

he entered the apartment. It did.

5 Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, evidence (the testimony of

Luna) showed that Luna and Hernandez-Cacho attempted to prevent Judeh from

entering the apartment when he arrived by holding the front door closed. Luna

testified that she and her sister were having a barbecue when Luna saw Judeh

approaching the apartment, uninvited. Luna stated that she “was terrified” of Judeh

and she screamed when she saw him approaching. She attested Hernandez-Cacho

told her to “stop him” from entering the apartment. Luna explained that, despite their

attempts to block him from entering, Judeh nevertheless forced the door open by

wedging his foot into the doorway, shouted “bitch, come here,” reached inside the

apartment, grabbed Luna by the hair, and dragged her out onto the porch.

Luna testified that he then assaulted her. Luna sustained significant injuries,

including a subconjunctival hemorrhage, abrasions, contusion, lacerations, and an

orbital fracture. Judeh fled before police arrived.

Judeh’s testimony painted a different picture. He testified that his girlfriend,

Hernandez-Cacho, invited him to the barbecue and was on the front porch with Judeh

for 20–30 minutes prior to the assault. He claims he never attempted to enter the

apartment, and that Luna came onto the porch with a steak knife and began attacking

him. Judeh testified that the injuries to Luna were a result of Judeh attempting to

resist her attack.

6 When the jury is faced with conflicting testimony like this, it is the jury’s role

to resolve the conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the

exclusive province of the jury. Id.

Here, the jury was not required to accept Judeh’s versions of events. Instead,

as the sole judge of witness credibility, the jury was free to disbelieve his testimony

and, rather, to credit Luna’s testimony. See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–26; see also

Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614 (jury free to believe or disbelieve witness testimony). We

defer to the jury’s credibility determination. Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166,

178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). As explained, “[w]hen the record supports conflicting

inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and

defer to that determination.” Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–26.

Moreover, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict

(as we are instructed to do), the jury could have rationally inferred that Judeh

intended to assault Luna at the moment of entry. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (we

view evidence in light most favorable to verdict and defer to jury to weigh evidence

and draw reasonable inferences therefrom).

“One’s acts are generally reliable circumstantial evidence of one’s intent . . . .”

Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citation modified);

7 see also LaPoint, 750 S.W.2d at 182 (jury may infer intent from defendant’s conduct

and surrounding facts and circumstances); Baum v. State, 848 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex.

App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (in inferring defendant’s intent, jury is

entitled to consider events that occurred before, during, and after commission of

offense).

Luna’s testimony, which the jury was free to believe, presented Judeh’s entry

and assaultive conduct together: according to her testimony, he arrived at the

apartment and immediately tried to enter; he forced the door open against the

occupants’ best efforts to keep him out; he shouted “bitch, come here,” while he

intruded into the apartment; he immediately grabbed Luna by the hair and pulled her

outside—and then he beat her. Under these circumstances, a jury could reasonably

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Judeh’s intent to assault was present at the

time of his entry into the apartment. See, e.g., McIntosh v. State, 297 S.W.3d 536,

541 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (evidence sufficient to support

conviction of burglary with intent to commit assault when defendant broke window

to gain entry to his ex-girlfriend’s house when no one would open the door, broke

down door, and had history of violence against ex-girlfriend); see also Houston v.

State, No. 01-10-00318-CR, 2011 WL 6014663, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Dec. 1, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (evidence

sufficient to support conviction for burglary with intent to commit assault when

8 defendant kicked in victim’s door late at night, entered while armed and masked,

and had previously stated that he went there to confront or “f***” victim); Macri v.

State, 12 S.W.3d 505, 507–08 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d) (evidence

sufficient to support conviction for burglary with intent to commit assault when

accused broke into house through window carrying handgun and knife and

continually asked, “Where is she?” before leaving).

This case is similar to Coleman v. State, in which this Court held that the jury

could infer intent to commit aggravated assault from the surrounding circumstances

of the defendant’s entry and conduct. 832 S.W.2d at 414–15. There, like here, the

defendant argued that his assaultive intent arose only after entry. Id. But, as the Court

explained, the jury was permitted to reject his explanation when considering the

evidence as a whole, which contained contrary evidence. Id. The same is true here.

As explained, the jury here was free to reject Judeh’s assertion that he acted only in

response to Luna’s alleged attack; the jury could instead have credited Luna’s

testimony and inferred from her description of his forced entry, his immediate

seizure of her, and his assault that he intended to assault her when he entered.

Finally, our conclusion accords with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision

in Conrad v. State, relied upon by Judeh. 230 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950).

There, the defendant was charged with burglary with intent to commit rape, but the

undisputed evidence showed that the defendant formed his intent to rape the injured

9 party only after he entered the house. Id. at 226–27. But applying the reasoning in

that case results in affirming this one. Unlike in that case, here, there was conflicting,

contradictory evidence relevant to when he formed his intent. The jury was the judge

of credibility and free to believe the evidence and infer Judeh’s intent at the time of

entry.

Considering the cumulative force of the evidence and deferring to the jury’s

credibility determinations, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that Judeh entered the habitation without effective consent and with intent to

commit assault. We overrule Judeh’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jennifer Caughey Justice

Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Johnson, and Dokupil.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).