Munsey v. Virginian Ry. Co.

39 F. Supp. 881, 8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1059, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3078
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedAugust 7, 1941
DocketC. A. 117
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 39 F. Supp. 881 (Munsey v. Virginian Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Munsey v. Virginian Ry. Co., 39 F. Supp. 881, 8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1059, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3078 (E.D. Va. 1941).

Opinion

WYCHE, District Judge.

This action was brought pursuant to Section 3, First (p), of a statute of the United States known as the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, First (p). The purpose of the action is to enforce an award and order of a tribunal established by that Act and known as the National Railroad Adjustment Board.

The complaint alleges in substance that the plaintiff System Federation No. 40 of the Railway Employees’ Department of the American Federation of Labor is the duly and legally selected representative of the machinists, boilermakers, blacksmiths, electrical workers, sheet metal workers, car-men and their various helpers and apprentices employed by the defendant Railway Company, that the action is brought by the plaintiff System Federation as the representative of said employees, and that the defendant is a carrier subject to the said Railway Labor Act; that during the year 1925, defendant hired certain employees known as turbine and switchboard operators to perform certain services at a [882]*882then newly erected power house of the defendant located at Narrows, Virginia, and that the operations carried on at this power house are a part of the operations of the defendant’s Mechanical Department conducted under the supervision of Mechanical Department supervisors.

It is also alleged that on or about November 15, 1922, the defendant and its Mechanical Department employees then represented by an organization known as the Mechanical Department Association of The Virginian Railway Company, entered into a collective bargaining agreement prescribing rules and wprking conditions for the Mechanical Department employees of the defendant, and that the said agreement is still in full force and effect; that the work performed by the turbine and switchboard operators at the Narrows, Virginia power house is within the scope of the aforesaid agreement, and that it falls within the functions of the Mechanical Department of the defendant.

It is further stated in the complaint that the turbine and switchboard operators aforesaid have not been compensated for over-time work in accordance with the rules set up in the said collective bargaining agreement; that a dispute arose between the plaintiff System Federation and the defendant growing out of these facts; that this dispute was handled up to the chief operating officer of the carrier with whom the employees were authorized to confer;' that no .adjustment could be reached; that plaintiff System Federation acting in all respects as the representative of the turbine and switchboard operators duly submitted the dispute to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for adjustment; that the said Board accepted jurisdiction of the said dispute and subsequently entered an award and order sustaining the position of the plaintiff System Federation; that the defendant protested said award and' order and requested reconsideration which the Board denied, and that the defendant has refused to comply .with the award and order in question. The complaint concludes with a prayer to the court asking that the defendant be ordered to comply with the award either through injunction, mandamus, or other appropriate decree, that an accounting be made of all sums due from the defendant to the turbine and switchboard operators in the premises, for attorney fees, and general legal and equitable relief.

The matter is before me upon a motion by defendant to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) The plaintiffs were not the petitioners or the person for whose benefit the said award was entered; (2) the award is insufficient and too indefinite to require compliance therewith, and (3) no judgment may be entered for the plaintiffs or any of them in this action.

As to the first ground of the motion, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff System Federation submitted this dispute to the Adjustment Board, that it was accordingly the “petitioner” before that Board, and that as such it now brings this action by virtue of Section 3, First (p), of the Railway Labor Act, a portion of which reads as follows: “If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment Board within the time limit in such order, the petitioner, or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the District Court of the United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the carrier operates, a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims relief, and the order of the division of the Adjustment Board in the premises.” (Emphasis supplied) It is the contention of the defendant that the Act does not authorize a labor organization to function as a petitioner before the Board, but on the other hand, “the only parties who are entitled under the Railway Labor Act to present a petition to the National Railroad Adjustment Board are employees of a carrier.” Hence the defendant concludes that the plaintiff System Federation had no proper status before the Board as a “petitioner” in the first instance, and therefore cannot bring .this action as such petitioner.

The Railway Labor Act provides that all disputes between a carrier and its employees shall be considered, and if possible, decided in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer by the carrier and the employees involved in the dispute. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Second. Employees are granted the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Fourth. In case of a dispute between a carrier and its employees arising out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements, it is provided that it shall be the duty of the designated representatives of [883]*883the carrier and of the employees, respectively, to confer regarding the same. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Sixth. Upon certification of an employee representative by the National Mediation Board, the carrier is required to treat with the representative so certified, for all of the purposes of the Act. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Ninth. It is further provided that disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier involved. 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, First (i).

Furthermore, Section 3, First (p), above quoted, provides that the right to obtain a judicial review of the orders of the Board is confined to those cases where the carrier does not comply with such orders. It follows that the statutory remedy is only available in those cases where the carrier is the unsuccessful party before the Board. Had Congress intended that employees were the only parties authorized to petition the Board the phrase, “or any person for whose benefit such order was made” would have been sufficient to describe the only parties entitled to maintain actions in the courts. The phrase, “the petitioner or any person for whose benefit such order was made” indicates an intention that some one other than the employees was authorized to petition the Board. To conclude otherwise would render the phrase, “the petitioner” ineffective.

These provisions of the Act clearly contemplate that collective bargaining on the railroads should be handled by representatives of carriers and employees. It is a matter of common knowledge that the employee representatives are almost invariably labor organizations.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
39 F. Supp. 881, 8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1059, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3078, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/munsey-v-virginian-ry-co-vaed-1941.