Munroe v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Munroe v. State

177 So. 3d 320, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 15907, 2015 WL 6449374

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedOctober 26, 2015

DocketNo. 1D15-1202

StatusPublished

This text of 177 So. 3d 320 (Munroe v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Munroe v. State, 177 So. 3d 320, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 15907, 2015 WL 6449374 (Fla. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Anticipating our decision in Baker v. State, 164 So.3d 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, reading “the plain language of section 316.605(1), Florida Statutes [], to mean that a license tag’s alphanumeric designation may not be obstructed by any matter.” Id. at 151, 155 (noting that “the statutory catchall phrase ‘other obscuring matter’ does not distinguish from obscuring matter ‘on’ the license tag versus external matter obscuring the tag”); see State v. English, 148 So.3d 529, 529-30 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that, under the plain reading of section 316.605(1), an officer had the authority to stop a vehicle where the license tag’s alphanumeric designation was obstructed by a hanging tag light and its attached wires), review granted, English v. State, 171 So.3d 115 (Fla.2015). But see Harris v. State, 11 So.3d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (concluding that section 316.605(1) requires a “license plate [to] be free from obscuring matter, be it grease, grime, or some other material placed over the plate,” but that “Matters external to the tag, such as trailer hitches, bicycle racks, handicap chairs, u-hauls, and the like are not covered by the statute.”). As we did in Baker, we certify conflict with Harris.

Affirmed; conflict certified.

BENTON, ROWE, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Anticipating our decision in Baker v. State, 164 So.3d 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, reading “the plain language of section 316.605(1), Florida Statutes [], to mean that a license tag’s alphanumeric designation may not be obstructed by any matter.” Id. at 151, 155 (noting that “the statutory catchall phrase ‘other obscuring matter’ does not distinguish from obscuring matter ‘on’ the license tag versus external matter obscuring the tag”); see State v. English, 148 So.3d 529, 529-30 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that, under the plain reading of section 316.605(1), an officer had the authority to stop a vehicle where the license tag’s alphanumeric designation was obstructed by a hanging tag light and its attached wires), review granted, English v. State, 171 So.3d 115 (Fla.2015). But see Harris v. State, 11 So.3d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (concluding that section 316.605(1) requires a “license plate [to] be free from obscuring matter, be it grease, grime, or some other material placed over the plate,” but that “Matters external to the tag, such as trailer hitches, bicycle racks, handicap chairs, u-hauls, and the like are not covered by the statute.”). As we did in Baker, we certify conflict with Harris.

Affirmed; conflict certified.

BENTON, ROWE, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.

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177 So. 3d 320, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 15907, 2015 WL 6449374, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/munroe-v-state-fladistctapp-2015.

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