Munoz v. Saul

Opinion

RAUL M., Case No.: 3:20-cv-02378-AGS Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) FEES (ECF 24) v. Martin O’MALLEY, Defendant. Plaintiff’s counsel moves unopposed for $15,716.50 in attorney’s fees after successfully recovering past-due Social Security benefits for plaintiff. (ECF 24, at 1); see 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Plaintiff received $62,866.00 in past-due benefits, meaning counsel’s request represents 25% of the recovery. (ECF 24, at 3.) “Under § 406(b), when a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may award a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53, 59 (2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A)) (cleaned up and emphasis omitted). In a § 406(b) award, courts must “respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements’” and assess the fee agreement for reasonableness. Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002)). Although § 406(b) “does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is reasonable,” fee agreements are generally presumed valid unless they exceed an award of 25 percent of past due benefits. Id.; see also Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (noting courts are “deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts in § 406(b) cases, accepting that the resulting de facto hourly rates may exceed those for non contingency-fee arrangements”). This is because “basing a reasonableness determination on a simple hourly rate basis is inappropriate when an attorney is working pursuant to a reasonable contingency contract for which there runs a substantial risk of loss.” Hearn, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1037. Yet fee awards can be reduced if representation is “substandard.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Several factors may be considered when assessing reasonableness: “(1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved; (3) whether the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases.” Avina v. Saul, No. 18-CV-1728 W (MSB), 2021 WL 2662309, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2021). Plaintiff agreed to a contingency fee “to receive 25% of Plaintiff's back benefits in the event of an award.” (ECF 24, at 3; see also ECF 24-3, at 1.) Because the fee is no more /than 25 percent of the award, it is presumptively valid unless counsel’s representation was substandard. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Counsel prepared a “written argument as well /as oral argument” for a case involving “a step-two denial.” (ECF 24, at 4.) Counsel won a remand here and got past-due benefits awarded at the agency. (See ECF 24, at 3.) She “spent a total of 33.3 hours on Plaintiffs case for an effective hourly rate of $471.96.” (ECF 24, at 4.) This is a reasonable amount of time and hourly rate. See Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1214 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that “33.75 hours spent by plaintiff's }counsel” was reasonable based on “a survey of several dozen [Social Security fee] cases’’); Christopher R. B. v. Colvin, No. 8:23-CV-00249-BFM, 2025 WL 26796, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2025) (noting that an “$876” per hour effective “rate is well within the rates that the Ninth Circuit and courts in this District have approved”). Counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is GRANTED. Counsel for plaintiff is entitled to $15,716.50 out of plaintiff's past-due benefits. Dated: January 17, 2025 f. Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge