Munoz v. Saul

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 RAUL M., Case No.: 3:20-cv-02378-AGS 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) FEES (ECF 24) 5 v. 6 Martin O’MALLEY, 7 Defendant. 8 9 Plaintiff’s counsel moves unopposed for $15,716.50 in attorney’s fees after 10 successfully recovering past-due Social Security benefits for plaintiff. (ECF 24, at 1); see 11 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Plaintiff received $62,866.00 in past-due benefits, meaning 12 counsel’s request represents 25% of the recovery. (ECF 24, at 3.) 13 “Under § 406(b), when a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant who was 14 represented before the court by an attorney, the court may award a reasonable fee for such 15 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 16 claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53, 59 17 (2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A)) (cleaned up and emphasis omitted). In a 18 § 406(b) award, courts must “respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 19 agreements’” and assess the fee agreement for reasonableness. Crawford v. Astrue, 20 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002)). Although 21 § 406(b) “does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is 22 reasonable,” fee agreements are generally presumed valid unless they exceed an award of 23 25 percent of past due benefits. Id.; see also Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 24 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (noting courts are “deferential to the terms of contingency fee 25 contracts in § 406(b) cases, accepting that the resulting de facto hourly rates may exceed 26 those for non contingency-fee arrangements”). This is because “basing a reasonableness 27 determination on a simple hourly rate basis is inappropriate when an attorney is working 28 pursuant to a reasonable contingency contract for which there runs a substantial risk of 1 || loss.” Hearn, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1037. Yet fee awards can be reduced if representation is 2 “substandard.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Several factors may be considered when 3 || assessing reasonableness: “(1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved; 4 ||(3) whether the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct; (4) whether the benefits are large in 5 || comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record 6 ||of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases.” 7 ||Avina v. Saul, No. 18-CV-1728 W (MSB), 2021 WL 2662309, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 8 2021). 9 Plaintiff agreed to a contingency fee “to receive 25% of Plaintiff's back benefits in 10 || the event of an award.” (ECF 24, at 3; see also ECF 24-3, at 1.) Because the fee is no more 11 |/than 25 percent of the award, it is presumptively valid unless counsel’s representation was 12 || substandard. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Counsel prepared a “written argument as well 13 |/as oral argument” for a case involving “a step-two denial.” (ECF 24, at 4.) Counsel won a 14 ||remand here and got past-due benefits awarded at the agency. (See ECF 24, at 3.) She 15 “spent a total of 33.3 hours on Plaintiffs case for an effective hourly rate of $471.96.” 16 (ECF 24, at 4.) This is a reasonable amount of time and hourly rate. See Patterson v. Apfel, 17 ||99 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1214 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that “33.75 hours spent by plaintiff's 18 |}counsel” was reasonable based on “a survey of several dozen [Social Security fee] cases’’); 19 || Christopher R. B. v. Colvin, No. 8:23-CV-00249-BFM, 2025 WL 26796, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 20 || Jan. 3, 2025) (noting that an “$876” per hour effective “rate is well within the rates that the 21 || Ninth Circuit and courts in this District have approved”). 22 ORDER 23 Counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is GRANTED. 24 || Counsel for plaintiff is entitled to $15,716.50 out of plaintiff's past-due benefits. 25 Dated: January 17, 2025 26 f. 17 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 28