Munoz v. Nielsen

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: May 28, 2020
• Docket: 2:19-cv-00241
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 Maricela Luna Munoz et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-00241-RFB-EJY

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER

9 v.

10 Nielsen et al,

11 Defendants.

12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 17. The Court grants the 15 motion. 16 17 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 18 The complaint was filed in Arizona on November 26, 2018. ECF No. 1. 19 On January 3, 2019, Defendants moved to stay the case due to the federal government 20 shutdown. ECF No. 7. This motion was granted on January 10, 2019. ECF No. 9. 21 On February 5, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation to change venue which was granted 22 on February 8, 2019. ECF Nos. 12, 14. The case was transferred to the District of Nevada on the 23 same day. 24 On March 15, 2019, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ 25 of Mandamus. ECF No. 17. Plaintiffs responded on March 29, 2019, and Defendants replied on 26 April 5, 2019. ECF Nos. 21, 22. 27 The parties stipulated to stay discovery pending the Court’s ruling on the instant motion 28 on April 26, 2019 and that stipulation was granted on April 29, 2019. ECF Nos. 23, 24. 1 III. ALLEGED FACTS 2 The following facts are stated as alleged: 3 Plaintiff Felipe Naranjo Luna was born in Los Angeles, California on July 5, 1968 and, 4 thus, Plaintiff Luna has been a U.S. citizen since birth. 5 On February 17, 1985, Plaintiff Maricela Luna Munoz was born in Mexicali, Baja 6 California, Mexico. Thus, Plaintiff Luna was sixteen years old when his daughter, Plaintiff Munoz, 7 was born. At the time of Plaintiff Munoz’s birth, her mother, Marina Munoz Ponce, was not 8 married to Plaintiff Luna. Marina is not a citizen of the United States but is a lawful permanent 9 resident. Plaintiff Luna and Marina were married in Riverside, California on August 25, 1987 and 10 remain married. 11 On June 22, 2012, Plaintiff Munoz filed her Form N-600, Application for Certificate of 12 Citizenship, with Defendant USCIS. Plaintiff Munoz claims that, by law, Plaintiff Luna 13 transmitted U.S. citizenship to her at birth and that she has been a U.S. citizen her entire life. 14 On September 13, 2013, Defendant USCIS’s Phoenix Field Office in Phoenix, Arizona 15 denied Plaintiff Munoz’s Form N-600. Plaintiff Munoz appealed the Phoenix Field Office’s 16 decision to the Defendants’ Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”). 17 The applicable law for transmitting citizenship to a child born abroad out of wedlock when 18 one parent is a U.S. citizen and the other parent is not a U.S. citizen is the statute that was in effect 19 at the time of the child’s birth. Because Plaintiff Munoz was born in 1985, she is subject to the 20 laws pertaining to the transmission of U.S. citizenship which were in effect between November 21 14, 1971 and November 14, 1986. 22 Former 8 U.S.C. §1401(g), in effect at the time of Plaintiff Munoz’s birth, provided, among 23 other things, that the U.S. citizen father of a child born abroad out of wedlock must be physically 24 present in the United States for ten years prior to the child’s birth and that presence in the U.S. for 25 five of those ten years must take place after the U.S. citizen father reaches the age of fourteen years 26 old. 27 On September 27, 2016, the AAO dismissed Plaintiff Munoz’s appeal on the sole ground 28 that Plaintiff Luna could not show compliance with all of the requirements of former 8 U.S.C. 1 §1401(g) because he could not show that he had been physically present in the United States for 2 five years after he turned fourteen years old but prior to Plaintiff Munoz being born. 3 It was impossible for Plaintiff Luna to meet all of the requirements for transmitting 4 citizenship to Plaintiff Munoz set forth in former 8 U.S.C. §1401(g) because Plaintiff Luna was 5 only sixteen years old at the time of Plaintiff Munoz’s birth and, therefore, it was impossible for 6 him to accrue five years of physical presence in the United States after he turned fourteen years 7 old but prior to Plaintiff Munoz’s birth. 8 The transmission requirements set forth in former 8 U.S.C. §1401(g) thus effectively 9 prohibit any U.S. citizen parent under the age of nineteen years old from transmitting U.S. 10 citizenship at birth to his child born abroad out of wedlock between November 14, 1971 and 11 November 14, 1986. 12 The issue of Plaintiff Munoz’s citizenship is not and has not been addressed in a removal 13 proceeding. 14 The Plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies. 15 16 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 17 A. Motion to Dismiss 18 In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a pleading must contain “a short 19 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 8(a)(2). 21 In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[a]ll well-pleaded allegations 22 of material fact in the complaint are accepted as true and are construed in the light most favorable 23 to the non-moving party.” Faulkner v. ADT Security Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 24 2013). 25 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, 26 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” meaning that the court can 27 reasonably infer “that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 28 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 1 “First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim 2 may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of 3 underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively. 4 Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, 5 such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery 6 and continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 7 B. 8 U.S.C. § 1503 8 8 U.S.C. § 1503 governs jurisdiction of proceedings for declaration of United States 9 nationality, and states: 10 If any person who is within the United States claims a right or privilege as a national 11 of the United States and is denied such right or privilege by any department or 12 independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States, such person may institute an action under the provisions of 13 section 2201 of Title 28 against the head of such department or independent agency for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States, except that no 14 such action may be instituted in any case if the issue of such person's status as a 15 national of the United States (1) arose by reason of, or in connection with any removal proceeding under the provisions of this chapter or any other act, or (2) is 16 in issue in any such removal proceeding. An action under this subsection may be instituted only within five years after the final administrative denial of such right 17 or privilege and shall be filed in the district court of the United States for the district 18 in which such person resides or claims a residence, and jurisdiction over such officials in such cases is conferred upon those courts. 19 20 V. DISCUSSION 21 Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) declaring Plaintiff 22 Munoz to be a United States citizen and a Writ of Mandamus compelling Defendants to approve 23 her Form N-600 application and to issue her a Certificate of Citizenship. Plaintiffs allege former 24 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) in effect between November 14, 1971 and November 14, 1986 should be 25 declared unconstitutional for impermissible age discrimination in violation of the equal protection 26 guarantee of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 27 At the time of Plaintiff’s birth, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7), now § 1401(a)(g), declared 28 citizenship to be conferred upon, inter alia: 1 (g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its 2 outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of 3 the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less 4 than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years . . . . 5

6 Defendants in the instant motion seek to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the statute’s 7 age classification satisfies rational basis review and therefore does not violate the equal protection 8 guarantee. ECF No. 6 at 6-7. Specifically, Defendants assert Congress has a legitimate interest in 9 establishing ties between the United States and foreign-born children and the physical presence 10 requirement is rationally related to that congressional purpose, as it does not irrationally 11 discriminate against fathers under the age of nineteen and adult parents may have more of a 12 connection to the United States than young parents. Id. at 8-9 (citing United States v. Flores-Villar, 13 536 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd, 564 U.S. 210 (2011), and abrogated on other grounds 14 by Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); United States v. Perez-Toledo, 259 F. 15 App'x 915, 916 (9th Cir. 2007)). As there was no constitutional violation in denying Plaintiff 16 Munoz’s application for citizenship, denial was proper and the complaint should be dismissed. 17 Plaintiffs counter by asserting that congressional intent with regard to related provisions in 18 the statute indicates that the physical presence requirement in § 1401(g) is irrational. Specifically, 19 Plaintiffs argue that the enactment of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c), a related provision now defunct after the 20 Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017), which 21 permitted unwed U.S. citizen mothers to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children after 22 only residing in the United States for one year prior to the child’s birth, indicates that Congress 23 considered one year to be sufficient to satisfy the congressional purpose of establishing ties 24 between the United States and the foreign-born child. ECF No. 21 at 7. Further, this provision is 25 evidence of congressional belief that one year of physical residence is sufficient regardless if 26 satisfied before or after the U.S. citizen parent reached age fourteen. Id. at 7-8. The five-year 27 physical presence requirement in § 1401(g) is not therefore rationally related to the purported 28 legitimate government interest in fostering ties, as that interest is sufficiently met after a mere year 1 of physical presence. Id. at 8. Consequently, as there is no rational basis for the five-year 2 requirement, the provision discriminates against Plaintiffs on the basis of age by serving as an 3 absolute bar to Plaintiff Luna’s ability to transmit citizenship to Plaintiff Munoz. 4 The applicable equality guarantee in a case involving federal legislation is the guarantee 5 implicit in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 6 1678, 1686 n.1 (2017) (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n.2 (1975) (“[W]hile 7 the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is so 8 unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal 9 protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the 10 Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). 11 Because Plaintiff Munoz “claims [she] is, and since birth has been, a U.S. citizen,” the 12 appropriate standard of review of the Equal Protection claim before the Court is not the “facially 13 legitimate and bona fide” standard established in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). See Morales- 14 Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693-94. However, because Plaintiffs assert age discrimination, and age 15 discrimination is subject to rational basis review, the appropriate level of scrutiny is nonetheless 16 substantively the same. See id. at 1693 (describing the “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard 17 employed in Fiallo v. Bell as “rational-basis review”). 18 Age is not a suspect classification and discrimination by the government on the basis of 19 age does not offend the Constitution if the age classification is rationally related to a legitimate 20 state interest: 21 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy for other 22 qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State's legitimate 23 interests. The Constitution does not preclude reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant. “[W]here 24 rationality is the test, a State ‘does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.’” 25

26 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (citations omitted). “[B]ecause an age 27 classification is presumptively rational, the individual challenging its constitutionality bears the 28 burden of proving that the facts on which the classification is apparently based could not 1 reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” Id. at 84 (internal 2 quotations and citation omitted). 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established a plausible entitlement to relief. The 4 law in this Circuit is clear. Employing rational basis review to the precise age discrimination claim 5 made here, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly held with regard to § 1401(a)(7), that “it is not irrational 6 to believe that a United States citizen father who has spent at least five years in residence during 7 his teenage years would have more of a connection with this country to pass on than, say, a father 8 who lived in the United States between the ages of one and ten.” United States v. Flores-Villar, 9 536 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd, 564 U.S. 210 (2011), and abrogated on other grounds by 10 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). The Supreme Court’s decision in Morales- 11 Santana does not change this analysis, because though the Court was focused on the physical- 12 presence requirement, it was concerned with gender disparity, not age discrimination, and so 13 employed a higher level of scrutiny accordingly. Although Plaintiffs’ argument that the one-year 14 physical presence requirement for unwed mothers previously enacted in § 1409(c) would suggest 15 an internal inconsistency that undermines Congress’ purported interest in fostering ties between 16 the United States and the foreign-born child via a residency requirement for the citizen parent, 17 rational basis review precludes a finding that this inconsistency renders §1401(g) unconstitutional. 18 The government “does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications 19 made by its laws are imperfect.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. As such, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 20 Flores-Villar as to age discrimination continues to be good law in the wake of Morales-Santana, 21 and its holding continues to bind this Court. The Court finds that it has no discretion to deviate 22 from this binding precedent on this issue. 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 VI. CONCLUSION 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 3 | Complaint (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is instructed to close this case. 5 DATED May 28, 2020. AS 7 RICHA gD F. HOULY ARE, II 8 UNITED STAFESDISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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