Munoz v. Earthgrains Distribution, LLC

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TLALOC MUNOZ, MIGUEL RUIZ, Case No.: 3:22-cv-01269-AJB-AHG EDGAR CORONA, and 12 ORDER RESOLVING JOINT STEVEN SNAVELY, MOTION FOR DETERMINATION 13 individually and on behalf of themselves OF SECOND DISCOVERY DISPUTE and all others similarly situated, 14 AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ Plaintiffs, MOTION TO COMPEL 15

v. 16 [ECF No. 84] EARTHGRAINS DISTRIBUTION, LLC 17 and BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC., 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 22 Before the Court is Plaintiff Tlaloc Munoz, Miguel Ruiz, Edgar Corona, and 23 Steven Snavely’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and Defendant Earthgrains Distribution, LLC 24 and Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Joint Motion for 25 Determination of Second Discovery Dispute. ECF No. 84. Defendants seek an order from 26 the Court requiring Plaintiff Snavely to produce tax returns in response to Request for 27 Production (“RFP”) Nos. 11, 19, and 20. Id. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ 28 motion to compel is DENIED. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On August 26, 2022, Defendants removed this matter to federal court under the 3 Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), alleging diversity of citizenship. ECF No. 1 at 8–10 4 (Plaintiffs are citizens of California, and Defendants are citizens of Delaware and 5 Pennsylvania). On May 2, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the operative amended complaint in this 6 matter, alleging that they were misclassified as independent contractors and, thus, that 7 Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime, failed to provide meal and rest breaks, failed 8 to provide compliant wage statements, deducted certain amounts from wages, and failed to 9 reimburse necessary business expenses. ECF No. 52. Plaintiffs are current and former 10 Distributors and bring their action on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated 11 people. Id. All of Plaintiffs’ claims arise under California law. Id. at 10–18 (alleging 12 violations of California Labor Code sections 221–23, 226, 226.7, 510, and 2802; 13 California’s Industrial Wage Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order 1 sections 3, 7–9, 11–12; 14 California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (“Unfair Competition 15 Law”); and California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), California Labor Code 16 section 2698, et seq.). 17 Defendant Earthgrains Distribution, LLC (“Earthgrains”) served its first set of RFPs 18 on Plaintiffs on May 12, 2025. ECF No. 84 at 31. Relevant to this dispute, RFP No. 11 19 seeks: 20 ALL DOCUMENTS that evidence or reference ALL expenses incurred by PLAINTIFF during the time that PLAINTIFF contracted with DEFENDANT, 21 including, but not limited to, insurance policies and costs, maintenance 22 records, and any expenses for gas, parking, employee or other helper expenses, home office expenses, accountant or financial advisor expenses, 23 and tolls. 24 Id. at 23. RFP No. 19 seeks: 25 PLAINTIFF’S and his businesses’ financial records and statements (such 26 balance sheets, income statements, or any records of sales and expenses) during the time that PLAINTIFF contracted with DEFENDANT. 27 Id. at 25. RFP No. 20 seeks: 28 1 PLAINTIFF’S and his businesses’ tax returns and related schedules (federal, state and local) during the time that PLAINTIFF contracted with 2 DEFENDANT. 3 Id. at 25. RFP Nos. 11, 19, and 20 are identical across all four Plaintiffs. Id. at 3 n.1.1 4 On July 28, 2025, the parties notified the Court that they disagreed about Plaintiffs’ 5 responses to Defendant Earthgrains’s RFP Nos. 11, 19, and 20, among others. Email to 6 Chambers (Aug. 4, 2025, at 8:45 PM) (notifying Court of disputes regarding 5 of 7 Defendants’ Interrogatories and 24 of Defendants’ RFPs); see Chmb.R. at 2. The Court 8 required the parties to lodge a joint chart with the text of the requests and responses at 9 issue. ECF No. 77 at 2. The Court provided guidance to the parties regarding their disputes 10 on August 7, 2025. Email from Chambers (Aug. 7, 2025, at 7:59 PM). Plaintiffs 11 supplemented their production on August 8, 2025. Email to Chambers (Aug. 11, 2025, at 12 3:48 PM). The Court held a discovery conference regarding the remaining requests and 13 responses at issue on August 14, 2025. ECF No. 80. The Court ordered Plaintiffs to provide 14 supplemental responses by August 19, 2025, and found it appropriate to issue a briefing 15 schedule for this Joint Motion. ECF No. 81. The parties timely filed their Joint Motion for 16 Determination of Discovery Dispute on August 29, 2025. ECF No. 84. This order follows. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 District courts have broad discretion to manage discovery. Laub v. United States 19 DOI, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 20 2002); see Goro v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 334 F.R.D. 275, 283 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (denying 21 motion to compel production of tax returns, and explaining that “[d]istrict courts have wide 22 latitude in controlling discovery”) (internal citations omitted). Specifically, prior to class 23 certification, discovery lies entirely within the discretion of the court. Vinole v. 24 25

26 1 Due to discrepancies between original and imprinted page numbers, page numbers for 27 docketed materials cited in this Order refer to those imprinted by the court’s electronic case 28 filing system. 1 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kamm v. Cal. 2 City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1975)). 3 III. RELEVANCE 4 The Court will first address whether the documents sought by Defendants are 5 relevant. 6 A. Legal Standard 7 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit parties to obtain nonprivileged 8 information if it is (1) relevant to any party’s claim or defense, and (2) proportional to the 9 needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). Courts have broad discretion to determine 10 relevance for discovery purposes. Doherty v. Comenity Capital Bank, No. 16cv1321-H- 11 BGS, 2017 WL 1885677, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2017) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 12 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Youngevity Int’l, Inc. v. Smith, No. 16cv704-BTM- 13 JLB, 2017 WL 2692928, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 22, 2017). The relevance standard is 14 commonly recognized as one that is necessarily broad in scope in order “to encompass any 15 matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any 16 issue that is or may be in the case.” Doherty, 2017 WL 1885677, at *2 (internal quotation 17 omitted). The question of relevance “should be construed ‘liberally and with common 18 sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable 19 bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 20 (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)). Regardless of its broad 21 nature, however, relevance is not without “ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Doherty, 22 2017 WL 1885677, at *2. 23 Information must also be “proportional to the needs of the case” to fall within the 24 scope of permissible discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). When analyzing the 25 proportionality of a party’s discovery requests, a court should consider the importance of 26 the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to 27 the information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 28 issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 1 benefit. Id. “The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) emphasize the need to impose 2 ‘reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the common-sense concept 3 of proportionality.’” Roberts v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 2016) 4 (internal citation omitted). 5 The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request 6 satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26. Landis v. Lionbridge Techs., LLC, No. 7 2:24-cv-07494-MRA-MAR, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90151, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 8 2025); see Bryant v. Ochoa, No. 07CV200-TM-PCL, 2009 WL 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 9 May 14, 2009). Thereafter, the party opposing discovery “has the burden of showing that 10 the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting 11 its objections.” Goro, 334 F.R.D. at 283 (citations omitted). 12 B. Discussion 13 Defendants argue that inquiry into the financial and tax records of Plaintiffs’ 14 business operations is relevant to the question of misclassification. ECF No. 84 at 7. For 15 example, Defendants explain that the information is relevant to “whether Plaintiffs could 16 control the profits and losses of their businesses and the investments they made in their 17 businesses, and to the merits and damages for their underlying Labor Code violation 18 claims, such as the amounts and types of expenses they incurred in running their 19 businesses, and the amounts earned, which is necessary to calculate overtime.” Id. 20 The Court agrees that the financial information sought is relevant. See Ortolivo v. 21 Precision Dynamics Int’l, LLC, No. 22-cv-01812-JSW, 2023 WL 8237265, at *1–*2 (N.D. 22 Cal. Nov. 28, 2023) (concluding that “tax returns would contain information that would be 23 ‘relevant’ to th[e] determination” of whether plaintiff was an employee or independent 24 contractor, but denying request to compel production due to tax return privilege); 25 Bowerman v. Field Asset Servs. Inc., No. 13-cv-00057-WHO, 2013 WL 6057043, at *2– 26 *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (concluding information was relevant to issue of 27 misclassification but denying request to compel production due to tax return privilege). 28 The Court also agrees with Defendants that the specific legal test for misclassification does 1 not impact the relevance determination. ECF No. 84 at 84 (arguing relevance and 2 referencing Borello2 test and Dynamex3 ABC Test); Goro, 334 F.R.D. at 281 n.3 3 (discussing Borello and Dynamex tests and concluding that, “[u]nder either test, Plaintiffs’ 4 tax returns may be relevant, but are not necessary to determine whether they were properly 5 classified as independent contractors”). 6 Defendants, however, do not address whether the information sought is proportional 7 to the needs of the case. Landis, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90151, at *4 (“relevancy alone is 8 no longer sufficient to obtain discovery, the discovery requested must also be proportional 9 to the needs of the case”) (internal citation omitted). As Defendants have not met their 10 burden, the Court need not elaborate; however, the Court notes that Plaintiff Snavely is a 11 current Distributor, while the other plaintiffs no longer work for or with Defendants, so the 12 burden to Plaintiff Snavely is greater than the other plaintiffs. This is particularly true given 13 the private nature of this information and Defendants’ actions in using the tax returns of 14 other Plaintiffs to seek broad discovery of personal information from their accountants. 15 IV. WHETHER PLAINTIFF SNAVELY SHOULD BE COMPELLED TO 16 PRODUCE HIS TAX RETURNS 17 Next, the Court turns to whether the information is privileged or otherwise protected 18 from discovery. 19 A. Legal Standard 20 In diversity actions, questions of privilege are controlled by state law. In re Cal. Pub. 21 Util. Comm’n, 892 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1989); FED. R. EVID. 501 (“But in a civil case, 22 state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the 23 rule of decision.”). Here, all of Plaintiffs’ claims arise under California law. ECF No. 52 at 24 10–18 (alleging violations of the California Labor Code, California’s IWC Wage Order, 25

26 2 S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rel., 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989) 27 28 3 Dynamex Operations W. v. Super. Ct., 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018). 1 California’s Unfair Competition Law, and PAGA). Further, Defendants removed this 2 matter to federal court under CAFA, alleging diversity of citizenship. ECF No. 1 at 8–10 3 (Plaintiffs are citizens of California, and Defendants are citizens of Delaware and 4 Pennsylvania). As such, the Court finds that California law governs assertions of privilege 5 in this matter. See, e.g., Goro, 334 F.R.D. at 280 (finding that California law governed 6 application of the tax return privilege in a putative class action alleging violations of the 7 California Labor Code, California’s IWC Wage Order, California’s Unfair Competition 8 Law, and PAGA, that was removed to federal court by defendants due to diversity of 9 citizenship); Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 15-cv-05128-JSC, 2017 WL 1684964, at *1 10 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2017) (in a PAGA action alleging independent contractor 11 misclassification, the court explained that “Plaintiff’s complaint alleges []CAFA[] 12 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) and is therefore before the Court on diversity 13 jurisdiction, so state law controls questions of privilege”); Taylor v. Shippers Transp. 14 Express, Inc., No. 13-cv-2092-BRO-PLAx, 2014 WL 12560878, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 15 2014) (applying state law to tax privilege question in CAFA case). 16 California courts recognize a statutory privilege against disclosing tax returns. 17 Schnabel v. Super. Ct. of Orange Cnty., 5 Cal. 4th 704, 718–21 (1993); Weingarten v. 18 Super. Ct. of San Diego Cnty., 102 Cal. App. 4th 268, 274 (2002). The California tax 19 privilege applies to tax returns and records submitted with the tax returns, such as W-2 and 20 1099 forms. Brown v. Super. Ct. of the City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 71 Cal. App. 3d 21 141, 143–44 (1977) (extending tax privilege to W-2 forms because the forms “are required 22 to be attached to a taxpayer’s state and federal income tax returns [and] constitute an 23 integral part of the return”); Bowerman, 2013 WL 6057043, at *1–*3 (applying California 24 law and holding that Schedule Cs, payroll tax records, and 1099s for any employees hired 25 were protected from discovery by the tax privilege). 26 Although “‘California law affords a very strong privilege from discovery for tax 27 returns,’ the tax return privilege is not absolute.” Davis v. Bangs, No. 2:20-cv-05738-SB- 28 JDEx, 2021 WL 6882324, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021) (quoting Net-Com Servs., Inc. 1 v. Eupen Cable USA, Inc., No. 11-cv-2553-PSG-SSx, 2012 WL 12887396, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2 Nov. 14, 2012)). “The privilege will not be upheld when: (1) the circumstances indicate an 3 intentional waiver of the privilege; (2) the gravamen of the lawsuit is inconsistent with the 4 privilege; or (3) a public policy greater than that of the confidentiality of tax returns is 5 involved.” Goro, 334 F.R.D. at 280. “A trial court has broad discretion in determining the 6 applicability of a statutory privilege[,]” including the tax return privilege. Weingarten, 102 7 Cal. App. 4th at 274. “The requesting party bears the burden of demonstrating that an 8 exception to the tax privilege applies.” Goro, 334 F.R.D. at 280; Lawson, 2017 WL 9 1684964, at *2; see also Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 721. 10 B. Parties’ Positions 11 Defendants assert that the tax return privilege should not shield Plaintiff Snavely’s 12 production in this case because the gravamen of the lawsuit is inconsistent with the 13 privilege. Defendants argue that Plaintiff Snavely’s production falls short “of telling 14 Defendants or the Court much about his business, the amounts and types of investments in 15 those businesses, his reliance on and expense incurred for paid helpers, how much he paid 16 their helpers, the revenue and income of his business or provide any insight into his actual 17 damages for unpaid wages or expenses.” ECF No. 84 at 9. Defendants argue that Plaintiff 18 Snavely’s “tax returns provide what is likely the only clear picture of the nature of his 19 business[] and the harms stemming from the allegations of misconduct he has lodged at 20 Defendants.” Id. Thus, if Plaintiff Snavely does not produce additional evidence or provide 21 Defendants with the name of his business accountant, Defendants argue that he must 22 produce his tax returns. Id. at 9–10. 23 Plaintiffs contend that Plaintiff Snavely “produced hundreds of invoices/receipts 24 related to his business expenses incurred following a diligent search and reasonable 25 inquiry” and was questioned about them during his August 27, 2025, deposition. Id. at 12. 26 As such, he is resting on his tax privilege assertion with regard to producing his tax returns. 27 Id. 28 / / 1 C. Discussion 2 As the requesting party, Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that an 3 exception to the tax privilege applies. Defendants have not met their burden. The first4 and 4 third5 exceptions are not at issue here; thus, the Court will focus on the second. 5 The Court does not find that the gravamen of the instant lawsuit—i.e., the substantial 6 point or essence of a claim6—is inconsistent with the tax return privilege. See, e.g., Landis, 7 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90151, at *11 (finding that “the gravamen of Plaintiff’s lawsuit, 8 which focuses on Defendant’s alleged misclassification of him as an independent 9 contractor, is not inconsistent with the [tax return] privilege”); Goro, 334 F.R.D. at 280 10 (finding that the gravamen of a putative class action alleging violations of the California 11 Labor Code, California’s IWC Wage Order, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and 12 PAGA, was not inconsistent with the tax return privilege); Taylor, 2014 WL 12560878, at 13 *2 (finding the second factor not satisfied because “the claim by plaintiffs and the class 14 members that they have been wrongly classified as independent contractors ‘does not place 15 the contents of their tax returns and tax documents squarely into question.’”) (quoting 16 Bowerman, 2013 WL 6057043, at *2). 17 Defendants, however, argue that “[c]ourts in this district will order the production 18 of tax records in independent contractor misclassification actions[.]” ECF No. 84 at 3 19 20

21 4 Defendants do not argue, and the Court finds no evidence, that Plaintiff Snavely waived 22 his tax return privilege. 23 5 The public policy exception “is narrow and applies only when warranted by a legislatively declared public policy.” Weingarten, 102 Cal. App. 4th at 274 (citations and quotations 24 omitted). Defendants do not argue that public policy warrants waiver, and “the assertion of 25 damages claims that makes the financial information underlying tax returns relevant does not, without more, represent a greater public policy meriting waiver of the tax privilege.” 26 Goro, 334 F.R.D. at 281–82 (finding that none of the exceptions to the tax return privilege 27 applied in independent contractor misclassification class action). 28 6 1 (citing Saravia v. Dynamex, Inc., No. C-14-05003-WHA, 2016 WL 4140509 (N.D. Cal. 2 Aug. 4, 2016)). Defendants’ reliance on Saravia, however, is unpersuasive. In Saravia, a 3 Fair Labor Standards Act collective action, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that 4 California’s qualified privilege over tax records applied because the claims arose under 5 federal law. 2016 WL 4140509, at *2. As such, the court applied the federal privilege rules, 6 found that the tax returns were not privileged, and found that the plaintiffs’ privacy interests 7 did not outweigh the tax returns’ probative value. Id. at *2–*4. In contrast, here, all of 8 Plaintiffs’ claims arise under California law and Defendants removed this matter to federal 9 court under CAFA, alleging diversity of citizenship. ECF No. 52 at 10–18 (alleging 10 violations of the California Labor Code, California’s IWC Wage Order, California’s Unfair 11 Competition Law, and PAGA); ECF No. 1 at 8–10. As discussed above, California law 12 governs the application of the tax return privilege in this diversity case. Since Saravia did 13 not consider California’s qualified tax return privilege, its analysis and outcome carry little 14 weight in this dispute. 15 Defendants’ remaining arguments regarding the tax privilege focus on the 16 information being relevant; however, relevance does not necessarily mean that the 17 information goes to the essence of the lawsuit. ECF No. 84 at 8 (“Here, the gravamen of 18 the lawsuit is inconsistent with the privilege. The information in the tax returns are relevant 19 …”); Bowerman, 2013 WL 6057043, at *1–*2 (concluding information was relevant to 20 issue of misclassification but denying request to compel production, explaining that the 21 plaintiffs’ “allegation that [defendant] willfully misclassified them as independent 22 contractors does not place the contents of their tax returns and tax documents squarely into 23 question.”). Tax records “bear little if any relationship to determining” Plaintiffs’ and 24 Defendants’ employment relationship because, “[w]hile evidence of the sources of class 25 26 27 7 Of note, though Defendants reference decisions in this district, the only case they cite for that proposition is from the Northern District. Regardless of the district issuing the 28 1 members’ income, as well as the costs, investments and expenses incurred in their 2 businesses, may be relevant to a determination of whether they were misclassified, tax 3 treatment is not a ‘strong factor’ in that determination and such source of income 4 information could have been obtained through means other than their tax return.” Taylor, 5 2014 WL 12560878, at *2 (quoting Bowerman, 2013 WL 6057043, at *2 n.5). Here, 6 Defendants have had numerous ways to seek information from Plaintiff Snavely, including 7 written interrogatories, RFPs, and a deposition.8 8 Defendants have not stated that Plaintiff Snavely refused to produce those 9 documents. See Ortolivo, 2023 WL 8237265, at *2. In fact, Plaintiff Snavely has 10 committed to produce all documents in his possession, custody, and control, and explained 11 that he “will produce all responsive documents that he plans to rely on to prove his expense 12 reimbursement claim in this case.” ECF No. 84 at 81, 86 (responses to RFP Nos. 11 and 13 19). Plaintiff Snavely produced 521 pages in his first production and 292 pages in his 14 second production. Email to Chambers (Aug. 11, 2025, at 3:47 PM); Email to Chambers 15 (Aug. 11, 2025, at 4:02 PM). The 814 pages produced is much more than the first two 16 productions of the other plaintiffs. Email to Chambers (Aug. 11, 2025, at 3:47 PM) (as of 17 August 8, 2025, Plaintiff Munoz produced 403 pages, Plaintiff Ruiz produced 27 pages, 18 and Plaintiff Corona produced 566 pages). Further, it is evident to the Court that Plaintiff 19 Snavely completed a substantial third production, raising his total pages produced to at 20 least 1,369. See ECF No. 81 at 2 (requiring Plaintiffs to provide supplemental responses 21 by August 19, 2025); ECF No. 84 at 12 (referencing production bates numbers of 816–46, 22 854–74, and 1110–1369). Thus, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff Snavely produced “a 23 smattering” of documents is unpersuasive. See ECF No. 84 at 9; see id. at 12 (Plaintiffs 24 assert that “Mr. Snavely produced substantial evidence of his business expenses”). 25 Additionally, Plaintiff Snavely “was questioned by Defendants regarding those 26

27 8 Plaintiffs note that “[a]t no point during his deposition did Defendants’ counsel ask 28 1 invoices/receipts during his August 27, 2025, deposition[,]” so Defendants have had ample 2 opportunity to question him under oath regarding his business activities. ECF No. 84 3 at 9, 12. 4 For these reasons, the Court finds that no exception to the tax return privilege applies 5 here.9 6 V. WHETHER PLAINTIFF SNAVELY SHOULD BE COMPELLED TO 7 SUPPLEMENT OTHER RESPONSES 8 In a footnote, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff [Snavely] will need to materially 9 supplement [his] responses [to RFP Nos. 14, 15, or 20] or if he cannot, produce his 10 business’ tax returns.” ECF No. 84 at 9 n.4. In another footnote, Defendants argue that 11 multiple Interrogatories require Plaintiff Snavely’s accountant’s identification. Id. at 5 n.3 12 (arguing that Interrogatories Nos. 1, 3,10 7, and 12 “sought the identification of Plaintiff 13 [Snavely]’s accountant”). To the extent that Defendants are seeking to compel responses 14 to these RFPs or Interrogatories,11 the Court declines to do so. Hardiman v. Davis, No. 15 3:23-cv-00584-MMD-CLB, 2025 WL 1135255, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 17, 2025) (“the party 16 moving for an order to compel discovery bears the initial burden of informing the court: 17 (1) which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel; (2) which of the 18 responses are disputed; (3) why he believes the response is deficient; (4) why defendants’ 19 20

21 9 Additionally, the voluntary agreement by the other plaintiffs to provide their tax returns 22 or accountants’ contact information as a compromise does not create a similar obligation for Plaintiff Snavely. 23 24 10 Interrogatory No. 3 was not presented to the Court in the parties’ joint email, was not discussed during the discovery conference, and was not referenced in the Court’s Order 25 setting the briefing schedule for the instant motion. 26 11 Plaintiff Snavely’s responses to the Interrogatories are not attached as an exhibit or 27 otherwise discussed in the instant motion. See ECF No. 84 at 110–121 (Exhibit D, 28 Defendants’ Interrogatories served on Plaintiff Snavely). 1 || objections are not justified; and (5) why the information he seeks through discovery is 2 relevant to the prosecution of this action”). 3 Similarly, any requests for Plaintiff Snavely to supplement his responses to RFP 4 ||Nos. 11 and 19 beyond producing tax returns are likewise denied. Though the Court agrees 5 || with Defendants that the information sought is relevant, the Court will not compel 6 || additional responses. As discussed above, Plaintiff Snavely’s tax returns are privileged, 7 || and the Court finds that Plaintiff Snavely’s supplemental responses are adequate. See ECF 8 84 at 81 (“Plaintiff will produce all responsive documents that he plans to rely on to 9 || prove his expense reimbursement claim in this case’); id. at 86 (“Plaintiff will produce all 10 ||documents in his possession, custody, and control. ... Plaintiff identified additional 11 receipts/invoices following a diligent search and reasonable inquiry”’); id. at 12 (production 12 |/of at least 1,369 pages of documents). 13 VI. CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to compel. 15 || ECF No. 84. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 ||Dated: September 3, 2025 ig _ArwiornH. Kuler Honorable Allison H. Goddard 19 United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28