Munoz 214046 v. Saad

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided October 17, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-01428·Unknown

Opinion

KM WO Albert Munoz, No. CV-23-01428-PHX-JAT (ASB) Plaintiff, v. ORDER Unknown Saad, et al., Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 6), proposed Amended Complaint (Doc. 6-1), and Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 4). The Court will grant the Application to Proceed; grant the Motion to Amend and direct the Clerk of Court to file the proposed First Amended Complaint; require Defendant Saad to answer the Count One of the First Amended Complaint; and dismiss without prejudice the remaining claim and Defendant. I. Background On July 20, 2023, pro se Plaintiff Albert Munoz, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 3, 2023, he filed his Application to Proceed and Motion to Amend. On August 31, 2023, he filed a certified trust account statement. II. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $104.63. Id. The remainder of the filing fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). IV. First Amended Complaint Plaintiff names Correctional Officers II Saad and Toliver in his two-count First Amended Complaint and seeks injunctive relief and money damages. In Count One, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Saad used excessive force on him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff claims that on the morning of May 15, 2023, he was waiting for Defendant Toliver to take him to work when Defendant Saad came to his cell door and “immediately began yelling at Plaintiff aggressively to come out and go to work as she opened the cell door.” (Doc. 6-1 at 6.) Plaintiff began to gather his work- related items and Defendant Saad slammed and locked the cell door, almost hitting Plaintiff’s face. (Id.) Plaintiff and his cellmate continued to calmly wait for Defendant Toliver. Defendant Saad returned to the cell, opened the door and yelled for Plaintiff to hurry up and come out. Plaintiff gathered his things, exited the cell, and saw Defendant Toliver coming up the stairs. Plaintiff asked Toliver “hey can you come get me for work from now on?” and “pointed at [Defendant Saad].” (Id.) Defendant Toliver “called Plaintiff to come to work.” (Id.) Plaintiff was turned away from Defendant Saad when Defendant Saad “pulled out her tactical stun gun, and shot Plaintiff in the back – discharging the weapon.” (Id. at 6-7). Plaintiff alleges he was “10 ft. away with his back to her, there was no aggression towards [Defendant Saad], who had no penological justification for the assault.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Saad then threatened his cellmate. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that during the incident, Defendant Toliver was at the stairs “but during the entire incident he just did nothing nor said nothing to stop or defuse the assault on Plaintiff or his cellie.” (Id.) As a result “of being electrocuted,” Plaintiff “collapsed to the floor . . . [and] hit his head and shoulder – causing more injury besides the electrification.” (Id.) Another officer initiated an Incident Command System (ICS), and Plaintiff was cuffed behind his back “and treated by security as if he had done something wrong.” Plaintiff alleges Defendant Toliver did not “speak up to say that Plaintiff was not in the wrong until later that day” and allowed “staff [to] get a restraint chair” and then “strap Plaintiff into the chair [and] then . . . push Plaintiff across the yard in front of every prisoner on the yard.” (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff was taken to medical where “people were shining lights into his eyes.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff closed his eyes in response, and was deemed to have “refused medical treatment because of his eye squinting.” (Id.) Plaintiff was then transported toward the yard supervisor’s office, but on the way there, he requested medical and “asked a staff [sergeant] to call medical and apologize for Plaintiff as he knew they were trying to help.” (Id.) Plaintiff was taken to medical where he “conveyed his head hurt where he landed and the light was hurting his eyes.” (Id.) He was then taken to the supervisor’s office for questioning. Plaintiff alleges “administration took [Defendant Saad] out of her job duties and sent her home.” (Id. at 9.) In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges the same facts and asserts Defendant Saad’s actions threatened his safety and caused him “physical an

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