MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE, ETC. v. Century 21 Cantrell Real Estate, Inc.
This text of 390 So. 2d 982 (MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE, ETC. v. Century 21 Cantrell Real Estate, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE OF JACKSON, INC. and Jackson Board of Realtors, Inc.
v.
CENTURY 21 CANTRELL REAL ESTATE, INC. and Helene Cantrell, President.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
John Land McDavid, McDavid, Edmonson & Noblin, Alex A. Alston, Jr., Thomas, Price, Alston, Jones & Davis, Jackson, for appellants.
Robert G. Nichols, Jr., W.E. Gore, Jr., Jackson, for appellees.
*983 Before PATTERSON, C.J., and WALKER and BROOM, JJ.
WALKER, Justice, for the Court:
This case involves the right of a private association to make rules of conduct involving its membership and its right to enforce disciplinary sanctions for failure to follow these rules. The appeal arises from the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, which issued a final decree enjoining the appellants, Multiple Listing Service of Jackson, Inc. (hereinafter MLS) and Jackson Board of Realtors, Inc. (hereinafter called Board of Realtors) from enforcing disciplinary sanctions against appellees, Century 21 Cantrell Real Estate, Inc. and Helene Cantrell, President (hereinafter collectively called Cantrell).
Both the Board of Realtors and MLS are non-profit professional associations, membership in which is voluntary. Cantrell became a member of the Board of Realtors on December 29, 1975, and a member of MLS on April 20, 1976. The two associations became affiliated on February 15, 1977. Cantrell was a member in good standing of the affiliated organizations.
The injunction issued by the Chancery Court prohibited the enforcement of three separate sanctions against Cantrell involving two unrelated complaints filed against her.[1]
The first sanction, imposed by the Board of Realtors, was a severe reprimand and the placing of Cantrell on probation for a period of six months. It was error for the lower court to enjoin the enforcement of this sanction for the reason that Cantrell did not first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the Constitution and Bylaws of the Board of Realtors. Cantrell did not appeal to the Board of Directors of the Board of Realtors, even though she was informed of her right to do so. The authorities are fairly uniform that the administrative remedies must be exhausted before resorting to the courts. NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So.2d 1072 (Miss. 1972).[2]
The second sanction, also imposed by the Board of Realtors, was the suspension of Cantrell from membership in that association for a period of thirty days. For the reasons hereinafter stated we find that the chancellor erred in enjoining the thirty-day suspension.
The third sanction, which was imposed by MLS, was a fine of $300. For the reasons hereinafter stated we are of the opinion the chancellor did not err in enjoining the enforcement of this sanction.
The authorities are in general agreement that judicial review of disciplinary proceedings of a voluntary association should be limited to determining only whether the member disciplined received procedural due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and whether the association has conducted its inquiry in accordance with its own rules of procedure. The writer of an exhaustive article involving judicial review of the actions of private associations stated:
*984 Where an association has conducted its inquiry in accordance with its own rules of procedure and in conformity with the minimum standards externally imposed to produce a rational and valid result, there is a strong presumption that its determination is a proper one. The interest in finality in the adjudication of disputes and the deference due the autonomy of the association and the competence of its tribunal argue against a broad scope of judicial inquiry. If a court, on consideration of the evidence adduced before the association tribunal, is convinced that the facts upon which the group's action is based could reasonably have been found by a body acting in good faith, it probably should refuse to overturn an otherwise proper proceeding. 76 Harv.L.Rev. 983 at 1037 (1963).
In Lowery v. International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Inc., 241 Miss. 458, 130 So.2d 831 (1961), this Court cited with approval the general rule, as follows:
The authorities seem to hold fairly uniformly that the courts will not intervene except for fraud perpetrated upon a member, or lack of jurisdiction. `It is well established that courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of voluntary associations, except in such cases as fraud or lack of jurisdiction. * * * The decisions of the tribunals of an association with respect to its internal affairs will, in the absence of mistake, fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, be accepted by the courts as conclusive. Moreover, it is held that the courts will not undertake to inquire into the regularity of the procedure adopted and pursued by such tribunals in reaching their conclusions.' 4 Am. Jur. 466, Associations and Clubs, Sec. 17. (130 So.2d at 836).
In the case at bar, the disciplinary proceedings were in full compliance with the constitution and bylaws of the Board, and the thirty-day suspension was given only after Cantrell was afforded every element of due process. That is, she was given notice of the charges, notice of a hearing, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, an opportunity to refute the charges, and a hearing before an unbiased tribunal.
A private association has the right to set its own goals and standards as long as they are not against the public policy of the State. Cantrell, by her assent to the rules of the Board of Realtors, bound herself to abide by all lawful limitations imposed by those rules. The decision of the Board of Realtors, relative to the thirty-day suspension, was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion and thus cannot be set aside under the limited review available in the courts. We therefore hold that the lower court erred in enjoining the enforcement of the thirty-day suspension of Cantrell imposed by the Board of Realtors.
The $300 fine imposed by MLS presents a different question. The complaint sent to MLS by Cecil Cost requested that MLS investigate a possible violation of Article 2(j) of the MLS Rules and Regulations, which state:
Any listing filed with the Multiple Listing Service shall not be made available to any non-participant in MLS without the consent of the listing broker.
After receiving the written response from Cantrell, MLS informed her by letter dated October 28, 1977, that she had been found guilty of violating Article 2(j) and that her membership in MLS would be suspended for sixty days unless she paid a penalty of $1,000. Cantrell was also informed that she had the right to appeal this decision to the professional standards committee of the Board of Realtors. Cantrell decided to appeal, and she was given a full and complete hearing, accompanied by all the required procedural safeguards heretofore mentioned. On April 4, 1978, the committee notified Cantrell that she had been found guilty of breaching Article 2(j) and that she was fined $300. Cantrell appealed this decision to the Board of Directors of the Board of Realtors, which affirmed the decision of the committee. The lower court enjoined MLS from enforcing this fine, in part because the rules and regulations of MLS established no guidelines for the imposition of fines or penalties.
*985
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