Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Corp.

31 Va. Cir. 551, 1992 Va. Cir. LEXIS 120
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Corp.. Read the opinion of the Court — 28 Va. Cir. 220
Charlottesville County Circuit Court·Decided December 18, 1992·No. Case No. (Chancery) 7624, 7627·Published

Opinion

By Judge Jay T. Swett

This matter is before the Court on the respondents’ demurrers and on cross motions for summary judgment. The matters were argued on October 30, 1992. Having considered the arguments and briefs, the following is my decision.

Reference should be made to my letter of June 8, 1992,1 regarding the identity of the parties and a brief statement of facts. The only significant matter that has occurred since that letter was the addition of Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Company as an additional defendant in both cases.

As stated in the Bill of Complaint, Adelphia Cable provides cable television service in the City of Charlottesville. Among those to whom service is provided are tenants whose apartments are owned by several of the respondents. Over the past several months, the respondent landowners have entered into contracts with respondent Charlottesville Quality Cable Corporation. In conjunction with those contracts, the owners have notified Adelphia that it no longer may utilize or service the related equipment located on or in the apartment buildings, and it no longer will be given access to the apartment buildings to service the [552]*552tenants who are its customers. Adelphia seeks injunctive relief claiming that respondents have tortiously interfered with its contracts with the tenants and has tortiously interfered with Adelphia’s right to enter into future contracts for cable television service to tenants at the apartment complexes.

The contracts between Adelphia and the tenants are terminable at will by either Adelphia or the tenants. In order for Adelphia to state a cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations, Adelphia must allege and prove the following: (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy and; (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 120 (1985).

Since the contracts between Adelphia and the tenants are terminable at will, Adelphia must also allege and prove that the intentional interference with the contractual relationships was done by an “improper” method. Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 227 (1987). An improper method of interference includes those that are “illegal or independently tortious such as violations of statutes, regulations or recognized common-law rules.” Id.

For purposes of ruling on the respondents’ demurrers, the complaints are sufficient to the extent that they allege facts which, if proven, would meet the four stated elements of Chaves, supra. Since the contracts are terminable at will, Adelphia must show the interference was by an “improper method.” Adelphia claims that the respondents acted improperly because of § 6-3 of the Charlottesville City Code. That ordinance provides as follows:

(a) No person who owns or controls any residential multiple-unit dwelling, trailer park, condominium or apartment complex, or subdivision shall interfere with the right of any tenant or lawful resident thereof to receive service from a cable television system lawfully operating within the city, or demand or accept payment of any fee, charge, or thing of value from such a cable system or any tenant or resident in exchange for giving such tenant or resident access to service from such a cable system, or discriminate in any way against [553]*553such tenant or resident who requests or receives cable service. It is determined that assuring access constitutes a public use.
(b) However, an owner of such property may receive just and reasonable compensation for such access. Such compensation shall be based upon evidence of: The diminution of investment-backed expectations; the impairment of the premises’ usefulness; the amount of space occupied by the facilities of the system; the prior use, if any, of the space; the continued physical availability of space on the premises for installation of alternative modes of television program reception or delivery; the difference in fair market value of the premises resulting from the installation of system facilities; and other reasonable, nonspeculative factors. Compensation shall not include the holdup value resulting from a landlord’s monopoly control of such access.

Under this ordinance, the city has chosen to regulate an element of the relationship between the owner of an apartment complex and its tenants. Under this ordinance, an owner is prohibited from interfering with any tenant who chooses to receive service from a cable television company such as Adelphia. The ordinance does not by its terms provide a right of action on the part of the tenant who claims that the apartment owner has interfered with the tenant’s desire to have cable television service. Nor does the ordinance by its terms create any claim of right or cause of action to a “cable television system lawfully operating within the City,” in this case, Adelphia. Adelphia claims that the ordinance grants it a “business expectancy” and a “prospective business advantage” such that an owner who denies Adelphia the right to come on the owner’s property to provide cable television service to its tenants is improperly interfering with its contracts with the tenants. Adelphia claims that the owner’s actions in denying Adelphia the right to come on their property constitutes an “improper method” as required by Duggin v. Adams, supra.

On the other hand, the respondents argue that Charlottesville City Ordinance § 6-3 does not give Adelphia any present right to be on the owners’ property. To construe the ordinance in a way to grant Adelphia the right to have access to the owners’ property over their objection would, argue the respondents, mean the City has effectively granted an easement to Adelphia over the property. Such an easement would constitute a taking of their property without just compensation in violation [554]*554of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 11, of the of the Virginia Constitution.

In response, Adelphia argues that the ordinance is a lawful exercise of the police power, and if the ordinance constitutes a “taking” under constitutional standards, the ordinance provides an adequate and appropriate remedy. Adelphia points to § 6-3(b), which states that an owner is entitled to claim “just and reasonable compensation” for granting access to the cable television company.

In 1982, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The dispute in Loretto was over a New York statute that prohibited a landlord from interfering with the installation of cable television equipment on a landlord’s property where the purpose was to provide cable television service to the landlord’s tenants. Prior to the passage of the New York law, a landlord had granted Teleprompter permission to affix its lines to the sides of its apartment building. After the enactment of the statute, the new purchaser of the apartment building, Mrs. Loretto, brought suit for trespass against Teleprompter seeking damages.

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Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Corp., 31 Va. Cir. 551, 1992 Va. Cir. LEXIS 120 (Va. Super. Ct. 1992).

31 Va. Cir. 551 (Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
438 U.S. 104 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
458 U.S. 419 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Chaves v. Johnson
335 S.E.2d 97 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1985)
Duggin v. Adams
360 S.E.2d 832 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1987)
Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Corp.
28 Va. Cir. 220 (Charlottesville County Circuit Court, 1992)