Muller v. Celebrezze

220 F. Supp. 862, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7414
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 29, 1963
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 220 F. Supp. 862 (Muller v. Celebrezze) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Muller v. Celebrezze, 220 F. Supp. 862, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7414 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).

Opinion

COOPER, District Judge.

Pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff brings this motion for judgment on the pleadings. The cross motion seeks the same relief. Involved is a review of the final decision by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying plaintiff’s application for child disability insurance benefits under Sec. 202(d) of the Social Security Act.

The paramount issue presented: Has plaintiff been continuously “disabled” as defined in the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i) wherein disability means “ * * * inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration.”

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff, bom September 2, 1901, filed application for child disability insurance benefits on January 9,1959 (243-6 Transcript of the Administrative Record, made part of the pleadings). In it she alleged she became unable to work in 1927 because of a mental impairment. [863]*863That application was denied and after reconsideration by a separate Bureau, lawfully empowered to proceed, it was again denied (Tr. 260-4, 283-9). The matter then came on before a hearing examiner who considered the case de novo and disallowed her claim (Tr. 122-131). Thereafter (on July 13, 1961) the Appeals Council reviewed the proceedings before the hearing examiner, held a hearing of its own at which further testimony was adduced and additional exhibits received in evidence, and on August 27, 1962 affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s claim (Tr. 5-13). That determination was adopted by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

A judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary is provided by Sec. 205(g) of the Act which includes, “The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive.” Thus this judicial review is not a trial de novo. As emphasized in Carqueville v. Flemming, 263 F.2d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 1959), “ * * * the function of the District Court was to review the record to determine whether it contained substantial evidence to support the administrative decision. Neither we nor the District Court have the right to make our own appraisal of the evidence.” And Adams v. Flemming, 276 F.2d 901, 903 (2d Cir. 1960) held, “The findings of the Social Security Agency are final and binding if there is a substantial basis for them. Such finality extends to inferences and conclusions drawn from the evidence.”

While judicial interference under these circumstances should be with the greatest reluctance therefore, the interests of justice compel the conclusion that the final determination of the Secretary disallowing plaintiff’s claim is not supported by “substantial evidence.”

MEDICAL STATEMENTS

Although regarding as impressive the written medical statements relating to plaintiff’s mental aberration during periods subsequent to her eighteenth birthday, the Secretary (and all who participated in the matter before it reached his hands) emphasized, as the sole deficiency in the case, the lack of medical conclusions pertaining to her mental condition prior to that birth date — eoneededly a crucial date in this determination.

It should be observed that the hearing examiner was “willing to assume that claimant at this time, including time of filing, is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, and unable to perform substantial gainful work on any regular basis.” And referring to the “medical testimony” he concluded, “None of it establishes onset of disability prior to age 18. On the contrary onset at about age 27 when her first baby died is corroborated. The only impairment prior to 18 even suggested is nervousness and perhaps general maladjustment” (Tr. 125). The Appeals Council, however, recorded, “Therefore, even at the present time there would still seem to be a considerable question as to whether the claimant has a severe psychiatric impairment” (Tr. 13).

Succinct though the medical statements are (pointing up a clear need for amplification), they are highly significant.

(a) Dr. Leavitt’s statement of January 29, 1959 (Tr. 254): He had her under treatment in 1928 for “post-partum neurosis manic-depressive type.” On February 9, 1961, he wrote (Tr. 303):
“The only office record that I have of this patient goes way back to August 25, 1928, and my office record of Mrs. McCann, as was her name at that time, indicates that 'since the death of her one and only baby some months ago she had become more depressed and sleepless, irritated and restless, and unable to pay attention and worries constantly that she is losing her mind.’ No information was given to me at that time, according to my records, that such a condition had existed prior to [864]*864the present attack. Of course, there may have been previous attacks, of which I was not informed. So, my answers to the questions were that the onset of the illness for which I treated her in August, 1928, was ‘some months ago.’
“The tentative diagnosis made at that time ‘post-puerperal psychosis of the manic depressive type.’ Such a type of psychosis is one that tends to recur but does not inevitably recur. One might compare it to a person who is predisposed to having severe influenzal attacks. He has one attack, gets over it, and may not necessarily have any more attacks but he is predisposed to such a recurrence.”
(b) Dr. Stillman on February 29, 1959 declared (Tr. 250):
“She has suffered from a manic-depressive psychosis for many years. At this time she has episodes of depression and is not employable.”
(c) Dr. Healey on August 20, 1955 (Tr. 302):
“ * * -* thg claimant was suffering the disabling effects of manic depressive psychosis and that because of her failure to understand the nature of her own condition the prognosis was poor.”
(d) Dr. Healey on February 6, 1962 affirmed a statement (Tr. 360) that he
“went into her background, found her unusually closely attached to the memory of her father, and in an extremely nervous and depressive state.”
(e) Dr. Bricker in a hand-written note received by the Department of Welfare, Bureau of Disability Determinations, on January 7, 1960 (Tr. 272) responded to a written inquiry by claimant’s son. The inquiry read:
“ * * * stating simply that you have known the claimant and her family since 1915 and as a neighbor in the community have heard of or have observed from time to time the results of serious mental disability.”

The doctor’s response thereto:

“Although I did not treat Mrs. Ella M. Botting psychiatrieally, I did treat her medically from time to time. I recall definitely that she was not mentally stable.”

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Bluebook (online)
220 F. Supp. 862, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7414, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/muller-v-celebrezze-nysd-1963.