Mullaney v. Cutting

175 Iowa 547
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedNovember 24, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 175 Iowa 547 (Mullaney v. Cutting) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mullaney v. Cutting, 175 Iowa 547 (iowa 1915).

Opinion

Evans, C. J.

1. Execution: sale: manner, conduct and validity: sale without redemption : strict compliance with statute. The sale in question was had upon general execution under a judgment against the plaintiff. The amount of the judgment, with interest and costs, was $1,056. The land sold was a farm of 280 acres, worth from $135 to $150 an acre, and encumbered by mortgage to the extent of $16,000 or $17,000. The property was sold for the amount of the judgment, no other hid being received. The defendant was the attorney for the execution [549]*549plaintiff, but made his bid in his own behalf. Upon the acceptance of his bid by the sheriff, he demanded and received a sheriff’s deed, the property being not subject to redemption because an appeal had been prosecuted to the Supreme Court from the original judgment under which the execution was issued. Immediately upon the discovery that a deed had actually been issued under the sale, the plaintiff herein tendered to the defendant the full amount of his bid with interest and costs. The tender being refused, this action was brought.

The facts are not greatly in dispute. The question is whether the sale and the proceedings leading thereto were attended with such irregularities as to entitle plaintiff to equitable relief. The ground of the holding of the trial court does not appear in the record. Needless to say that the result of the sale was appalling. The plaintiff is at the disadvantage herein of having received notice of the time and place of the sale. "What he evidently did not know was that the sale was not subject to redemption. The irregularities contended for are quite numerous. These are that the sale was irregular in that the tract was sold en masse; that the bid was inadequate; that the levy, if any, was excessive; that there was, in fact, no levy made before the sale; that, if there was a levy, it was only upon 120 acres of the land.

Section 3970, Code, 1897, is as follows:

2. Execution : sale: manner, conduct and validity: sale en masse -without redemption :inadequate bid. “The officer shall in all cases select such property, and in such quantities, as will be likely to bring the exact amount required to be raised, as nearly as practicable, and, having made one levy, may at any time thereafter make others, if he finds it necessary. But no execution shall be a lien on personal property before the actual levy thereof.”

There was no attempt in this case to sell the property in any other way than en masse. Neither, on the other hand, was there any plan of division presented by the defendant before the sale. The fact that the property was all encumbered under one encumbrance is [550]*550an important consideration as bearing upon the propriety of a'sale en masse. The same ought to be considered, also, as bearing upon the question of excessive levy. The execution defendant had other real property in the same county which was subject to execution. This consisted of a town property worth $4,000 and encumbered for $1,500. -We have held heretofore that a sale en masse or a sale for an inadequate bid does not necessarily render the sale voidable. Our holding in that respect has been based in part upon the fact that the sales under consideration were subject to redemption.

In Cooper v. Iowa Trust & Savings Bank, 149 Iowa 336, 343, we said:

“The fact that the execution defendant has a large protection in his- right of redemption for the period of one year from an execution' sale of real estate usually furnishes the strong reason why such sale should not be set .aside for a mere irregularity, which does not affect his substantial right.”

The fact that the sale under consideration was not subject to redemption presents a reason why a more strict compliance with statutory provisions should be required than in eases where such right of redemption exists.

3. execution: vaSa?ty :ainaaeof sheri1^/ duty It must be said in this ease that the levy was grossly excessive. In view of the encumbrance, however, it would have been difficult, if not impracticable, to make it otherwise, so far as this particular property was concerned. It was, however, within the power 1° protect the execution defendant against an unfair sale.

Section 4029, Code, 1897, is as follows:

“When there are no bidders, or when the amount offered is grossly inadequate, or when from any cause the sale is prevented from taking place on the day fixed, or the parties so agree, the officer may postpone the sale for not more than three days without being required to give any further notice thereof, which'postponement shall be publicly announced at the time the sale was to have been made, but not more than [551]*551two such adjournments shall be made, except by agreement of the parties in writing and made a part of the return upon.the execution.”

4. Execution: sale: manner, conduct and validity: sale without redemption : essentials of notice. In view of the fact that the sale was not subject to redemption, the amount of the bid was grossly inadequate. There were no other bidders present. The sheriff knew the land and believed it to be worth $150 an acre at the time of such sale. Under the circumstances here shown, the duty of postponement was clearly upon him. It should be said for the sheriff that he did not himself know that the sale was not subject to redemption. In this connection, attention should be directed to the notice of sale. This was given in what was called the “usual form.” It is common knowledge that usually a proposed execution sale of real estate is subject to redemption. A sale not subject to redemption is somewhat exceptional. Because such proposed sale is subject to redemption, the attention and interest of general bidders are not attracted thereto. For the same reason, parties desiring to buy property do not usually attend a sheriff’s, sale of real estate. The usual bidder, uncontested, is the execution creditor, and the usual bid is the amount to be made on the execution. In such a case, if the bid be inade-. quate or the levy excessive or the proceedings irregular, the irregularity can be equitably cured by the redemption. Sections 4023 and 4024, Code, 1897, provide for notice of execution sales. They do not provide for the exact form of such notice. Clearly, it is contemplated' that such notice should show such proposed “sale.” Our statute in terms contemplates two kinds of execution sales. One is the “sale absolute,” as defined in Sections 4043 and 4045, Code. The other is the sale “subject to redemption,” as defined in Code Section 4044. We think it was the very essence of the notice of sale in this case that it should have shown that the proposed sale in this ease was to be absolute and not subject to redemption; and this is especially;, sol because, as already indicated, the usual [552]*552execution sale of real estate is subject to redemption. If such fact had appeared in the notice involved herein, it would undoubtedly have avoided the unconscionable result which followed. If the public had been advised by this notice that a farm worth $20,000 above its encumbrance was to be sold to the best bidder without redemption to satisfy a judgment of $1,056, it is inconceivable that, other and larger bids would not have been received.

5. Execution: levy: indorsement of levy on writ.

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175 Iowa 547, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mullaney-v-cutting-iowa-1915.