Mujahid v. Shinn

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 6, 2023
• Docket: 4:21-cv-00115
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Abdullah Mujahid, No. CV-21-00115-TUC-SHR

10 Petitioner, Order Accepting R&R

11 v.

12 David Shinn, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 16 On March 7, 2023, Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald issued a Report and 17 Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 24) in which he recommended the Court dismiss 18 Petitioner Abdullah Mujahid’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 19 § 2254 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). The Court has reviewed the record, including Petitioner’s 20 Objection (Doc. 25) and Respondent’s Reply (Doc. 26), and accepts Judge Macdonald’s 21 R&R. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 22 I. Standard of Review 23 When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, this Court “may accept, reject, or 24 modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate 25 judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s 26 findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United 27 States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in 28 original). However, objections to R&Rs “are not to be construed as a second opportunity 1 to present the arguments already considered by the Magistrate Judge.” Betancourt v. Ace 2 Ins. Co. of Puerto Rico, 313 F. Supp.2d 32, 34 (D.P.R. 2004); see also Camardo v. Gen. 3 Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The 4 purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act is to relieve courts of unnecessary work” and 5 “[t]here is no increase in efficiency, and much extra work, when a party attempts to 6 relitigate every argument which it presented to the Magistrate Judge.”). 7 II. Background 8 The Court adopts the following unobjected-to facts as set forth in the R&R: 9 In March 1989, Mujahid pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, theft, and second-degree burglary for offenses 10 committed in 1988 when he was 17 years old. (Doc. 13-1 at 4- 11 9, Exh. A, Doc. 13-1 at 11-26, Exh. B, Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) At sentencing, defense counsel asked the trial court 12 to determine “whether [it] should perhaps reject [the plea 13 agreement] as being too harsh” based upon information contained in the presentence report and a doctor’s report. (Doc. 14 13-1 at 31, Exh. C at 4.) The trial court found the plea 15 agreement should be accepted, and, consistent with the plea agreement, sentenced Mujahid to life with parole eligibility 16 after 25 years for the murder, 10 years for the theft and 10 years 17 for the burglary. (Doc. 13-1 at 35, 36-38, Exh. C at 8, 10-11; Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) All three sentences were ordered 18 to be served consecutively. (Doc. 13-1 at 37-38, Exhs. C at 10–11; Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) Mujahid was granted 19 parole on the life sentence in 2014 and will be eligible for 20 release after serving two-thirds of each of his remaining prison terms. (Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) On September 12, 2016, 21 Mujahid filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 22 13-1 at 41-43, Exh. D.) On May 8, 2017, Mujahid filed his PCR petition, (Doc. 13-1 at 45-106, Exh. E), and following 23 several extensions and a stay, filed an amended PCR petition 24 on May 31, 2019. (Doc. 13-1 at 108-135, Exh. F.) In his petition, Mujahid argued that his sentences cumulatively 25 amounted to a de facto life sentence without the possibility of 26 parole which violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Supreme Court’s 27 holdings in Miller and Montgomery. Id. He based his argument 28 that his cumulative sentence amounted to life without the possibility of parole on life expectancy estimates. Id. 1 The State responded, arguing Mujahid was not entitled 2 to relief under Miller or Montgomery because Mujahid was 3 never subjected to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. (Doc. 13-2 at 105-108, Exh. H.) The State observed 4 that the Arizona [C]ourt of [A]ppeals had rejected a similar 5 argument in a separate case. Id.; see also State v. Helm, 431 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. App. 2018). The State also criticized 6 Mujahid’s argument regarding his de facto life sentence, noting 7 there was no consistent approach as to what amounted to a de facto life sentence among the various authorities Mujahid 8 cited. (Doc. 13-2 at 105-108, Exh. H.) Mujahid filed a reply. 9 (Doc. 13-2 at 110-118, Exh. I.) The PCR court denied Mujahid’s petition. (Doc. 13-2 10 at 120-124, Exh. J.) The court began by observing that “it 11 [was] unclear if Miller even applies,” because Mujahid was paroled on the murder charge but remained in prison on two 12 remaining sentences that were not life sentences. Id. Relying 13 on Helm, supra, the PCR court found that Mujahid’s arguments were unsupported by Arizona law. Id. The PCR court further 14 noted that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit lengthy aggregate sentences and “prohibits the imposition of life 15 without parole sentences on a juvenile defendant only for 16 nonhomicide offenses.” Id. (emphasis original). The PCR court thus found Mujahid failed to present “a colorable claim 17 that would provide relief under Rule 32 [of the Arizona Rules 18 of Criminal Procedure] and [was therefore] not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.” Id. 19 Mujahid petitioned for review to the Arizona [C]ourt of 20 [A]ppeals. (Doc. 13-2 at 126-153, Exh. K.) He again argued that the Eighth Amendment prohibited aggregate sentences 21 which exceeded a juvenile offender’s expected lifespan. Id. 22 He acknowledged, however that Miller and Montgomery do not expressly apply to the cumulative length of consecutive 23 sentences for juvenile offenders. (Doc. 13-2 at 135, Exh. K at 24 10) (stating “the reasoning in [the Miller and Montgomery] line of cases also implicates de facto JLWOP [juvenile life without 25 parol] sentences”) (emphasis added). Rather, he argued that 26 the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals should, in effect, reverse its prior decisions and conclude Miller and Montgomery apply to 27 cumulative sentences. Id. The [C]ourt of [A]ppeals granted review of Mujahid’s 28 petition. (Doc. 13-2 at 155-156, Exh. L.) The [C]ourt of 1 [A]ppeals noted that Mujahid asked the court to revisit “the argument that Montgomery and Miller, which prohibit life 2 sentences for juvenile offenders without a meaningful 3 opportunity for release, apply to non-life, consecutive sentences.” Id. The [C]ourt of [A]ppeals “decline[d] to do so,” 4 and denied relief. Id. 5 (Doc. 24 at 3–6.) 6 In his Petition, Mujahid asserts the state court’s decision was contrary to or involved 7 an unreasonable application of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), Miller v. 8 Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 9 Specifically, Mujahid argues: (1) “The Eighth Amendment prohibits aggregate sentences 10 that exceed a juvenile offender’s expected lifespan”; (2) the Arizona Court of Appeals 11 decision was “contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Miller and 12 Montgomery”; and (3) the Ninth Circuit “has recognized that Graham, Miller, and 13 Montgomery apply to ‘de facto’ life without parole sentences.” (Doc. 1 at 11, 13, 16.) 14 Mujahid also argues: “By refusing to consider evidence supporting Mr. Mujahid’s claims, 15 the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 16 the evidence.” (Id. at 16.) 17 Respondents filed an Answer urging the Court to dismiss the Petition as untimely 18 and arguing: “The state court’s denial of Mujahid’s PCR petition was not contrary to, nor 19 did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.” (Doc. 13 at 20 6–7.) Specifically, Respondents asserted Mujahid is not entitled to relief because the 21 United States Supreme Court “has never held that a juvenile defendant’s lengthy 22 cumulative prison term, based upon consecutive sentences—that are not themselves life 23 without the possibility of parole—violates the juvenile defendant’s Eighth Amendment 24 right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” (Doc. at 9.) Respondents also argue 25 the state court’s denial of the PCR petition “was not an unreasonable determination of the 26 facts in light of the evidence presented.” (Id. at 14.) 27 Mujahid filed a Reply arguing his Petition is timely because he is entitled to 28 equitable tolling. (Doc. 22.) Specifically, he asserted the State has the burden of arguing 1 timeliness, so he did not need to affirmatively plead it in his Petition, and he did “not know, 2 and could not have known, that Miller v. Alabama had been decided” because the “prison 3 law library did not contain case law” and he “had no other way to obtain new Supreme 4 Court case law.” (Id. at 3.) As to the merits, Mujahid argued: (1) his sentence is 5 “materially indistinguishable” from a life sentence without the possibility of parole; 6 (2) “[r]elief was not foreclosed by Jones v. Mississippi”; and (3) he is entitled to an 7 evidentiary hearing to develop his claim that his limited life expectancy will likely mean 8 his sentence is a de facto [life sentence without parole].” (Id. at 4–9.) 9 III. Report and Recommendation 10 Judge Macdonald found Mujahid’s Petition untimely because Miller was announced 11 in 2012, so he had until 2013 to file his Petition and, therefore, is eight years too late. (Doc. 12 24 at 7.) Judge Macdonald rejected Mujahid’s equitable tolling argument because he did 13 not demonstrate the eight-year delay was due to extraordinary circumstances from an 14 external force, rather than his lack of diligence. (Id. at 8.) That is, Judge Macdonald found 15 Mujahid’s “failure to recognize that the statute of limitations began to run from the date 16 Miller was decided” did not entitle him to equitable tolling. (Id. at 9.) 17 As to the merits, Judge Macdonald found the “state court’s denial of Mujahid’s PCR 18 petition was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly 19 established federal law” because “the Supreme Court has never held that a juvenile 20 defendant’s lengthy cumulative prison term, based upon consecutive sentences—that are 21 not themselves life without the possibility of parole—violates the juvenile defendant’s 22 Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” (Doc. 24 at 9– 23 10, 13.) Judge Macdonald also found the state court’s denial of Mujahid’s PCR petition 24 was “not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented” 25 because he was not entitled to relief under Graham, Miller, or Montgomery, and, under 26 Arizona law, Arizona courts need not hold an evidentiary hearing where there are no 27 material facts in dispute and the only issue is the legal consequences of the undisputed 28 material facts. (Id. at 16–17.) 1 Judge Macdonald, therefore, recommended this Court dismiss Mujahid’s Petition. 2 (Doc. 24 at 17.) 3 IV. Objections 4 Mujahid objects to the R&R’s finding that his Petition was untimely and again 5 argues he is entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations because “he 6 did not know—and had no reason to know—that Miller had been decided” because “[t]he 7 prison law library did not contain case law and he had no way of otherwise accessing new 8 Supreme Court case law.” (Doc. 25 at 1–2.) That is, Mujahid merely repeats the same 9 argument regarding timeliness that he made before the magistrate judge. As explained 10 above, an objection to an R&R it not a second opportunity to present arguments already 11 considered by the magistrate judge. See Betancourt, 313 F. Supp.2d at 34; see also 12 Camardo, 806 F. Supp. at 382. To the extent Mujahid urges the Court to apply equitable 13 tolling because the prison law library did not contain the relevant case law, the Court notes 14 Mujahid’s reliance on Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 1998), is 15 misplaced. Contrary to Mujahid’s assertion, that case does not stand for the proposition 16 that a “petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the limitations period is a ground for equitable 17 tolling.” That case did not involve a habeas petition, but rather explained that equitable 18 tolling “focuses primarily on the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance of the limitations period,” 19 and concluded “the absence of legal advice from the government’s counsel” did not excuse 20 the plaintiff’s ignorance of the statute of limitations. Id. at 1016. Mujahid does not cite, 21 and the Court has not found, any authority supporting his assertion that a habeas petitioner 22 is entitled to equitable tolling because the prison law library lacked particular case law. 23 Thus, the Court concludes Mujahid’s Petition is untimely. 24 Mujahid also argues, for the first time, 29 U.S.C. § 2244(d) violates the Suspension 25 Clause of the United States Constitution to the extent that it bars his Petition as untimely. 26 (Doc. 25 at 3–5.) He did not present this argument to the Magistrate Judge and has, 27 therefore, waived it. See Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 2017) 28 (arguments waived when raised for first time in objection to magistrate judge’s R&R). 1 Accordingly, the Court declines to address it. 2 Mujahid objects to the R&R’s conclusion that the state proceedings did not result in 3 a decision that is “’contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law’ because the 4 case upon which [he] relied to establish that his sentence was the functional equivalent of 5 a [life without the possibility of parole] sentence is a decision of the Ninth Circuit, Moore 6 v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013), and not the Supreme Court.” (Doc. 25 at 6.) 7 Mujahid contends “this argument ignores the fact that the clearly established federal law 8 upon which [he] rests his position—Miller and Montgomery—are Supreme Court 9 decisions.” Mujahid acknowledges that this Court is “not [] required to grant relief under 10 ADEPA to a new rule of law established by the Ninth Circuit,” but he asserts this Court “is 11 bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of clearly established federal law announced by 12 the Supreme Court.” (Id. at 6.) That is, Mujahid argues this Court must follow Moore, 13 which, he contends, “requires this Court to hold that a term-of-years sentence that is 14 ‘materially indistinguishable from a life sentence’ be treated as the functional equivalent 15 for eighth amendment purposes.” (Id. at 7.) 16 V. Respondents’ Reply 17 Respondents argue Mujahid’s claim fails on the merits because he has failed to 18 “demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of his Miller claim was objectively 19 unreasonable,” so he has failed to show “the R&R erred in finding his claim meritless.” 20 (Doc. 26 at 4.) Respondents explain the Supreme Court has not addressed the 21 constitutionality of imposing cumulative prison sentences on juvenile defendants, as 22 Montgomery and Miller addressed a juvenile’s life-without-parole sentence, and Graham 23 addressed a defendant’s life sentence. (Id. at 4–5.) Therefore, Respondents contend, to 24 conclude Mujahid’s consecutive prison sentences violate the Eighth Amendment “would 25 have required the State courts to extend Supreme Court precedent to grant him relief,” 26 which therefore shows the rationale on which Mujahid relies, by definition, was not clearly 27 established at the time of the state court’s decision. (Id. at 5.) 28 Respondents assert Mujahid’s argument that Moore requires this Court to grant 1 relief fails for three reasons: (1) Mujahid’s claim is based on Miller and Montgomery and 2 Moore “does not represent an interpretation of Miller or Montgomery, and thus has no 3 bearing on Petitioner’s Miller claim”; (2) Moore involved sentences that totaled more than 4 250 years for non-homicide offenses, whereas Mujahid’s sentences total 45 years and 25 5 of those are for homicide, and because Mujahid was paroled on the 25-year sentence and 6 is eligible for release on the other two 10-year sentences, he has an opportunity to be 7 released; and (3) Mujahid’s sentence for the murder conviction complies with Miller, 567 8 U.S. at 470, because he did not receive a mandatory LWOP [life-without-parole] sentence,” 9 and his “10-year sentences for theft and burglary do not violated Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 10 because he did not receive life sentences for nonhomicide offenses.” (Id. at 6–7.) 11 VI. Discussion 12 As a threshold matter, Mujahid’s Petition is not timely. Judge Macdonald correctly 13 explained Mujahid is not entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 14 because he has not shown extraordinary circumstances “stood in his way and prevented 15 timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (internal quotation marks 16 and citation omitted). For that reason alone, the Court could dismiss it. However, even if 17 the Petition was timely, the Court concludes the state court’s decision as not “contrary to,” 18 and did not “involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 19 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “A state- 20 court decision is contrary to [the Supreme Court’s] clearly established precedents if it 21 applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, 22 or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 23 Supreme Court] but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). 24 “A state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of [the Supreme Court’s] 25 clearly established precedents if the state court applies [the Court’s] precedents to the facts 26 in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. 27 28 1 To the extent Mujahid argues the R&R erred by not following Moore, the Court 2 disagrees that Mujahid is entitled to relief under Moore. First, as Respondents correctly 3 note, Moore involved the Ninth Circuit’s application of Graham—not Miller or 4 Montgomery, which are the cases on which Mujahid’s Petition is based. In Graham, the 5 Supreme Court “clearly established that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the punishment 6 of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.” Moore, 725 F.3d at 1186. 7 There, the juvenile defendant was sentenced to life plus fifteen years and, because Florida 8 had abolished its parole system, the sentence was, in effect, life without the possibility of 9 parole. Id. at 1188 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 57). The Supreme Court held the Eighth 10 Amendment prohibits imposing a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile who did not 11 commit homicide and noted that while a state “need not guarantee the offender eventual 12 release,” if it imposes a life sentence, “it must provide him or her with some realistic 13 opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.” Id. at 82. Therefore, Graham’s 14 sentence was unconstitutional. Id. 15 Three years after Graham, the Ninth Circuit found the state court decision in Moore 16 “was contrary to the clearly established Federal law set forth in Graham.” Moore, 725 17 F.3d at 1194. Moore was sentenced to 254 years, with the possibility of release after 127 18 years and two months, after being convicted of a total of 24 counts: nine counts of forcible 19 rape, seven counts of forcible oral copulation, two counts of attempted second degree 20 robbery, two counts of second degree robbery, forcible sodomy, kidnaping with the specific 21 intent to commit a felony sex offense, genital penetration by a foreign object, and the 22 unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. Id. at 1186–87. The jury also found Moore has 23 used a firearm while committing his crimes. Id. at 1186. Because Moore would have had 24 to live to be 144 years old before he could be released, the Ninth Circuit found his sentence 25 was “materially indistinguishable from the sentence in Graham,” because both sentences 26 denied the juvenile the chance to return to society. Id. at 1192. The Ninth Circuit also 27 found Moore’s crimes were materially indistinguishable from Graham’s crimes because 28 the Supreme Court in Graham “drew only one line that was crime-specific: it distinguished 1 || between homicide and nonhomicide crimes.” Jd. 2 First, Mujahid’s sentence here—life with the possibility of parole after 25 years || followed by two ten-year consecutive sentences—is materially distinguishable from the sentences in Moore and Graham. Indeed, Mujahid was granted parole on the life sentence 5 || in 2014 after he had served 25 years, and he will be eligible for release after serving two- 6 || thirds of the remaining ten-year terms. (Doc. 13-1 at 155-56, Exh. L ¥ 2.) In other words, 7 || Mujahid will be eligible for release after having served a total of 38.33 years. This is vastly 8 || different and distinguishable from the 127 years or life-without-parole sentences addressed in Moore and Graham. Second, Mujahid’s crimes are materially distinguishable from 10 || those in Moore and Graham, as Mujahid was convicted of first-degree murder. (/d.) As 11 || the Ninth Circuit noted in Moore, the Supreme Court has explained the “line between 12 || homicide and other serious violent offenses” is justified because “[l]ife 1s over for the 13 || victim of the murderer, but for the victim of even a very serious nonhomicide crime, life . . . is not over and normally is not beyond repair.” Moore, 725 F.3d at 1192 (quoting Graham, 130S.Ct. at 2027). Based on these materially distinguishable facts, Mujahid’s reliance on || Moore is unavailing and the Court finds no error in the R&R on this point. Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED Magistrate Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation 18 || (Doc. 24) is accepted. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Myjahid’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is dismissed 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall docket accordingly and close this case. 23 Dated this 6th day of April, 2023. 24 25 /)

97 Honorable Scott H, Rash United States District Judge 28

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