Muhaymin v. Phoenix, City of

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided November 2, 2021·No. 2:17-cv-04565·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Mussalina Muhaymin, et al., No. CV-17-04565-PHX-DLR

Plaintiffs, ORDER

v.

City of Phoenix, et al.,

Defendants. Before the Court are three motions to intervene for the limited purpose of moving to unseal judicial records. (Docs. 357, 358, 363.) These motions were filed by Muslim Advocates, the Associated Press, and Lei Ann Stickney, respectively (collectively “Proposed Intervenors”). Each motion contains two requests: (1) for permission to intervene in this matter and (2) for the Court to unseal judicial records. The Court will grant the first request in full and grant the second request in part. I. Permissive Intervention “Nonparties seeking access to a judicial record in a civil case may do so by seeking permissive intervention[.]” San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court—N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) governs permissive intervention and provides, in relevant part, that “on timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Thus, “[p]ermissive intervention to litigate a claim on the merits under Rule 24(b) requires (1) an independent ground for jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common question of law and fact between the movant’s claim or defense and the main action.” Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). But when permissive intervention is sought only for the limited purpose of moving to unseal judicial records—rather than to litigate claim on the merits—the first and third elements do not apply. Id. at 473-74. Instead, the Court’s discretion is guided by the timeliness of the motion and “whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). Defendants oppose the Proposed Intervenors’ motions to intervene, arguing that Muslim Advocates and Stickney lack “standing” to intervene because they do not have a sufficient interest in this litigation, that all Proposed Intervenors waited too long to intervene, and that intervention at this time would unduly prejudice the existing parties by diverting resources away from trial preparation. (Docs. 364, 365, 371.) The Court rejects the first argument; as already noted, a non-party moving to intervene solely for the purpose of accessing records need not show a nexus of fact or law with the main action. Beckman, 966 F.2d at 474. Moreover, the public has a common law right to access court records. San Jose Mercury News, 187 F.3d at 1100. As members of the public, all Proposed Intervenors have “standing,” to use Defendants’ chosen term, to seek such access. The Court also finds all three motions timely. Here, the motions to intervene were filed less than two years after the Court first began sealing documents in this case (Doc. 99), and mere weeks after the Court sealed its order on Defendants’ summary judgment motion (Doc. 352), which, together with the summary judgment briefing, are the highest priority items to which the Proposed Intervenors seek access. (Doc. 358 at 6.) “[D]elays measured in years have been tolerated where an intervenor is pressing the public’s right of access to judicial records.” San Jose Mercury News, 187 F.3d at 1101. Lastly, the Court does not find Defendants’ arguments concerning prejudice to be persuasive. The mere fact that Defendants will need to explain why the relevant records should remain sealed is not, itself, unduly prejudicial. It is, after all, their burden to establish that either good cause or compelling reasons justify curtailing the public’s right to access judicial records. Moreover, the Court recently rescheduled the trial in this matter to begin on April 25, 2022. (Doc. 359.) This schedule leaves plenty of time to adjudicate the merits of the Proposed Intervenors’ motions to unseal without adversely impacting the parties’ trial preparations. For these reasons, all three Proposed Intervenors will be granted permission to intervene for the limited purpose of seeking to unseal records in this case. II. Propriety of Sealing Judicial Records The public has a right to access judicial records. San Jose Mercury News, 187 F.3d at 1101. The Court therefore begins “with a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). A party seeking to overcome this presumption and file a judicial record under seal generally must provide a compelling reason for doing so. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016). Examples of compelling reasons “include when a court record might be used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal, to circulate libelous statements, or as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). A movant’s reason for seeking to seal a judicial record must be supported by an articulable factual basis, rather than “hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. at 1096-97 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has carved out an exception to this general rule “for sealed materials attached to a discovery motion unrelated to the merits of the case.” Id. at 1097. A party seeking to seal such materials “need only satisfy the less exacting ‘good cause’ standard.” Id. Although earlier decisions from the Ninth Circuit sometimes used the words “dispositive” and “non-dispositive” to describe the dividing line between those records governed by the compelling reasons standard and those governed by the good cause standard, the Ninth Circuit has since clarified that “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the motion at issue is more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action.” Id. at 1099. Sometimes non-dispositive motions are unrelated or only tangentially related to the merits of a case; other times they “are strongly correlative to the merits of a case.” Id. The exception to the ordinary compelling reasons standard applies only to judicial records that are unrelated or merely tangentially related to the merits of a case. Sealing a record that is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case requires a compelling justification. Using this framework, the Court will address each sealed docket entry. Docket Entry 99, filed under seal on November 20, 2019, is a Notice of Deposition of a minor, A.M., filed by Defendants. This record was sealed because it contains the minor’s full name in violation Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, which requires such information to be redacted. (Docs. 299, 300.) When confronted with such non-compliant filings, it is the undersigned’s practice to seal the document containing the private information and to order the filing party to publicly file a version of the document that redacts the private information. In this case, it appears that the Court ordered the non-compliant filing to be sealed, but did not order that a publicly available, redacted version be filed. Accordingly, Docket Entry 99 will remain sealed, but Defendants will be required to publicly file a version of the document that complies with Rule 5.2. Docket Entry 114-1, filed under se

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