Mueller's Case

Massachusetts Appeals Court

Mueller's Case

719 N.E.2d 519, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 1999 Mass. App. LEXIS 1290

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court

DecidedNovember 17, 1999

DocketNo. 98-P-1568

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 719 N.E.2d 519 (Mueller's Case) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mueller's Case, 719 N.E.2d 519, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 1999 Mass. App. LEXIS 1290 (Mass. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

As to the permanent loss of function claim under G. L. c. 152, § 36, the single justice correctly decided that it was barred under principles of claim preclusion because the claimed loss of function was known at the time the employee entered into a lump sum settlement (G. L. c. 152, § 48) with the insurer. See Saint Louis v. Baystate Med. Center, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 399 (1991). For the application of such principles in workers’ compensation cases, see Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 63 (1987). As to the question of legal fees, the employee had accepted disability payments after he had obtained work at a higher rate of pay than he was getting on the job at which he sustained an ankle injury. The insurer was rightly entitled to recoupment of the payments unlawfully received by the employee. The insurer was compelled to bring a complaint to seek redress. That, upon accounting, the amount due was $6,669.65 less than the insurer had first calculated does not make the employee the prevailing party under G. L. c. 152, § 13A(5). He still had to disgorge $11,128.06. Generally, an employee has prevailed in a workers’ compensation case only when a payment of compensation has been ordered. See Gonzalez’s Case, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 39, 42 (1996). The decision in Connolly’s Case, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 36-38 (1996), is not to the contrary.

Judgment affirmed.

Jean A. Nicolazzo for the employee. Loran G. Lang for the insurer.

The case was submitted on briefs.

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As to the permanent loss of function claim under G. L. c. 152, § 36, the single justice correctly decided that it was barred under principles of claim preclusion because the claimed loss of function was known at the time the employee entered into a lump sum settlement (G. L. c. 152, § 48) with the insurer. See Saint Louis v. Baystate Med. Center, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 399 (1991). For the application of such principles in workers’ compensation cases, see Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 63 (1987). As to the question of legal fees, the employee had accepted disability payments after he had obtained work at a higher rate of pay than he was getting on the job at which he sustained an ankle injury. The insurer was rightly entitled to recoupment of the payments unlawfully received by the employee. The insurer was compelled to bring a complaint to seek redress. That, upon accounting, the amount due was $6,669.65 less than the insurer had first calculated does not make the employee the prevailing party under G. L. c. 152, § 13A(5). He still had to disgorge $11,128.06. Generally, an employee has prevailed in a workers’ compensation case only when a payment of compensation has been ordered. See Gonzalez’s Case, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 39, 42 (1996). The decision in Connolly’s Case, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 36-38 (1996), is not to the contrary.

Judgment affirmed.

Jean A. Nicolazzo for the employee. Loran G. Lang for the insurer.

The case was submitted on briefs.

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Bluebook (online)

719 N.E.2d 519, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 1999 Mass. App. LEXIS 1290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/muellers-case-massappct-1999.

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