Mudica v. Wexford Medical

District Court, N.D. Indiana·Decided March 26, 2021·No. 3:19-cv-01090·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DONALD E. MUDICA, III,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:19-CV-1090-DRL-MGG

WARDEN,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER Donald E. Mudica, III, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint and an amended motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The court screened the amended complaint and granted him leave to proceed against the Warden of the Westville Correctional Facility in his official capacity for injunctive relief to ensure he is provided with constitutionally adequate medical care for the worsening symptoms in his head, ears, and jaw related to the cyst and sores in his mouth as required by the Eighth Amendment. ECF 12. After receiving the Warden’s response and supporting medical documentation and reviewing the parties’ arguments, the court denied Mr. Mudica’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief because he had not established that the care he was receiving violated the Constitution. ECF 27. The court concluded that, while Mr. Mudica claimed generally that “nothing” was being done to treat or diagnose his symptoms since he saw Dr. Jackson who diagnosed him with a benign left mucosal cyst November 6, 2019, he had not disputed the medical evidence submitted by the Warden that showed he had been subsequently evaluated by the medical staff on multiple occasions for a variety of related and unrelated (mainly gastrointestinal) issues. See id. at 2–4 (citing ECF 18-2 at 4–21). Accordingly, the court concluded that “this is not a case

where an inmate is being ignored by the medical staff; rather, it is one where an inmate disagrees with the diagnoses and treatment being provided. Mr. Mudica has not established, by a clear showing, that the medical care he is currently receiving violates the constitution.” Id. at 5. (citing Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) and Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996). The court also noted that, based on the record presented, there was “no indication that such care will cease absent a court order

when or if he presents with new symptoms.” Id. Mr. Mudica has filed a “Motion for a Second Opinion from an Outside Physician” (ECF 32) and a “Motion to Reconsider Preliminary Injunction” (ECF 33), both of which challenge the court’s denial order. The Warden has filed a response (ECF 36), and Mr. Mudica has filed several supplements that the court will construe as his reply (ECF 38 &

ECF 39). Thus, the motions are ripe for adjudication. Reconsideration of an interlocutory order “is a matter of a district court’s inherent power” and is “committed to a court’s sound discretion.” Cima v. Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 374, 386 (S.D. Ill. 2008) (citations omitted). “Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to

present newly discovered evidence.” Publishers Res., Inc. v. Walker–Davis Publ’ns, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); see also Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (granting a motion to reconsider is proper when “the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. A further basis for a motion to reconsider would be

controlling or significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the Court. Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.”) (citation omitted). Here, Mr. Mudica asks the court to “order the Department of Corrections to follow the orders of his private physician, or a second opinion of an outside doctor which is not affiliated with IDOC.” ECF 32 at 2; see also ECF 33 at 4, 6 (requesting a second opinion by

an outside doctor, an MRI, and medical treatment for his condition). He claims that it is impossible to prove he would suffer irreparable harm before the final resolution of his claims without a second opinion from an outside specialist. Mr. Mudica alleges that the court erred because it “did not consider that the plaintiff is a ‘lay person’ in dealing with the law.” ECF 33 at 1. He alleges that the Warden is being deliberately indifferent to his

medical needs because he has “not received any treatment for his condition since [November 6, 2019, when] Dr. Jackson cease and desist all treatments” related to any request regarding his ears, head, neck, or cyst. Id. at 5. Mr. Mudica’s motions essentially rehash his previous arguments and reiterate his prior allegations. He has not provided a valid basis for granting the motion to reconsider

and implementing preliminary injunctive relief. To begin, although Mr. Mudica contends the court erred by not considering his pro se status when ruling on the motion, this argument is without merit. While it is true that a document filed pro se must be liberally construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), pro se litigants are not relieved from meeting the demanding standards necessary to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. See e.g. Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 762–63 (7th Cir. 2020); Mays v. Dart,

974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020). Moreover, the undisputed medical evidence presented by the parties shows that Mr. Mudica was seen by medical staff several times following the examination by Dr. Jackson—he was reexamined for pain and pressure in his head and to his face which resulted in normal findings, was directed to use Tylenol and warm compresses for a strain/sprain in his neck, and was diagnosed with “alerted sensory perception” related to a headache when he presented for head pressure, pain, and

cracking sounds in his ear. Accordingly, there was no manifest error of law or fact when the court denied the motion because Mr. Mudica had not established the medical care he was receiving at that time violated the constitution or would likely cease absent a court order. Moreover, to the extent Mr. Mudica is arguing in his later filed supplements that

a change in the facts since the initial submission of the issue requires the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the court disagrees. Mr. Mudica’s subsequent filings—which include medical documentation—show that he has continued to receive medical care for the issues related to his worsening symptoms in his head, ears, and jaw related to the cyst and sores in his mouth since the original motion was denied. Specifically, on June 11,

2020, he was referred to dental where he received a thorough examination of his mouth and an x-ray; however, the dentist cancelled the cavity filling procedure and referred him back to medical. ECF 38 at 3. Throughout the remainder of the June, Mr. Mudica submitted almost daily health care requests. See ECF 44 at 2–4. Many of the responses indicated he was scheduled for an upcoming consult. Id. On July 16, 2020, Mr. Mudica was transported to the Plainfield Correctional Facility where he was examined by oral

surgeon Dr. Alderman. Id. at 5. According to Mr. Mudica, Dr.

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