Much v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance

266 F.3d 637
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedSeptember 13, 2001
Docket99-2762
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 266 F.3d 637 (Much v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Much v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance, 266 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2001).

Opinion

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Todd W. Much and Charles A. Marien, III (collectively “the plaintiffs”) and their wholly owned corporation, Certified Insurance Consultants, Inc. (“CICI”), brought a breach-of-contract action against Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. (“Pacific Mutual”), seeking renewal commissions for the sale of variable life insurance policies. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

1.

Mr. Much and Mr. Marien are licensed to sell life insurance in Illinois and are licensed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) to sell securities. Mr. Much owns all of CICI’s shares, and both Mr. Much and Mr. Marien work for CICI.

Pacific Mutual issued a variable life insurance product termed “Pacific Select Exec.” (“PSE”) beginning in 1988. Variable life insurance is a permanent form of insurance in which the cash value is based on the performance of an underlying pool of securities. To sell variable life insurance products, an individual must be a NASD-registered representative of a broker-dealer licensed with both the SEC and the NASD.

Pacific Mutual itself was not registered as a broker-dealer with either the SEC or the NASD. Pacific Equities Network (“PEN”), a subsidiary of Pacific Mutual, was properly registered as a broker-dealer, and, therefore, Pacific Mutual paid PEN to act as the principal underwriter of the PSE policies.

Pacific Mutual and PEN had a selling agreement with Mutual Service Corporation (“MSC”), a wholly owned subsidiary of *639 PEN and a wholly owned indirect subsidiary of Pacific Mutual. Under the agreement, PSE was sold by NASD-registered representatives of MSC. Pursuant to another agreement among the three entities, Pacific Mutual and PEN acted as “paymaster” for MSC; at MSC’s direction, they sent commission checks directly to the MSC-registered representative selling the policies.

More specifically, the flow of commission dollars generally worked as follows. The insured or policyholder first paid premiums to Pacific Mutual. Pacific Mutual then sent the gross commission dollars to PEN, who paid the broker-dealer, who then paid the registered representative. When the broker-dealer was MSC and the registered representative at issue a producer or subproducer of Pacific Mutual, the process changed somewhat, as per the service agreement among the three entities. In that case, the commission dollars did not physically flow to MSC. PEN instead paid the money directly to the registered representative on MSC’s behalf, although the money belonged to MSC and the payments were entered in MSC’s books and records. For those registered representatives of MSC who were also Pacific Mutual agents, this arrangement allowed them to receive a higher percentage of commission, because MSC did not retain a percentage of the commission dollars for itself, and to obtain their commission monies more quickly.

As further background, a given insurance policy can generate various forms of commission. First, commissions are earned in the first year the policy is in effect. These commissions are percentages of the target premium, an actuarially determined amount of thousands of insurance policies on which commissions are paid. This commission has two parts, a base amount and a bonus. Second, commissions are earned on premiums paid in year two and beyond in the amount of two percent of all renewal commissions. Third, continuing commissions known as “trails” are paid annually starting in the tenth year the policy is in effect, based on the net asset value of the policy.

2.

In February 1989, the firm Foote, Cone & Belding (“FCB”) contacted Mr. Much about purchasing variable life insurance policies, valued at approximately $1 million apiece, for its executives. Mr. Much and Mr. Marien met with Gene Kolasny, Pacific Mutual’s branch manager in Chicago, to discuss the possibility of Pacific Mutual’s supplying the insurance policies to Mr. Much and Mr. Marien. Kolasny met multiple times with the plaintiffs; Mr. Much, in fact, testified that Mr. Marien and he met with Kolasny four or five times.

In these conversations, Kolasny and the plaintiffs discussed the commissions that the plaintiffs would receive. Kolasny testified at trial that he told the plaintiffs that their commissions would be eighty-five percent of the target premium in the first year of a given policy and two percent of renewal premiums in subsequent years. Mr. Much testified that Kolasny told him that the commissions would consist of eighty-five percent of the first-year commissions, two percent of renewal commissions, and trails based on net asset value.

Kolasny admitted at trial that Mr. Much and he may have discussed vesting during these initial contract talks, but he does not remember any specific conversations. Vesting of commissions permits an agent to receive renewal commissions on policies that the agent instituted even after the policy owner has terminated the agent. Mr. Much, in contrast, testified as to four different conversations that he had with Kolasny or Evelyn Grant, another Pacific *640 Mutual employee, in which he was assured that his commissions would be vested.

3.

To receive commissions on the PSE policies, the plaintiffs needed to become registered representatives of a broker-dealer that had a PSE selling agreement in force. According to Mr. Much, Kolasny told the plaintiffs in May or June 1989 that, if they used MSC as their conduit, Kolasny and the Chicago office could participate, be paid, and receive credit for the deal. Further, the plaintiffs would be paid a higher rate of commission if they used MSC. Ko-lasny did not disclose in these discussions that he was a principal with MSC.

The plaintiffs completed the necessary forms to become registered representatives of MSC. Mr. Much testified that “it didn’t make any difference to us” and that Mr. Marien and he assumed that what Kolasny told them regarding the necessity of registering with MSC was correct. R.91 at 11. Mr. Much further testified that he viewed the forms more as a licensing requirement for NASD than as an agreement with MSC.

Mr. Much also completed a set of MSC registration materials, signed on June 13, 1989, and received a MSC compliance manual, which he reviewed.

4.

On July 1, 1989, CICI entered into a producer contract with Pacific Mutual. Under its terms, Pacific Mutual agreed to pay CICI compensation for policies sold at the rates set forth in the compensation schedules in effect on the application date of the policies. The contract specifically provided that:

Subject to the conditions of this contract [Pacific] shall pay [CICI] ... compensation on policies procured under this contract at the rates set forth in the Compensation Schedules in effect on the application date of the policies to which they relate.
[CICI] shall be solely responsible for compensating its employees, agents and brokers by commission or otherwise.

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Related

Much v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
266 F.3d 637 (Seventh Circuit, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
266 F.3d 637, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/much-v-pacific-mutual-life-insurance-ca7-2001.