MTR. OF CLOVE DEV. CORP. v. Frey

470 N.E.2d 849, 63 N.Y.2d 181, 481 N.Y.S.2d 50, 1984 N.Y. LEXIS 4611
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 16, 1984
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 470 N.E.2d 849 (MTR. OF CLOVE DEV. CORP. v. Frey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MTR. OF CLOVE DEV. CORP. v. Frey, 470 N.E.2d 849, 63 N.Y.2d 181, 481 N.Y.S.2d 50, 1984 N.Y. LEXIS 4611 (N.Y. 1984).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Jones, J.

A tax assessor has no power to make a determination whether property is an “eligible tract” for forest land tax exemption under section 480-a of the Real Property Tax *184 Law, such authority having been committed exclusively to the Department of Environmental Conservation.

Finding that, under the statutory provisions then in effect, lands devoted to growth of forest crops were often being assessed at a level which rendered their continued dedication to such use uneconomical, the State Legislature in 1974 enacted section 480-a of the Real Property Tax Law under which a partial tax exemption could be obtained by owners of eligible tracts who would commit their lands to forest crop production for a specified period of time (L 1974, ch 814). The statute was substantially amended in 1976 by adding a requirement for forest management plans, increasing from 8 to 10 years the minimum period for which the land must be committed to forest crop production, and changing the procedure by which the tax exemption is obtained (L 1976, ch 526).

Under the amended statute, an owner seeking a section 480-a exemption is required to make application first, under subdivision 2 of the section, to the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for certification that the land sought to be benefited is an “eligible tract” as that term is defined in paragraph (d) of subdivision 1 of the section. (For purposes of the present litigation, an eligible tract is a tract of privately owned forest land comprising at least 50 contiguous acres. “Forest land” is “land exclusively devoted to and suitable for forest crop production” and stocked with a stand of forest trees of a prescribed description [§ 480-a, subd 1, par (b)].) With respect to issuance of the certificate, it is provided in subdivision 2: “If the department finds that such tract is an eligible tract it shall forward a certificate of approval to the owner thereof, together with a management plan for the eligible tract specified by the department.”

Subdivision 3 of the section sets out in paragraph (a) how, if the Department has certified eligibility, the tax exemption is thereafter procured, providing first that to qualify for a forest land exemption the owner of “a certified eligible tract” must commit the tract to continued forest crop production for the next 10 years under the management plan that has been specified by DEC. The commitment must be made annually and filed in the county clerk’s *185 office where the tract is situated in manner and form prescribed by DEC. The owner is also required to file an exemption application with the appropriate assessor on forms prescribed by the State Board of Equalization and Assessment, showing on the application that the commitment as just described has been made. The paragraph then provides that “If the assessor is satisfied that the requirements of this section are met he shall approve the application and such eligible tract shall be exempt from taxation as herein provided”. The property continues to be exempt thereafter on receipt by the assessor of a certified copy of a properly filed annual commitment “so long as the certification of the eligible tract shall not be revoked by the department”.

Seeking to avail itself of a partial exemption under section 480-a for 4,142 acres of forest land owned by it in the Town of Highland, Clove Development Corporation in both 1981 and 1982 secured from DEC a certificate of approval together with a management plan for its acreage and filed with the appropriate county clerk a commitment which complied with paragraph (a) of subdivision 3 of the section. In each year it also filed a properly completed application for exemption with respondents town assessors, who in both instances declined to approve the application, and whose refusal was upheld by respondent Board of Assessment Review when Clove filed a complaint with respect to its assessments in the years 1981 and 1982 with that reviewing body. In denying the partial exemptions the assessors took the position that they were not satisfied that the requirements of section 480-a had been met because, in their judgment, the acreage in question was not an “eligible tract” under the section. Their classification of the area as not “eligible” rested on their conclusion that the land was not used “exclusively” for forest crop production and that Clove was not a private owner engaged in such production.

Clove instituted separate proceedings under article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law, which were subsequently consolidated by stipulation of the parties, to review the assessments imposed with respect to the 4,142 acres in the Town of Highland for the years 1981-1982 and 1982-1983. *186 After issues of valuation, also raised in the proceedings, had been settled by stipulation, Clove moved for summary judgment determining that the action of respondents in failing to grant it the exemptions sought under section 480-a was illegal. From the papers submitted it appeared that the issue critical to the disposition of the motion was whether, as respondents contended, the assessors had authority under section 480-a of the Real Property Tax Law to make a determination that the land in question — already certified by DEC as an eligible tract under 480-a — was not eligible for the tax exemption, based on their own conclusion as to the nature of its use and the status of its owner, or whether, as Clove contended, the determination of eligibility was vested exclusively in DEC such that, the Department having found that the tract was an eligible tract and having issued its certificate of approval, and the owner concededly having filed the required commitment with the county clerk and the necessary application for exemption under section 480-a with the appropriate assessor, the assessors were required to approve the exemption.

Resolving that issue in favor of respondents, Supreme Court denied the owner’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division, however, reversed the order of the lower court, granted the motion, and directed that the property be reassessed to give effect to the exemptions sought under section 480-a. We now affirm that disposition.

Respondents’ argument that the town assessors have power, independently of the finding of eligibility made by DEC, to appraise and redetermine eligibility of acreage for which a forest land exemption is sought — an argument for which support is said to be found in an alleged traditional broad prerogative of tax assessors to decide entitlement to tax exemption — must fail, in face of the unambiguous pattern and language of the statute.

Section 480-a, in its structure, clearly distinguishes between and makes discrete provision for the determination of eligibility as privately owned forest land and the granting of a consequent tax exemption — the former being a function of the State agency, one of whose primary responsibilities is the encouragement of environmentally protec *187 tive land use, and the latter being a function of the local tax assessor.

The section contemplates that before an exemption may be secured there must be, first, the determination that the land in question qualifies as an eligible tract.

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Bluebook (online)
470 N.E.2d 849, 63 N.Y.2d 181, 481 N.Y.S.2d 50, 1984 N.Y. LEXIS 4611, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mtr-of-clove-dev-corp-v-frey-ny-1984.