MT. PATMOS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. SHERYL RUCKER

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 10, 2025
DocketA25A0934
StatusPublished

This text of MT. PATMOS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. SHERYL RUCKER (MT. PATMOS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. SHERYL RUCKER) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MT. PATMOS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. SHERYL RUCKER, (Ga. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

September 10, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0934. MT. PATMOS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. RUCKER et al.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

Mt. Patmos Baptist Church, Inc. appeals from a final order which adopted a

special master’s report and dismissed Mt. Patmos’ complaint concerning title to real

property. Mt. Patmos correctly asserts that the trial court erred by adopting the special

master’s report without first giving the parties the required opportunity to object to

the report. So we vacate the final order and remand the case to the trial court for

further proceedings. Mt. Patmos’ additional enumeration challenging the

appointment of the special master presents nothing for review because Mt. Patmos

never objected to the order appointing the special master.

1. Facts and procedural posture Mt. Patmos filed a complaint in superior court against multiple defendants for

damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief concerning title to and

possession of certain real property. After the defendants filed answers to the

complaint, the superior court entered an order, pursuant to Uniform Superior Court

Rule 46 (“Rule 46”), appointing a special master to review and consider the

pleadings, evidence, and arguments on all motions and other matters in the case. The

order directed the special master, upon completion of such review and consideration,

to report his findings to the court and serve the parties with copies of the report.

A hearing before the special master was scheduled and the parties were notified

of the hearing and directed to submit briefs outlining their contentions. The

defendants filed such a brief and appeared at the hearing, but Mt. Patmos did not

submit a brief or appear at the hearing. A week after the hearing, the special master

submitted his report, finding that there was a threshold issue as to whether Mt.

Patmos had standing to bring the action and recommending that the court order a title

search of the contested property. Thirteen days later, the court entered its final order

adopting the special master’s report and dismissing the complaint on the basis that

2 Mt. Patmos lacked standing to bring the action because it did not have title to the

property. This appeal followed.

2. Opportunity to object

Mt. Patmos asserts that the superior court erred by prematurely entering the

final order adopting the special master’s report without first giving the parties time to

object to the report as required by Rule 46. We agree.

“Rule 46 . . . sets forth a clearly defined scheme for the appointment of a special

master[.]” E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Waters, 287 Ga. 235, 238 (695 SE2d 265)

(2010). Rule 46 (G) (1) provides that “[i]n acting on a [special] master’s order, report,

or recommendations, the court must afford the parties an opportunity to be heard and to

object to any portion thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.) “Rule 46 (G) (2) gives [the parties]

20 days from the date the special master’s report is served to file a motion to reject or

modify the report, unless the court sets a different time.” McBride v. Kelly, 359 Ga.

App. 437, 438 (1) (858 SE2d 253) (2021).

In the instant case, there is no indication in the record that the court set a

different time other than the 20-day period for the parties to object to the special

3 master’s report. Rather, the record shows that the special master’s report was filed

on October 10, 2024,

and the superior court entered the final [order] adopting the report . . . [just] 13 days later, on [October 23, 2024]. Therefore, the parties were not afforded the 20-day opportunity to object or move to reject or modify the report as required by Rule 46 (G). Accordingly, we vacate the superior court’s final [order] and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with Rule 46.

McBride, supra (footnotes omitted). See also E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., supra at

238 (remanding case for further proceedings based on the trial court’s failure to

comply with Rule 46); Steinichen v. Stancil, 281 Ga. 75, 76 (2) (635 SE2d 158) (2006)

(where a party was not entitled by statute to file exceptions to a special master’s

report, the failure to file objections before the trial court adopts the report does not bar

the party from objecting to the court’s judgment in a motion for new trial or on

appeal). In doing so, we note an apparent discrepancy between the special master’s

recommendation that the trial court order a title search of the property and the final

order of dismissal, from which it is not clear if such a title search was ordered. So

whether the recommended title search is necessary will be an issue before the trial

court on remand.

3. Appointment of special master

4 Mt. Patmos challenges the superior court order appointing the special master

based on alleged failures to comply with Rule 46 notice and affidavit requirements

before the appointment. See Rule 46 (B) (1) & (3). But even if the “trial court’s

[alleged] failure[s] . . . violated [Rule] 46[, Mt. Patmos has] not demonstrated that [it]

objected to the order appointing the special master. Thus, we cannot consider

the . . . challenge to the appointment of the special master.” Standard Bldg. Co. v.

Schofield Interior Contractors, 315 Ga. App. 516, 520 (3) (726 SE2d 760) (2012)

(footnotes omitted) (holding that even though the trial court violated Rule 46 (B) (1)

by failing to provide notice before appointing a special master, the appellants did not

object to the appointment and thus could not challenge it for the first time on appeal).

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Hodges and Pipkin, JJ.,

concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Waters
695 S.E.2d 265 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2010)
Standard Building Co. v. Schofield Interior Contractors, Inc.
726 S.E.2d 760 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2012)
Steinichen v. Stancil
635 S.E.2d 158 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
MT. PATMOS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. SHERYL RUCKER, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mt-patmos-baptist-church-inc-v-sheryl-rucker-gactapp-2025.