M&T Mortgage Corp. v. Camacho

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

M&T Mortgage Corp. v. Camacho

5 A.D.3d 111, 771 N.Y.S.2d 897, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2080

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 2, 2004

StatusPublished

This text of 5 A.D.3d 111 (M&T Mortgage Corp. v. Camacho) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

M&T Mortgage Corp. v. Camacho, 5 A.D.3d 111, 771 N.Y.S.2d 897, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2080 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alexander Hunter, Jr., J.), entered October 9, 2003, which denied defendant Camacho’s motion to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale and to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, with leave to serve a late answer, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Camacho argued that her right to proper notice of the action [112]*112was denied when her estranged husband, for allegedly fraudulent reasons, intercepted the substituted service at her place of residence, as well as all legal notices pertaining to her default on the mortgage. Personal jurisdiction was obtained in accordance with CPLR 308 (2). The court could nonetheless grant Camacho an opportunity to answer the complaint without vacating the judgment of foreclosure as an exercise of discretion in these unusual circumstances. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Mazzarelli, Saxe, Ellerin and Marlow, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alexander Hunter, Jr., J.), entered October 9, 2003, which denied defendant Camacho’s motion to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale and to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, with leave to serve a late answer, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Camacho argued that her right to proper notice of the action [112]*112was denied when her estranged husband, for allegedly fraudulent reasons, intercepted the substituted service at her place of residence, as well as all legal notices pertaining to her default on the mortgage. Personal jurisdiction was obtained in accordance with CPLR 308 (2). The court could nonetheless grant Camacho an opportunity to answer the complaint without vacating the judgment of foreclosure as an exercise of discretion in these unusual circumstances. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Mazzarelli, Saxe, Ellerin and Marlow, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

5 A.D.3d 111, 771 N.Y.S.2d 897, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2080, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mt-mortgage-corp-v-camacho-nyappdiv-2004.