Msp Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Pfizer, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedApril 4, 2023
DocketCivil Action No. 2022-1419
StatusPublished

This text of Msp Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Pfizer, Inc. (Msp Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Pfizer, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Msp Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Pfizer, Inc., (D.D.C. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. 22-cv-01419 (DLF) v.

PFIZER, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Five limited liability corporations—MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSP Recovery

Claims PROV, Series LLC; MSPA Claims I, LLC; MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC, Series PMPI;

and MSP Recovery Claims Series 44, LLC—bring this action against Pfizer, Inc., Advanced Care

Scripts, and the Patient Access Network Foundation. Before the Court are the defendants’ motions

to dismiss, Dkts. 47, 49, 50, and Pfizer’s motion to strike, Dkt. 47. For the reasons that follow, the

Court will grant the defendants’ motions to dismiss and deny as moot Pfizer’s motion to strike.

I. BACKGROUND

Under the Medicare and Medicaid systems, beneficiary patients may receive their

healthcare benefits, including drugs, from private insurers that contract with the government to

provide healthcare insurance to patients. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 44, 48. 1 These insurers cover most of a

1 On a motion to dismiss, the Court assumes the truth of material factual allegations in the complaint. See Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). For purposes of this opinion, the Court accepts all of the allegations of the complaint, including those derived from any settlement agreement between the defendants and the government. The Court will not address the defendants’ argument that a plaintiff may not “recast” the allegations in a settlement drug’s cost, but patients may still be required to pay a portion of the cost, called a co-payment. Id.

¶ 2 n.5. Thus, even when insured by private entities, some patients struggle to pay for their

medications. Id. ¶ 49. To cover their co-payments, patients can receive financial aid from

independent charity patient assistance programs that are funded by donations from pharmaceutical

companies. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. The Patient Access Network Foundation is one such financial assistance

program. Id. ¶ 50. It has received money from, among others, Pfizer, id. ¶¶ 3, 13, 28, and, at the

same time, it has helped patients pay for drugs manufactured by Pfizer—Sutent and Inlyta, both

of which treat renal cell carcinoma, and Tikosyn, which treats arrhythmia (collectively, “Subject

Drugs). Id. ¶¶ 1, 3–4.

The plaintiffs allege that these co-payment assistance schemes create perverse incentives

for drug manufacturers because patients end up purchasing drugs that they otherwise could not

afford. Although drug manufacturers pay the cost of patients’ co-payments (through financial

assistance programs), they receive the remaining cost of the drug from the patient’s insurer—in

this context, a private insurer contracting with Medicare or Medicaid. Id. ¶¶ 52–53. Because

patients who receive a drug in this manner are not concerned about the total cost of the drug, drug

manufacturers are also able to charge more for the drug without losing business. Id. ¶¶ 12, 59, 61.

Drug manufacturers prefer to make donations to patient assistance programs rather than participate

in drug donation programs where they receive no payments for their drugs; by participating in

patient assistance programs, they can not only boost sales, but also increase the prices of their

drugs. Id. ¶¶ 50, 52.

agreement to state a claim, see, e.g., Pfizer Mem. at 10–14, Dkt. 47-1, because the Court will resolve the motions on standing grounds. 2 Such incentives also create room for improper collusion between manufacturers and

assistance programs. Id. ¶¶ 65–69. As the complaint alleges, a manufacturer can donate to an

assistance program to induce the program to “steer patients toward and lock them into [that]

manufacturer’s product, even when other equally effective and less costly alternatives are

available.” Id. ¶ 61. And an assistance program might, in turn, “influence the patient to purchase

. . . certain items,” such as drugs made by manufacturers donating to the program, so that the

program receives more donations. Id. ¶ 63. The Office of the Inspector General has stated that

such behavior would be illegal because it would violate the Anti-Kickback Statute, among other

laws. Id.

The plaintiffs are companies that allegedly have been assigned the right to recover on

behalf of Medicare and Medicaid private insurers who were injured by such illegal behavior

(“Insurers”). Id. ¶ 14. According to the plaintiffs, the three defendants— Pfizer, the Patient Access

Network Foundation, and Advanced Care Scripts, a specialty pharmacy—engaged in a

“conspiratorial scheme to increase the unit price and quantity dispensed” of the Subject Drugs

from January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 1, 102, 106–08. Allegedly, during that

time period, Advanced Care Scripts “funneled patients away from Pfizer’s free drug program” into

the Patient Access Network Foundation’s copayment assistance program. Id. ¶ 5. Pfizer donated

money to the Foundation, id. ¶¶ 3–5, 115–121, and in exchange, the Foundation covered these

patients’ co-pays for prescriptions of the Subject Drugs, id. ¶ 3. As a result, Pfizer stopped

donating its drugs to these patients for free, and instead received large payments from the patients’

private Medicare and Medicaid insurers for providing the same drugs to the same patients. Id. ¶

102, 144–145. In addition, to help Pfizer “ensure that [the Foundation] did in fact use [its] . . .

‘donations’ to pay the co-pays for patients’ prescriptions” of the Subject Drugs, Advanced Care

3 Scripts shared the Foundation’s data with Pfizer. Id. ¶ 3. For the drug Tikosyn in particular, Pfizer

also conspired with the Foundation “to create and finance a fund [specifically] for Medicare

patients” eligible to be prescribed Tikosyn. Id. ¶ 4. They coordinated the timing of the opening

of this foundation with a Tikosyn price increase so that the Foundation’s co-pay assistance could

reduce the price sensitivity of Tikosyn patients and permit them to continue purchasing the drug

despite the price increase. Id. ¶ 102.

The plaintiffs allege that, “as a result of [this] illegal [s]cheme,” the Insurers were forced

to pay for artificially increased amounts of the Subject Drugs at supra-competitive prices. Id. ¶¶

70, 80, 88, 99. Namely, they “were harmed as a result of [the] illegal conduct in the approximate

sum of $20,853,617 between 2012 and 2021.” Id. ¶ 40. As evidence that the defendants’ conduct

caused the Insurers financial injury, the plaintiffs cite “a continuous significant increase in the

annual dosage units for Tikosyn” until 2016. Id. ¶ 71. Similarly, they allege that usage of Inlyta

“went down when the Scheme ended”: “Total units provided fell by over 100,000 from 2015 to

2016, in the final year of the Scheme[.]” Id. ¶ 86.

On May 20, 2022, the plaintiffs filed this complaint alleging claims under the federal

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, id. ¶¶ 167–206; various state consumer

protection laws, id. ¶¶ 207–335; unjust enrichment under state law, id. ¶¶ 336–349; and a Florida

statute, id. ¶¶ 350–373. The plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a proposed

class consisting of all private insurers “that bore all or part of the expense to purchase the Subject

Pfizer Drugs between January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2016, pursuant to Medicare and/or

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