Msi v. Lmcit

646 N.W.2d 546
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedJune 26, 2002
DocketCX-01-1929
StatusPublished

This text of 646 N.W.2d 546 (Msi v. Lmcit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Msi v. Lmcit, 646 N.W.2d 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

646 N.W.2d 546 (2002)

MUTUAL SERVICE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
LEAGUE OF MINNESOTA CITIES INSURANCE TRUST, Respondent.

No. CX-01-1929.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

June 26, 2002.

*547 Jack D. Moore, Moore, Warner & Kruger, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Charles E. Gillen, Stephen F. Buterin, Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, PLLP, Saint Paul, MN, for respondent.

Michael C. Snyder, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association.

Considered and decided by WILLIS, Presiding Judge, SHUMAKER, Judge, and FOLEY, Judge.[*]

OPINION

WILLIS, Judge.

Appellant insurer challenges adverse summary judgment, arguing that the district court erred by concluding that a marked police patrol car is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of the Minnesota *548 No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2000). Because we conclude that applying the plain meaning of the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" to this case produces an absurd and unreasonable result that plainly departs from the first stated purpose of the no-fault act, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

On March 17, 2000, a marked police patrol car, driven by a Rochester police officer and owned by the City of Rochester, struck and injured a pedestrian. Appellant Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Company (MSI) insured the pedestrian as a resident relative under an automobile policy; respondent League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust (LMCIT) insured the city under an automobile policy. Both policies provided $20,000 in basic economic-loss benefits, and MSI's policy provided $60,000 in optional medical-expense benefits. The pedestrian incurred medical expenses in excess of $20,000.

MSI paid the excess and brought a declaratory-judgment action against LMCIT for payment of $20,000 of basic economic-loss benefits on the ground that LMCIT's policy had a higher priority for payment. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.47 (2000) (providing priority of payment of basic economic-loss benefits). MSI moved for summary judgment. The district court denied MSI's motion and granted summary judgment to LMCIT, concluding that the pedestrian was not entitled to benefits under LMCIT's policy because a marked police patrol car is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2000). This appeal follows.

ISSUE

Did the district court err by concluding that a marked police patrol car is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2000)?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from summary judgment, this court determines (1) whether there are genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Hertz Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Minn.1998). The parties agree that there are no disputed facts and that the issue on appeal involves interpretation of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (no-fault act), Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2000). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which appellate courts review de novo. Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn.2000).

LMCIT's coverage declarations limit payment for personal-injury claims to "basic Minnesota statutory coverage," and the parties do not dispute the district court's finding that the policy provides "benefits coverage for qualifying motor vehicles as required by the [no-fault act]." Thus, the scope of LMCIT's policy, and the right of a pedestrian to recover benefits under that policy, is determined by the provisions of the no-fault act.

The no-fault act provides:

Every owner of a motor vehicle of a type which is required to be registered or licensed or is principally garaged in this state shall maintain during the period in which operation or use is contemplated a plan of reparation security * * * [that] shall provide for basic economic loss benefits and residual liability coverage.

Minn.Stat. § 65B.48, subd. 1. "[E]very person suffering loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle * *549 * * has a right to basic economic loss benefits." Minn.Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 1.

Here, the parties do not dispute that a marked police patrol car is not required to be registered under chapter 168. See Minn.Stat. § 168.012, subd. 1(b) (2000 & Supp.2001) (providing that "police patrols * * *, the general appearance of which is unmistakable, shall not be required to register"). MSI argues, however, that because the marked police patrol car was a motor vehicle that was principally garaged in Minnesota, Minn.Stat. § 65B.48, subd. 1, requires that it be insured for basic economic-loss benefits. But the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" is

every vehicle, other than a motorcycle or other vehicle with fewer than four wheels, which (a) is required to be registered pursuant to chapter 168, and (b) is designed to be self-propelled by an engine or motor for use primarily upon public roads, highways or streets in the transportation of persons or property.

Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 2. Therefore, no matter where a vehicle is garaged, it is not within the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" unless it is required to be registered under chapter 168. And the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" applies throughout the no-fault act "except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning." Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 1.

The plain language of the no-fault act provides that a vehicle can only be a "motor vehicle" if it is required to be registered under chapter 168, the plain language of the no-fault act's right-to-benefits provision uses the statutory definition, and there is no context in that provision that "clearly indicates a different meaning." See Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 1. Because marked police patrol cars are not required to be registered under chapter 168, the right-to-benefits provision, on its face, does not grant a person the right to basic-economic-loss benefits for an injury arising out of the use of a marked police patrol car. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 1.

If, on its face and in application to the facts, a statute's meaning is plain, judicial construction is not normally appropriate. See Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn.2001). But although plain meaning is the governing principle in applying statutory language, Minnesota courts will not give effect to plain meaning if it produces an absurd or an unreasonable result that departs from the purpose of the statute. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2000); Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn.1997); Wegener v. Comm'r of Revenue, 505 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn.1993); Anker v. Little, 541 N.W.2d 333

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Related

Anker v. Little
541 N.W.2d 333 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota, 1995)
Hertz Corp. v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.
573 N.W.2d 686 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1998)
Nathe Bros., Inc. v. American National Fire Insurance Co.
615 N.W.2d 341 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 2000)
American Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant
636 N.W.2d 309 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 2001)
Olson v. Ford Motor Co.
558 N.W.2d 491 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1997)
Wegener v. Commissioner of Revenue
505 N.W.2d 612 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
646 N.W.2d 546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/msi-v-lmcit-minnctapp-2002.