FOR PUBLICATION May 19 2014, 9:13 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: THOMAS E. WHEELER II THOMAS W. BLESSING MAGGIE L. SMITH Hollingsworth & Zivitz, P.C. Frost Brown Todd LLC Carmel, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana IAN THOMPSON Frazier Law Firm Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
M.S.D. OF MARTINSVILLE, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) ) REBECCA JACKSON, individually and ) No. 55A01-1304-CT-182 As parent and legal guardian of C.J. a ) Minor, and KELLI DEARTH, ) Individually and as parent and legal ) Guardian of B.K., a Minor, ) ) Appellees-Plaintiffs. )
APPEAL FROM THE MORGAN SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable G. Thomas Gray Cause No. 55D01-1109-CT-1984
May 19, 2014 OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge After Martinsville West Middle School students C.J. and B.K. were injured during
a school shooting by former student Michael Phelps (“Phelps”), C.J. and B.K. each filed
lawsuits against the Metropolitan School District of Martinsville (“the School District”)
alleging that the School District breached its duty to keep C.J. and B.K. safe. The School
District filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied.
The School District now appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment
and argues (1) that it is immune from liability pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act,
(2) that the School District did not breach its duty to C.J. and B.K., and (3) that C.J. was
contributorily negligent.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On March 25, 2011, C.J. was an eighth-grader at Martinsville West Middle School
(“MWMS”). C.J. and Phelps, who had also been an eighth-grader at MWMS, were once
friends, but their relationship had deteriorated during the preceding few years and had
grown particularly antagonistic in 2011 after they both began sporadically dating the
same girl, N.A. Phelps remained close with N.A. In the spring of 2011, C.J. allegedly
began to spread offensive rumors about N.A., which caused further hostility between C.J.
and Phelps. Although the boys had never had a physical altercation at school, Phelps
once tried to start a fight with C.J. on a local street after a school basketball game.
2 During the four years Phelps was enrolled at MWMS,1 he accumulated a total of
fifty discipline referrals, forty-three of which were for disrespect toward school personnel
or failure to follow school rules. Phelps also had seven discipline referrals for harassing,
threatening, and physically assaulting other students. On March 2, 2011, three weeks
before the shooting, Phelps commented to some of his classmates that he wanted to “just
blow up the school.” Appellant’s App. p. 712. After Phelps’s classmates reported his
remark, the school suspended Phelps for ten days. Phelps remained barred from entering
school property except to take the ISTEP test. Because of his overall disciplinary history,
the school’s principal, Suzie Lipps (“Principal Lipps”) also initiated expulsion
proceedings against Phelps.2 However, before Phelps was expelled, and about a week
before the shooting, his mother withdrew him from school.
Two days after Phelps made his comment about blowing up the school, on March
4, 2011, while Phelps was on school property to take the ISTEP test, he had an argument
with C.J. about N.A. A MWMS teacher overheard the argument and told C.J. “not to
feed into it and to walk away.” Appellant’s App. p. 137. According to C.J., this is the
only conversation he had with any school personnel regarding his ongoing problems with
Phelps. Around the same time, about two weeks before the shooting, Phelps again
threatened C.J. after a school basketball game. C.J.’s girlfriend, A.M., testified that she
1 Phelps repeated the sixth grade. 2 Principal Lipps also notified Phelps’s probation officer of Phelps’s threat. Following a March 2010 incident where Phelps threatened another student, Phelps was adjudicated a delinquent and placed on probation for six months. After Phelps threatened to “blow up” the school, Phelps’s probation officer unsuccessfully sought to revoke Phelps’s probation.
3 told two MWMS teachers that Phelps had threatened C.J. According to A.M., those
teachers did not report Phelps’s threats to the school administration.
A.M. also testified that seven days before the shooting, on the afternoon of March
18, 2011, N.A. and A.M. were riding the school bus together when A.M. heard N.A. tell
Phelps over the phone that C.J. had made fun of her again. Phelps apparently made yet
another threat against C.J. during this conversation. After ending the phone call with
Phelps, N.A. told A.M. that “[C.J.] is doomed.” Appellant’s App. p. 158. A.M. testified
that she later warned C.J. of Phelps’s threat and C.J. responded, “I’m a big boy.” Id.
Neither A.M. nor C.J. reported this threat to school personnel.
On the morning of the shooting, March 25, 2011, Phelps’s Facebook status read
“[t]oday is the day” and “[d]on’t use your mind, use your nine.” Appellant’s App. pp.
562, 751. Phelps arrived at the school around 7:00 a.m. He was wearing a dark-colored
hooded sweatshirt with the hood pulled over his head and moved toward the building so
as to avoid detection.
Principal Lipps had developed a safety plan for the school3 and the school’s three
surveillance cameras, positioned at three of the school entrances, were functioning
properly that morning. One of the school’s entrances was unlocked from 6:30 a.m. to
7:30 a.m.; two other entrances were unlocked from 7:10 a.m. to 7:30 a.m.; and the five
school employees who were assigned to various positions around the school’s exterior to
monitor student arrival were in place beginning at 7:00 a.m. All of the monitors knew
3 The safety plan also provided for a school anti-bullying policy which requires that anyone who is a victim or witness to bullying report the behavior to the school office. Principal Lipps is responsible for investigating claims of bullying. 4 Phelps and were aware that he was prohibited from being on school property. None of
the monitors noticed Phelps when he arrived at the school, although several students did.
No students reported Phelps’s presence to school personnel, even though “everybody
knew” that he was banned from school property and even though the students saw that
Phelps carried in his back pocket what appeared to be a wrench covered in a cloth.
Appellant’s App. pp. 141, 252-53.
Immediately before Phelps approached C.J. that morning, N.A. sought out C.J. in
the school’s vestibule and told him that Phelps had arrived at the school and planned to
“kick [C.J.’s] ass.”4 Appellant’s App. pp. 138-39. C.J. replied, “I don’t care.” Id. at 138.
C.J. then sent a text message to his mother to tell her that Phelps wanted to fight him.
C.J.’s mother told him via text message to go to the school’s office. However, C.J.
remained in the school’s vestibule because he wanted to show Phelps that he was not
afraid of him and because he didn’t believe that Phelps would actually assault him.
Another MWMS student, B.K., and two other students also remained in the vestibule
with C.J.
Phelps entered the school’s vestibule and confronted C.J. around 7:15 a.m. He
threatened that C.J. “was about to get [expletive] up.” Appellant’s App. pp. 138-39, 497.
Phelps then left the vestibule, only to return a few minutes later. C.J. and B.K. were both
still in the vestibule when Phelps arrived. C.J. told Phelps that he did not wish to fight
4 N.A. apparently knew that Phelps possessed a gun, and Phelps had stated to N.A. that he wanted to shoot C.J., but N.A. did not warn C.J. that Phelps had a gun because she did not believe Phelps would really use the gun to attack C.J. 5 and Phelps responded, “too bad,” pulled a stolen handgun5 from his waistband, and fired
two shots into C.J.’s stomach. The ejected shell casings from the bullets hit B.K.,
injuring his hand. After the shooting, Phelps fled the scene. C.J. was transported via
Lifeline to Methodist Hospital in Indianapolis.
The State subsequently charged Phelps with attempted murder, aggravated battery,
carrying a handgun without a license on school property, trespassing on school property,
possession of a firearm on school property, and theft. The State later dismissed all counts
except for the attempted murder count. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction and,
following a bench trial on July 11, 2011, Phelps was found guilty of attempted murder.
He was sentenced to thirty-five years executed in the Department of Correction, with five
years suspended and five years of probation.
On September 20, 2011, approximately six months after the shooting, C.J. and his
mother, Rebecca Jackson sued the Martinsville Metropolitan School District, claiming
that the School District failed to protect C.J. from Phelps. Specifically, C.J. argued that
the School District was negligent when it left Door 2 unlocked, allowing Phelps to enter
the school; when it failed to warn personnel monitors that Phelps posed a threat and to
instruct them to specifically look for Phelps on school grounds after he was suspended;
and when it failed to instruct personnel monitors to call 911 if Phelps was spotted on
school property.
Seven months later, on March 22, 2012, B.K.’s mother, Kelli Dearth (“Dearth”)
filed a similar lawsuit. The trial court consolidated C.J. and B.K.’s complaints. On
5 Phelps apparently stole the handgun from the home of his former stepfather. 6 January 25, 2013, the School District filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that
it was immune from liability pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act, that C.J. was
contributorily negligent, and that the School District did not breach its duty to C.J. and
B.K. The parties filed briefs, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion on March 8,
2013. That same day, the trial court issued an order denying the School District’s motion
for summary judgment.
The School District now appeals.6 7
Standard of Review
This case comes to us prior to trial, as a result of the trial court’s denial of the
School District’s motion for summary judgment. Our standard of review of summary
judgment appeals is well established:
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as that of the trial court. Considering only those facts that the parties designated to the trial court, we must determine whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In answering these questions, the reviewing court construes all factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor and resolves all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party. The moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and once the movant satisfies the burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate and produce evidence of facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
6 B.K. declined to file a separate appellate brief, but instead joined in C.J.’s appellee’s brief. 7 We held oral argument in this appeal on April 26, 2014, at Taylor University in Upland, Indiana. We extend our gratitude to the faculty, staff, and students for their hospitality and commend counsel for the quality of their written and oral advocacy. 7 Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind. 2009)
(citations omitted).
The party appealing a summary judgment decision has the burden of persuading
this court that the grant or denial of summary judgment was erroneous. Knoebel v. Clark
County Superior Court No. 1, 901 N.E.2d 529, 531-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Where the
facts are undisputed and the issue presented is a pure question of law, we review the
matter de novo. Crum v. City of Terre Haute ex rel. Dep’t of Redev., 812 N.E.2d 164,
166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Importantly for this case, summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence
actions, since negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a
standard of the objective reasonable person. This standard is best applied by a jury after
hearing all of the evidence. See Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2010).
I. Indiana Tort Claims Act Discretionary Function Immunity
The School District argues that, because “the challenged actions involve the
performance of a discretionary function,” it is entitled to immunity under the Indiana Tort
Claims Act. Appellant’s Br. at 15. The Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”), Indiana Code
section 34-13-2-1 et seq., was enacted after our supreme court abrogated the common law
sovereign immunity of governmental units from tort liability. The ITCA governs tort
claims against governmental entities and public employees. Harrison v. Veolia Water
Indianapolis, LLC, 929 N.E.2d 247, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Pursuant to the ITCA,
“governmental entities can be subjected to liability for tortious conduct unless the
conduct is within an immunity granted by Section 3 of [the] ITCA.” Oshinski v. N. Ind.
8 Commuter Transp. Dist., 843 N.E.2d 536, 543-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The party
seeking immunity bears the burden of establishing that its conduct comes within the
ITCA. Peavler v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Monroe Cnty., 528 N.E.2d 40, 46 (Ind. 1988).
The ITCA provides that a governmental entity or governmental employee who
acts within the scope of that employee’s duty will not be liable if a loss results from
“[t]he performance of a discretionary function[.]” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7). The party
who seeks immunity bears the burden of establishing that its conduct falls within the
discretionary function exception.
Prior to our supreme court’s decision in Peavler v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Monroe
Cnty., we distinguished between ministerial and discretionary acts in order to determine
if certain conduct is included within the immunity exception. Discretionary acts were
immune and ministerial acts were not. Harvey v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Wabash County,
416 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
Historically, Indiana courts defined a ministerial act as “one which a person
performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
legal authority without regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety
of the act being done.” Dep’t of Mental Health v. Allen, 427 N.E.2d 2, 4 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981). We classified conduct as discretionary “when it involves [discretion] on the part
of the officer to determine whether or not he should perform a certain act, and, if so, in
what particular way[.]” Adams v. Schneider, 71 Ind. App. 249, 124 N.E. 718, 720 (1919).
However, in its 1988 decision, Peavler v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Monroe Cnty, our
supreme court expressly rejected the ministerial/discretionary distinction analysis,
9 concluding that, unless they can be properly characterized as policy decisions that have
resulted from a conscious balancing of risks and benefits and/or weighing of priorities,
discretionary judgments are not immune from legal challenge under the ITCA. In
rejecting the ministerial/discretionary distinction analysis, the supreme court observed
that:
The ministerial/discretionary test does not advance the public policy of government immunity because it does not consider the type of decision protected by immunity. Rather, it considers only the resulting conduct and attempts to label that conduct. The ministerial/discretionary test defines “discretionary” in the negative: anything which is non-ministerial is discretionary. The test does not require an affirmative finding that the governmental action arose from the type of policy-making decision protected by governmental immunity.
Peavler, 528 N.E.2d at 45-46.
The supreme court chose instead to adopt the planning/operational test, defining
planning activities as those that “include acts or omissions in the exercise of a legislative,
judicial, executive or planning function which involves formulation of basic policy
decisions characterized by official judgment or discretion in weighing alternatives and
choosing public policy” as well as “[g]overnment decisions about policy formation which
involve assessment of competing priorities and a weighing of budgetary considerations or
the allocation of scarce resources are also planning activities.” Id. at 45.
Under Peavler, then, the discretionary function exception of the ITCA insulates
from liability only planning activity, characterized as “only those significant policy and
political decisions which cannot be assessed by customary tort standards” and as “the
exercise of political power which is held accountable only to the Constitution or the
10 political process.” Id. at 45. The supreme court was unambiguous in its declaration that
it did not intend all decisions that involve “judgment or discernment” to be immune from
liability, since “[i]t would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how
directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its
performance.” Id. at 43, 45. See also Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat’l Trust Ins.
Co., 3 N.E.3d 1 (Ind. 2014) (holding that the City’s failure to require for-profit water
company to follow terms of management agreement by properly maintaining water
supply to fire hydrants was not a discretionary function, and thus, statutory immunity
under the ITCA did not protect the city from liability for damages that resulted from a
fire that destroyed a restaurant when firefighters’ efforts were delayed due to a frozen fire
hydrant; the city made no deliberate policy decision to fail to require company to follow
the terms of a management agreement by properly maintaining fire hydrants’ water
supply, or make a conscious decision about policy formation which involved assessment
of competing priorities and a weighing of budgetary considerations or the allocation of
scarce resources).
The School District contends that the safety plan implemented by Principal Lipps
and in place the morning of the shooting “resulted from a conscious balancing of risk and
benefits” and thus was entitled to immunity. Id. at 19. An affidavit by Principal Lipps
states, in relevant part:
6. As the West Principal, I am responsible for all facets of West’s operation. I supervise staff, perform staff evaluations, oversee curriculum development and implementation and am responsible for overall student performance and achievement. In many respects, I am the Chief Executive Officer of West.
11 7. Overseeing school operations so that students and staff have safe learning and working environments is also part of my responsibilities as Principal. Thus, I am responsible for the development of a plan for student and staff safety at West.
8. West’s Code of Conduct for Students and Discipline Policy is an important part of the safety environment at West. An excerpt from the Student Planner setting forth these provisions is attached. The Anti-Bulling [sic] Policy provides that that [sic] “anyone who is a victim of or a witness to any type of hurtful or aggressive act to an individual student or group of students should immediately report the incident to the office.”
9. A school safety plan must balance competing factors and resource limitations that must be considered in providing a learning environment for an educationally diverse student population. A school safety plan must weigh the competing needs of providing a safe environment against the obligation to creating [a] stimulating and open learning environment where students have a reasonable degree of freedom and choices. Because of financial limitations, which have become even more restrictive over the last several years, school administrators throughout the State of Indiana and the M.S.D. Martinsville must constantly prioritize all projects and programs requiring funding to assure that a reasonable balance is struck between educational programming and building security needs.
10. Providing a safe environment for staff and students requires a multi- faceted approach. Prevention of acts of violence, while very important, is not the only concern of a school safety plan. West is a public school and, as such, it must accommodate the needs of students and visitors who, as a practical matter, must have reasonable access [to] the building at various times throughout the school day and at other times for after school activities or other events.
11. With regard to building access, I, as principal, developed a plan that was in place at the time of the shooting in this case and that considered these factors. For example, the M.S.D Martinsville has a system for numbering the exterior doors of each school to guide emergency personnel to the appropriate part of the school in the event of a fire or medical emergency. As Principal, I made certain that each entrance to West has a unique number which is placed above the entrance consistent with the district’s numbering system . . . .
12 12. Second, I developed a plan with the assistance of other staff that limited access to the school. All exterior doors . . . were generally locked during the day to prevent access to the building.
13. Staff and students must have reasonable access to the building. Therefore, as part of the school safety plan, I determined that Doors 1, 2, and 3 needed to remain unlocked from 6:30 to 7:30 a.m. when students and staff generally arrived for the school day.
14. To increase student and staff safety, especially during school arrival times when three of the doors are unlocked, I took other steps to reduce the chances of violent incidents. I had cameras installed at all exterior doors that were used by students to enter the building so as to record activity at those doors and to act as a deterrent to misconduct. By recording all activity at these entrances, I believed, based on my experience and training, that the likelihood of violence would be reduced because students and staff would know that their actions by these doors would be preserved for future disciplinary or criminal proceedings. I also determined that based upon the layout of the school building, financial resources, competing building needs, and the utility of additional cameras that the placement and number of cameras was sufficient to provide a safe school environment.
***
17. I specifically considered how to place personnel during the mornings to monitor arrivals. One staff member was placed at a location where he or she could observe Door 2 as well as the front of the School….
18. Before the shooting, I participated in regular meetings with the M.S.D. Martinsville’s leadership team and the district safety committee. A variety of school safety issues were discussed at these meetings. I, and the assistant principal, frequently re-evaluated West’s school safety plan in light of these meetings to determine what improvements or changes should be made to the security at West.
Appellant’s App. pp. 94-98 (internal citations omitted).
The School District declares that the decisions made by Principal Lipps with
respect to MWMS’s safety plan are “quintessential discretionary functions” and argues,
“[t]he fact that Plaintiffs may disagree with the ultimate decisions the School made
13 regarding its safety policy does not alter the underlying nature of the School’s decision in
the first place.” Id. at 21, 22.8
To support its argument, the School District cites several cases from other
jurisdictions concluding that a school’s safety and security decisions are discretionary
functions which are immune from liability. In Mosley v. Portland School Dist., 843 P.2d
415 (Or. 1992), a high school student who was stabbed with a knife during a fight with
another student on school property brought a personal injury claim against the school
district and officials, alleging negligence in the school’s failure to properly supervise its
students, failure to provide adequate security for students, failure to prevent weapons
from being brought onto school grounds, and failure to end the fight before the knife was
used. The trial court entered judgment against the student. The Oregon Supreme Court
affirmed, observing that a “public body that owes a particular duty of care (such as that
owed by a school district to its students who are required to be on school premises during
school hours) has wide policy discretion in choosing the means by which to carry out that
duty.” Id. at 419.
The School District also cites Randell v. Tulsa Independent School Dist., 889 P.2d
1264 (Ok. Ct. App. 1994), where a student sued the school district and the school’s
assistant principal for negligence. The plaintiff had been struck in the face after the
assistant principal broke up a fight between the plaintiff and three other students. In his
8 Here, the School District cites Leo Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 936 N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) aff’d on reh’g, 940 N.E.2d 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (designated evidence that a different course of action would have been better does not alter the immunity analysis as long as the decision being challenged was in fact “undertaken after a conscious and informed risk/benefit analysis”).
14 complaint, the plaintiff argued that the school district failed to spend all of the money it
had available for security, that it did not have an adequate policy for breaking up crowds
or identifying student gang members, that it did not create or enforce policies to report
criminal acts of students to police, that it did not have security cameras, and that it failed
to act reasonably and prudently. The Court of Appeals of Oklahoma held that the
policies created by the school board regarding security were “discretionary acts for which
no liability can be imposed.” Id. at 1267.
Next, the School District cites Kelly v. Lewis, 471 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996),
where the estate of a high school student killed in a shooting sued the school’s principal
and one of its teachers, arguing that the defendants were aware of the risks of violent
crime against the students and failed to use ordinary care to protect the decedent, failed to
enforce the school’s security rules, and failed to provide adequate security. The Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, noting that “‘making decisions requiring the means used to supervise school
children is a discretionary function of a school principal,’” and that “the teachers’ task to
monitor, supervise, and control students is a discretionary action protected by the doctrine
of official immunity.” Id. (quoting Guthrie v. Irons, 211 Ga. App. 502, 506, 439 S.E.2d
732 (1993)). It is important to note, however, that the Georgia court reached its decision
using the discretionary/ministerial act analysis expressly rejected by our supreme court in
Peavler.
15 Finally, the School District cites Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 44 (Minn.
1992), where the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the school district’s district-wide
bus-boarding policy entitled the school district to discretionary function immunity.
We first note that C.J.’s complaint does not allege that the MWMS safety plan was
negligently formulated. Rather, it claims that C.J.’s injury resulted from negligent
implementation of the plan. See Greathouse v. Armstrong, 616 N.E.2d 364 (Ind. 1993)
(under the Peavler planning-operational test, decisions involving formulation of basic
policy are entitled to immunity while decisions regarding only execution or
implementation of that policy are not). We further note that even if C.J. did allege
negligent formulation of the safety plan, MWMS’s safety plan was not created in a way
that would entitle the School District it to immunity.
In its reply brief, the School District cites two repealed sections of the Indiana
Code which provided that “[p]rincipals have the authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, promote, discharge, and discipline school employees,” Ind. Code § 20-7.5-1-2(h)
(repealed in 2005), and that “[a] principal may take any action concerning the principal’s
school or a school activity within the principal’s jurisdiction that is reasonably necessary
to carry out or prevent interference with an educational function or school purposes.” Ind.
Code § 20-8.1-5.1-5 (repealed in 2005). The School District also quotes Beeching v.
Levee, 764 N.E.2d 669, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), where another panel of this court noted
that school principals “have the authority to write regulations governing student conduct”
and that “to the general public, a principal is perceived to have responsibility and
authority for operating a school and overseeing the education of its students.”
16 Importantly for our case, however, the court in Beeching went on to note that
under Indiana law the only publicly elected, local school officials are school board members. While these elected school board members could easily be determined to be “public officials” because of their elective office, building principals are at least two employment levels removed from school board members. In most, if not all Indiana public school systems, building principals are appointed by system superintendents and ratified by vote of the system’s school board.
Beeching, 764 N.E.2d at 679 (internal citations omitted). The Beeching court declared
that, under the circumstances of that case, “public school principals are not ‘public
officials.’” Id. Although this conclusion was made in the context of a defamation action
the school principal brought against defendant Beeching, the court’s analysis is relevant
to the question of whether Principal Lipps’s safety plan constituted policy-making
immune from liability under the Peavler planning/operation test. Like the principal in
Beeching, Principal Lipps had the authority to, and did, write regulations governing the
conduct of students at Martinsville West Middle School. Like the principal in Beeching,
Principal Lipps stated in her affidavit that she is largely responsible for “all facets of
West’s operation.” Appellant’s App. p. 94. However, also like the principal in Beeching,
Principal Lipps is not a public official, and her role is not that of policymaker. She is “at
least two employment levels removed from [the] school board members” who are elected
public officials. Id.
Indeed, language found in Indiana Code Article 20 indicates that a school
principal’s role is mostly administrative, while the responsibility for creating policy lies
with the school board. Indiana Code section 20-18-2-14 provides that “‘Principal’ refers
to the chief administrative officer of a school” (emphasis added). And while Indiana
17 Code section 20-33-8-10 states that “[a] principal may take action concerning the
principal’s school or a school activity within the principal’s jurisdiction that is reasonably
necessary to carry out or prevent interference with an educational function or school
purposes,” including “writ[ing] regulations that govern student conduct,” Indiana Code
section 20-23-16-26 makes clear that it is the school board which “make[s] decisions
pertaining to the general conduct of the schools.” The statute provides that:
The government of the common schools of a district is vested in the board. The board shall function with the authority, powers, privileges, duties, and obligations previously granted to or required of school cities and their governing boards regarding the: (1) purchase of supplies; (2) purchase and sale of: (A) buildings; (B) grounds; and (C) equipment; (3) erection of buildings; (4) employment and dismissal of school personnel; (5) insuring property and employees; (6) making and executing of a budget; (7) borrowing money; and (8) paying the salaries and expenses of the: (A) county superintendent; and (B) employees; as approved by the board.
Ind. Code § 20-23-16-26.
The federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana has held that, in the
context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim brought against a school principal, “the school board
and not the Principal . . . has final policy making authority under Indiana law.” Harless
by Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1339, 1349 (S.D. Ind. 1996). In Harless, the court noted
18 Indiana’s statutory language9 allowing school principals to “take any action concerning
his school or any school activity within his jurisdiction which is reasonably necessary to
carry out or prevent interference with an educational function or school purposes”
including “establishing written rules and standards to govern student conduct” but held
that this delegation of authority to make “ad hoc decisions” to maintain order within the
school was distinguishable from the board’s authority to create final policy. Id.
And in Oliver by Hines v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Ind. 1995),
the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held that, in a section 1983 action
brought by a student against the school principal, “it would appear that while [Principal]
McClung and other principals in Indiana were delegated much authority by [Indiana
Code section] 20-8.1-5-2, that delegation was not absolute so as to grant principals the
power to make final policy for the school boards” and that “while McClung may have
had broad discretion to make decisions regarding the operation of the West Jay County
Junior High School, nothing in [section] 20-8.1-5-2 purports to grant him policy-making
authority.”
Under our reading of Indiana case law, Indiana statutes, and the evidence before
us, Principal Lipps’s safety plan does not entitle the School District to discretionary
function immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act and the Peavler planning/operation
test. Principal Lipps stated in her affidavit, “[a]s the West Principal, I am responsible for
9 The court cited Indiana Code section 20-8.1-5-2(b), which has since been replaced with similar language found in Indiana Code section 20-33-8-10(a) (“A principal may take action concerning the principal's school or a school activity within the principal's jurisdiction that is reasonably necessary to carry out or prevent interference with an educational function or school purposes.”)
19 all facets of West’s operation.” Appellant’s App. p. 94 (emphasis added). And it is
apparent that Principal Lipps, a person to whom Indiana law grants no policy-making
authority, was largely, if not entirely, the person responsible for developing the MWMS
safety plan. Her affidavit provides that “I, as principal, developed a plan that was in
place at the time of the shooting in this case and that considered these factors”; that “I
determined that Doors 1, 2, and 3 needed to remain unlocked from 6:30 to 7:30 a.m.
when students and staff generally arrived for the school day”; that “I had cameras
installed at all exterior doors that were used by students to enter the building”; and that “I
specifically considered how to place personnel during the mornings to monitor arrivals.”
Id. at 94-98. Her affidavit indicates that she attended meetings with “the M.S.D.
Martinsville’s leadership team and the district safety committee” but the leadership team
and safety committee apparently had no direct involvement in the development of the
Martinsville West Middle School safety plan.10
While it may be the case that, in developing the MWMS safety plan, Principal
Lipps was required to “balance competing factors and resource limitations that must be
considered in providing a learning environment for an educationally diverse student
population,” Id. at 94, it is important to note that Principal Lipps’s development of the
plan was not an action mandated by statute under the General Assembly’s policy-making
authority. Furthermore, unlike the Oregon, Oklahoma, and Minnesota cases cited by the
School District, Mosley, Randell, and Pletan, there is no evidence in the record that the
10 Lipps’s affidavit provided that “I, and the assistant principal, frequently re-evaluated West’s school safety plan in light of these meetings.” Appellant’s App. pp. 97-98.
20 elected officials on the school board, the School District’s policy-making body, played
any role in developing or approving the safety plan. And the Georgia appellate court case,
Kelly v. Lewis, has marginal, if any, relevance to our inquiry since it reaches its
conclusion using a ministerial/discretionary function analysis that has been considered
and rejected by our supreme court.
Peavler dictates that the discretionary function exception under the ITCA grant
immunity only to those decisions and actions which constitute “the exercise of political
power . . . held accountable only to the Constitution or the political process.” Peavler,
528 N.E.2d at 45. Here, we have been directed to nothing to support the School District’s
contention that Principal Lipps’s development of the safety plan was an exercise of
political power under Peavler. At best this plan might be immune under the pre-Peavler
definition of the word “discretionary,” but it is not the type of policy-making that our
supreme court has since determined should be exempt from liability under the
planning/operation test. As with most discretionary decisions, Principal Lipps may well
have balanced factors and resource considerations in developing her plan, but that does
not mean that this activity rises to the level of protected policy-making by the school
board. Under these facts and circumstances, the School District is not entitled to
immunity under the discretionary function exception of the ITCA.
II. Breach of Duty
The School District next argues that “the School exercised reasonable care for the
protection of its students and that it was not foreseeable to the School that [Phelps] would
trespass onto school property the morning of March 25th and shoot [C.J.].”
21 Negligence consists of: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a
breach of that duty by the defendant; and (3) injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by
that breach. Foddrill v. Crane, 894 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “An
indispensable element of an action for negligence is that the act complained of must be
the proximate cause of the accident producing the injury.” Havert v. Caldwell, 452
N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind. 1983). In defining proximate cause, the Indiana Supreme Court
has stated that a “negligent act or omission is the proximate cause of an injury if the
injury is a natural and probable consequence which, in light of the circumstances, should
reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated.” Id. Foreseeability of the injury is the
critical test for determining the defendant’s liability. Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Everton, 655 N.E.2d 360, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The foreseeability of whether the
defendant’s act proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries is a question for the trier of fact.
Id. at 366-67.
In cases involving an alleged breach of a school’s duty owed to its students,
Indiana courts have held that schools have a “special duty,” beyond regular premises
liability, to exercise the level of care an ordinary, prudent person would exercise under
the same or similar circumstances. Swanson v. Wabash College, 504 N.E.2d 327, 330
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987); see also Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 611, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706
(1974) (“[T]he relationship of school pupils and school authorities should call into play
the well recognized duty in tort law that persons entrusted with children, or others whose
characteristics make it likely that they may do somewhat unreasonable things, have a
special responsibility recognized by the common law to supervise their charges.”).
22 Because there is “some remote risk of injury in all human existence,” Norman v.
Turkey Run Cmty. School Corp., 274 Ind. 310, 316, 411 N.E.2d 614, 617 (1980), the
duty imposed upon Indiana schools to protect their students has been necessarily defined
by the specific circumstances of each case. Under facts similar to those in the present
case, this court has held that a plaintiff has established that a school had a duty to protect
its student from criminal attack and breached that duty where the attacker had a
propensity towards violence; the school system or school personnel was aware of this
propensity; and school personnel’s failure to provide adequate supervision allowed the
attacker the opportunity to assault the student, proximately causing his injuries. See
McClyde v. Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 752 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Consequently, we must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether the School District conformed to the standard of conduct required by its duty
with respect to C.J. See Ashcraft v. Ne. Sullivan Cnty. Sch. Corp., 706 N.E.2d 1101,
1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
A. Foreseeability of the Shooting
The School District argues that summary judgment in its favor is appropriate in
this case because the School District could not have foreseen that Phelps would come to
the school on March 25, 2011 to shoot C.J. The School District declares that public
schools “do not have the luxury of picking and choosing who they can educate” and that,
therefore, “school corporations are not and cannot be considered insurers against all risks
posed by a student towards others.” Appellant’s Br. at 32. The School District quotes
Roe v. North Adams Community School Corp., 647 N.E.2d 655, 660 (Ind. Ct. App.
23 1995), where another panel of this court held, “[i]n order for the plaintiffs to recover
[against the school district], they were also bound to show that [the other student’s]
conduct was foreseeable by the school.” The School District emphasizes that Phelps’s
shooting of C.J. was a criminal act by a third party and that the “duty to anticipate and to
take steps against a criminal act of a third party arises only when the facts of the
particular case make it reasonably foreseeable that a criminal act is likely to occur.”
Appellant’s Br. at 34 (quoting Schlotman v. Taza Cafe, 868 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007)).
In analyzing the foreseeability factor of duty, we focus on whether the injured
person actually harmed was a foreseeable victim and whether the type of harm actually
inflicted was reasonably foreseeable. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991).
Such foreseeability does not mean that the precise hazard or exact consequences should
have been foreseen, but neither does it encompass anything which might occur. Crull v.
Platt, 471 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Here, as
the moving party, the School District has the burden of demonstrating that, as a matter of
law, Phelps’s assault on C.J. was not foreseeable. See Kroger Co., 930 N.E.2d at 7.
In this regard, the School District first argues that the affidavit of Phelps’s and
C.J.’s classmate, C.H., is “insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact” and must be
stricken from the record. Appellant’s Br. at 25. During a June 28, 2011 deposition taken
in criminal proceedings against Phelps, C.H. testified that she did not learn of Phelps’s
24 plan to shoot C.J. until she saw Phelps’s Facebook status11 on the morning of March 25,
2011. She also testified that, prior to the shooting, she never notified Principal Lipps that
Phelps planned to shoot C.J.12 However, in a April 30, 2012 affidavit containing the
transcript of a recorded statement C.H. made as part of C.J.’s civil proceeding against the
School District, C.H. stated that she had learned of Phelps’s plan sometime prior to
March 25, 2011. In the affidavit, she further stated that, prior to the shooting, she “went
to Mrs. Lipps and told her there was going to be a shooting, but [Lipps] said [C.H. was]
nothing but a liar . . . she said that in her whole school career she never saw a shooting
and she was never going to see one.”13 Appellant’s App. p. 39.
The School District requested that the trial court strike the affidavit because “a
nonmovant may not create issues of fact by pointing to affidavit testimony which
contradicts the witnesses [sic] sworn testimony in a prior deposition.” Appellant’s Br. at
27 (quoting Miller v. Monsanto Co., 626 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). The
School District notes that the trial court did not rule on the School District’s motion to
strike the affidavit. The School District asks that this court “strike the portions of
[C.H.’s] Affidavit that contradict her prior deposition testimony.” Appellant’s Br. at 28.
11 Phelps’s status read, “Today is the day” and “Don’t use your mind, use your nine.” Appellant’s App. pp. 750-752. 12 The following exchange occurred between C.H. and Phelps’s defense counsel: Q: Did you and [N.A.] and a whole bunch of sixth graders tell Mrs. Lipps that [Phelps] was going to shoot [C.J.]? A: No. I didn’t tell Mrs. Lipps anything. Appellant’s App. pp. 753-54. 13 Shortly after the shooting, C.H.’s classmate, A.R., made a similar statement to a reporter from local news station Fox 59. 25 The School District further argues that “[e]ven if not stricken, this Affidavit is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the School had actual
knowledge of [Phelps’s] threat to shoot [C.J.] prior to the shooting.” Id., citing Gaboury
v. Ireland Rd. Grace Brethren, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (Ind. 1983) (“contradictory
testimony contained in an affidavit of the nonmovant may not be used by him to defeat a
summary judgment motion”).
The School District acknowledges that MWMS teacher Mrs. Kempe overheard an
argument between Phelps and C.J. when Phelps was on school grounds to take the ISTEP
test and that C.J. subsequently told Mrs. Kempe that Phelps wanted to fight with him.
The School District argues, however, that this is “insufficient to establish that the School
should have known that [Phelps] intended to harm [C.J.] the morning of March 25,”
emphasizing that the conversation between C.J. and Kempe occurred three weeks prior to
the shooting. Appellant’s Br. at 24. The School District also underscores that, prior to
the shooting, Phelps had been withdrawn from school by his mother; that Phelps and C.J.
had never been involved in a physical altercation with each other at school; that Phelps
had never been involved in physical violence at school beyond fist fights; and that even
the juvenile court did not consider Phelps to be enough of a danger to others to revoke his
probation after he commented that he wanted to blow up the school. Appellant’s Br. at
29.
It is well settled that summary judgment is especially inappropriate where the
critical question for resolution is whether a defendant exercised the requisite degree of
care under the factual circumstances. Randolph Co. Hospital v. Livingston, 650 N.E.2d
26 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. Under the facts and circumstances before
us in the record prior to trial, we conclude that there exist genuine issues of material fact
on this issue and that the School District has not proved as a matter of law that the
shooting was not foreseeable. Phelps had a lengthy history of serious misbehavior in
school; threatened to blow up the school; and was on school grounds, presumably in
close proximity to the personnel monitors, for thirty minutes prior to the shooting. He
had made threats against C.J., of which at least one MWMS teacher was aware. The day
before the shooting, another MWMS student had made a threat to shoot a teacher. Given
these facts, a jury could conclude that it is foreseeable that a shooting would occur at
MWMS. The unstricken affidavit of C.H. also creates genuine issues of material facts as
to whether the School District had specific warning about Phelps’s attack. See McClyde,
752 N.E.2d at 235 (concluding that an affidavit relied on exclusively by plaintiff can be
sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact precluding grant of defendant’s motion
for summary judgment).
We further note that the School District’s argument regarding the affidavit
containing C.H.’s recorded statement is misguided. The principles the School District
cites do not apply to the use of C.H.’s affidavit. While it is true that our courts have held
that “contradictory testimony contained in an affidavit of the nonmovant may not be used
by him to defeat a summary judgment motion where the only issue of fact raised by the
affidavit is the credibility of the affiant,” Gaboury v. Ireland Rd. Grace Brethren, Inc.,
446 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (Ind. 1983), the stated purpose for this rule is to “prevent a party
from generating its own genuine issue of material fact by providing self-serving
27 contradictory statements without explanation.” Crawfordsville Square, LLC. v. Monroe
Guar. Ins. Co., 906 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). Here, it is
the deposition and affidavit of a non-party witness that allegedly conflict. Furthermore,
the deposition with which C.H.’s affidavit allegedly conflicts occurred within a different
case altogether, Phelps’s criminal proceeding. Therefore, it is not likely the case that
C.H. made contradictory statements in a self-serving attempt to avoid a damaging
admission she made in a deposition in a separate proceeding.
Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that the question of whether the
shooting was foreseeable to the School District is one that is best resolved by the trier of
fact rather than through summary judgment.
B. Implementation of Safety Plan
The School District next contends that it exercised reasonable care in providing for
the safety of its students, noting that Principal Lipps had implemented (1) a school-wide
policy prohibiting threats, bullying, and fighting; (2) a door numbering system; (3) an
electronic door locking system; (4) a video surveillance system; and (5) the placement of
personnel monitors around school grounds during the time in which students arrived in
the morning. The School District further emphasizes that when Phelps threatened to
“blow up the school,” he was suspended immediately and expulsion proceedings were
initiated. The School District declares, “there is no scenario whereby a school can go
into the type of extended lockdown requested by Plaintiffs every time two students are
threatening to fight each other—occurrences that law enforcement in this case described
as ‘typical’ among adolescent boys.” Appellant’s Br. at 33.
28 Given the unresolved question of whether the shooting was foreseeable, it follows
that there remains this question: if the School District knew or should have known that
Phelps posed a threat to C.J.’s safety, should it have taken more steps to protect C.J. from
Phelps? A recent opinion by another panel of this court, Prancik v. Oak Hill United Sch.
Corp., 997 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) trans. denied, involves facts that are
somewhat similar to the facts of this case, but can be distinguished in two important ways.
There, a junior high school teacher left two students unsupervised in her classroom
during a four-minute passing period to supervise the hallway. While the teacher was in
the hallway, one of the students assaulted the other, injuring him. This court affirmed the
trial court’s grant of the school’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the
school was not negligent for failing to prevent the attack since there was no evidence that
the school was on notice that the attacker could be violent and no evidence that the
assault happened as a result of any failure by the teacher to follow school protocol.
Viewing the facts liberally in a light most favorable to C.J., as our standard of
review requires, it seems to us that reasonable persons could differ as to whether there is
a sufficient relationship between the School District’s general duty to supervise and
protect its students and its alleged failure to take adequate measures to protect C.J. from
Phelps. There exist genuine issues of material fact here, in light of the continued conflict
between the two boys, Phelps’s extensive disciplinary history, including discipline
referrals for harassing, threatening, and assaulting other students, and Phelps’s threat to
blow up the school. Therefore, this issue is more appropriately a question for the trier of
fact. See Drake by Drake v. Mitchell Cmty. Sch., 628 N.E.2d 1231, 1234-35 (Ind. Ct.
29 App. 1994) aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds (holding that summary
judgment was inappropriate where a reasonable jury could have found that a school
hosting a social event inside a grain elevator “breached its duty to exercise reasonable
care to warn the students and/or protect them from a known danger, exposure to
histoplasmosis” resulting from pigeon droppings inside the elevator).
III. C.J.’s Contributory Negligence
The School District next argues that summary judgment in its favor is required
because C.J. was contributorily negligent “in failing to follow his mother’s directions to
leave the vestibule and go to the office and report the threats.” Appellant’s Br. at 36.
“Contributory negligence” is the failure of a plaintiff to exercise the reasonable
care an ordinary person would use for his own protection and safety. Funston v. Sch.
Town of Munster, 849 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. 2006). In 1985, Indiana largely put to rest
its common law defense of contributory negligence “that barred recovery on a plaintiff’s
negligence claim if the plaintiff was even slightly at fault.” Penn Harris Madison Sch.
Corp. v. Howard, 861 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2007). In its place, Indiana’s
Comparative Fault Act created a modified comparative fault scheme whereby “‘any
contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount
awarded as compensatory damages . . . .’” Hopper v. Carey, 716 N.E.2d 566, 575 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied (quoting Ind. Code § 34-51-2-5). But “the claimant is
barred from recovery if the claimant’s contributory fault is greater than the fault of all
persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s damages.” Ind. Code § 34-
51-2-6.
30 However, the legislature specifically provided that the new comparative fault
scheme would not apply to governmental entities. See Ind. Code § 34-51-2-2. “This
exemption for governmental entities from comparative fault means that the common law
contributory negligence principles apply when a governmental entity is the defendant in
negligence litigation.” Penn Harris Madison Sch. Corp. v. Howard, 861 N.E.2d 1190,
1193 (Ind. 2007). And “Indiana law requires that contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff bars any recovery against government actors.” Clay City Consol. Sch. Corp.
v. Timberman, 918 N.E.2d 292, 300 n. 6 (Ind. 2009).
Since the School District is a governmental entity, if C.J. were found to be
contributorily negligent, he would be barred from recovery. Roddel v. Town of Flora,
580 N.E.2d 255, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). The general rule on the issue of the plaintiff’s
contributory negligence is that the plaintiff must exercise that degree of care to protect his
or her own safety that an ordinary reasonable person would exercise in like or similar
circumstances. Sawlani v. Mills, 830 N.E.2d 932, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff that contributes as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered and falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection. Piatek v. Beale, 994 N.E.2d 1140, 1147-48 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013) aff’d on reh’g, trans. denied.
Contributory negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury where the facts
are subject to more than one reasonable inference. Jones v. Gleim, 468 N.E.2d 205, 207
(Ind. 1984). However, where the facts are undisputed and only a single inference can
reasonably be drawn therefrom, the question of contributory negligence becomes one of
31 law. Id. Indiana courts have found contributory negligence as a matter of law in cases in
which the voluntary conduct of the plaintiff exposed him to imminent and obvious
dangers which a reasonable man exercising due care for his own safety would have
avoided. Id.
The School District claims that C.J. “had actual knowledge of the specific risk of
an imminent attack from [Phelps] that could result in serious injury or even death.”
Appellant’s Br. at 41. The School District emphasizes that:
[Phelps] had previously threatened [C.J.] with a chain outside school grounds. A student of [C.J.’s] age could appreciate the risk of serious injury that could result from [Phelps’s] use of such a weapon. Further, as discussed in the preceding subsection, [C.J.] himself has admitted that he had actual knowledge and appreciation of the specific risk that [Phelps] presented with the threats to “kick his ass” and that he ‘‘was about to get [expletive] up.”
Nevertheless [C.J.] chose to stay in the vestibule and wait for [Phelps] to come back, despite being told by his mother to leave and go to the office.
Id.
For the trial court to have ruled that contributory negligence was present as a
matter of law, “the evidence would have had to overwhelmingly establish, and without
grounds upon which reasonable men may disagree,” that C.J. was able to realize and
appreciate the danger with which he was confronted. Dibortolo v. Metro. Sch. Dist. of
Washington Twp., 440 N.E.2d 506, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). The School District has
laboriously argued that Phelps’s shooting of C.J. was unforeseeable to the School District,
yet it claims that C.J. should have foreseen that he would be vulnerable to a shooting
32 when he decided to remain in the vestibule in which Phelps confronted C.J. This is
precisely the type of genuine issue of material fact that should be resolved by a jury.
Moreover, in a society where bullying is a pervasive and confusing problem,
especially among young, school-aged children, we question whether the issue of
contributory negligence can be properly resolved as a matter of law, especially when, as
here, a victim is not the initial aggressor in an altercation, but merely fails to meekly walk
away from an attacker who is violently disposed, and especially where the victim appears
to have been unaware that the attacker was armed. Because the issue of contributory
negligence is generally not appropriate for summary judgment and because, in the present
case, the facts are subject to more than one reasonable inference, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in finding that the issue of C.J.’s contributory negligence is most
appropriately a matter for the jury. See Randolph Co. Hospital, 650 N.E.2d at 1217;
Maldonado by Maldonado v. Gill, 502 N.E.2d 1371, 1373 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); see also
Stowers v. Clinton Cent. Sch. Corp., 855 N.E.2d 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
material issues of fact exist as to whether a high school student football player was
contributorily negligent, as a matter of law, and whether the student had actual
knowledge of the specific risk and incurred the risk, thus precluding grant of summary
judgment to school on wrongful death claim brought by parents of the student, who
collapsed due to heat related problems after summer football practice and later died).
IV. Conclusion
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of the School
District’s motion for summary judgment was proper. The School District has not met its
33 burden of showing that it is entitled to discretionary function immunity under the ITCA,
since C.J. and B.K. challenge the implementation rather than formulation of the safety
plan, and since the safety plan was not the result of the type of policy decision-making
protected by the statute. Furthermore, there exist genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the School District breached its duty to protect C.J. and B.K. and whether C.J.
was contributorily negligent in a manner which proximately caused his injuries.
Affirmed.
ROBB, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.