M.S., et al. v. Tanque Verde Unified School District

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 10, 2026
• Docket: 4:23-cv-00344
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 M.S., et al., No. CV-23-00344-TUC-JAS (MSA)

10 Plaintiffs, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 11 v.

12 Tanque Verde Unified School District,

13 Defendant. 14 15 N.S. (Student), by and through his parents (Parents), appeals an administrative 16 decision finding that Defendant Tanque Verde Unified School District (District) did not 17 violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). For the following reasons, 18 the Court will recommend that the administrative decision be reversed. 19 Statutory Background 20 The IDEA allocates federal funds to states on condition that states “make a ‘free 21 appropriate public education’ (FAPE) available to all children with disabilities.” N.D. v. 22 Reykdal, 102 F.4th 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)). “The 23 hallmark of a FAPE for students with disabilities is the individualized education program 24 (IEP), which is ‘a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, 25 reviewed, and revised’ at least annually.” J.B. v. Kyrene Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 28, 26 112 F.4th 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)). The IEP 27 “should assess the child’s current academic performance, articulate measurable educational 28 goals, and specify the nature of the special education and services the school district will 1 provide.” L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. A.O. ex rel. Owens, 92 F.4th 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2024) 2 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)). 3 The IDEA creates “formal procedures for resolving disputes” over IEPs. Capistrano 4 Unified Sch. Dist. v. S.W., 21 F.4th 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fry v. Napoleon 5 Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 159 (2017)). “If parents believe that a school has denied their 6 child a FAPE, they may present a complaint to the local or state educational agency.” L.B. 7 ex rel. Morrisey v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 168 F.4th 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2026) 8 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)). If the complaint cannot be resolved through mediation, the 9 parents “are entitled to an impartial due process hearing conducted by the local or state 10 educational agency. Any party dissatisfied with the outcome of the state administrative 11 hearing may seek review in a federal district court.” A.O., 92 F.4th at 1165 (citing 20 U.S.C. 12 § 1415(f)(1)(A), (i)(2)(A)). 13 Factual and Procedural Background 14 I. The August 2020 IEP 15 Student, a longtime enrollee in the District, had a history of anxiety-driven school 16 refusal dating back to 2017. (R107 at B5; R133 at 287.) In April 2018, Student’s mother 17 (Mother) informed the District that Student was being treated for anxiety, which had 18 “contributed to many school absences.” (R104 at A16.) She later requested that the District 19 reevaluate Student for an emotional disability, stating that Student’s “school avoidance 20 [was] directly related to his anxiety” and that his anxiety needed to be addressed in his IEP. 21 (R104 at A26; R107 at B33.) In October 2018, the District convened a meeting of the 22 Multidisciplinary Evaluation Team, which found that Student qualified for special 23 education services for an emotional disability and a specific learning disability in reading 24 comprehension. (R104 at A27.) 25 Student’s freshman year at Tanque Verde High School (the 2018-2019 school year) 26 was plagued with anxiety-related absences. (R107 at B25–45, B72–84.) In August 2019, 27 Parents provided the District with an “Exemptions from School Attendance” form filled 28 out by Student’s psychiatrist, Dr. Kevin Leehey. (R104 at A101–02.) Dr. Leehey identified 1 Student’s diagnoses as anxiety with school phobia, depression, and ADHD and explained 2 that Student’s conditions were “persistent” and would “likely increase with return to school 3 [and] transition to classroom(s).” (R104 at A101.) 4 Due to Student’s absences and inability to take online courses at the District, Parents 5 withdrew Student from the District and enrolled him at Primavera Online High School for 6 his sophomore year (the 2019-2020 school year). (R133 at 288–89.) Primavera’s online 7 format was asynchronous, or self-paced. (R142 at 13.) While attending Primavera, Student 8 had an IEP for his emotional disability and learning disability in reading comprehension. 9 (R104 at A105.) Student’s IEP included a language arts goal to increase his reading 10 comprehension and a social emotional goal to reach out to his case manager three times 11 each quarter. (R104 at A111–12.) His accommodations included testing in a small group 12 environment, extended time to turn in assignments, and the ability to complete sections of 13 his classes out of sequence. (R104 at A113.) Student passed all his classes with As, Bs, and 14 Cs and made progress on his goals. (R104 at A111–12, A220.) 15 Student wanted to return to Tanque Verde High School for his junior year (the 2020- 16 2021 school year), so Mother contacted the District in early 2020 to enroll him and “touch 17 base” on his IEP. (R107 at B126–27.) Mother asked whether Student had the “option to 18 start classes part-time and work up to full-time” or “do a blended day” with “a few classes 19 at school and a few online at home,” as those were mentioned as possibilities in Student’s 20 last IEP at the District. (R107 at B132–33.) She explained that she wanted “to collaborate” 21 with the District to find a way to “help someone like [Student] with anxiety transition from 22 full-time online school to successfully being at school[.]” (R107 at B137.) She also wanted 23 to know whether Student could “be switched to online [classes]” if in-person attendance 24 did not “work out.” (R107 at B167.) 25 The District convened a meeting on August 24, 2020, to review and revise Student’s 26 IEP. (R104 at A148.) As of the meeting date, all students in the District had been attending 27 class online for a few weeks due to the COVID pandemic. (R133 at 30.) During that period, 28 Student struggled with attendance, participation, and work completion. (R104 at A158–59; 1 R107 at B197–98.) The IEP team observed that while Student had been successful in prior 2 online classes, he was “struggling with the current [synchronous] online format which 3 require[d] more interaction with teachers and classmates.” (R104 at A159.) The team also 4 observed that Student’s “social anxiety may prevent him from attending/participating in 5 his classes.” (R104 at A159.) Mother requested an accommodation that Student be placed 6 with people he knew for small-group assignments. (R142 at 89.) She did not otherwise 7 voice concern with continuing the services and accommodations that Student had received 8 at Primavera. (R142 at 89.) 9 The August 2020 IEP was very similar to Primavera’s. (R142 at 90–91.) Student’s 10 eligibility categories remained the same, as did his language arts goal. (R104 at A156, 11 A162.) Student’s social emotional goal was amended so that he would reach out to his case 12 manager more often (once a week instead of three times a quarter). (R104 at A163.) His 13 accommodations included testing in a small group environment, up to three extra days to 14 turn in assignments, and being placed with students he knew for small-group assignments. 15 (R104 at A164.) The accommodation allowing Student to complete sections of his classes 16 out of sequence was not consistent with the District’s synchronous learning format and was 17 thus removed. (R142 at 91.) 18 After the IEP was implemented, Student continued to struggle with attendance, 19 participation, and work completion. (R107 at B207–11, B220–25; R142 at 93–94.) When 20 a hybrid online and in-person option became available in October 2020, Parents submitted 21 another “Exemptions from School Attendance” form from Dr. Leehey. (R104 at A175–76.) 22 Dr. Leehey reconfirmed that Student’s diagnoses were “persistent [and] continuous” and 23 explained that Student needed to be reintegrated into school gradually and would “likely 24 exceed the allowed number of absences because of school phobia.” (R104 at A175–76.) A 25 week later, however, the District approved Parents’ request that Student be allowed to 26 remain online only due to anxiety. (R107 at B215.) In November 2020, after being advised 27 that Student had not turned in any math homework since October, Mother asked the District 28 for a meeting. (R107 at B234.) The meeting was held a few days later with Mother, 1 Student’s teachers, and Student’s case manager, Christine Nielsen, present. (R107 at B237, 2 B244–45.) Nielsen sent an email summarizing her “takeaway from the meeting,” which 3 was that Student “need[ed]” to attend classes from start to finish, interact with the teacher 4 and class orally and through chat, and turn in assignments on time. (R107 at B244–45.) 5 Student’s struggles continued after the meeting through the end of the fall semester. (R107 6 at B266–67, B279–80, B283, B286, B290.) He failed English but passed his other classes, 7 mostly with Cs and Ds. (R104 at A220.) 8 Student’s problems resumed almost immediately in the spring semester. (R107 at 9 B313–18.) In response, Nielsen emailed Mother and Student, stating that the District’s 10 online format was synchronous and that Student was expected to attend all live classes and 11 turn in assignments on time. (R107 at B319.) Nevertheless, teachers reported throughout 12 the semester that Student was not attending, participating, or completing his work. (R107 at 13 B323, B328, B330–31, B335, B341, B350–51, B383, B392–94, B405, B407.) By early 14 May 2021, Student was certain to fail all his core classes. (R107 at B398, B414.) 15 II. The May 2021 IEP 16 In April 2021, Nielsen scheduled an IEP meeting for May 14 (two weeks before the 17 end of the semester) to ensure that Student had an updated IEP going into a credit-recovery 18 year. (R104 at A256; R107 at B406, B413; R142 at 136.) Nielsen followed up with Mother 19 on May 11, asking what Student’s “plan [was] for next year” so that she could make his IEP 20 “appropriate to whichever setting he [would] be in.” (R107 at B416.) Mother responded 21 that the plan was for Student “to do an online school,” but that he had not “decided whether 22 he want[ed] to do Primavera or Grad Solutions.” (R107 at B416.) Like Primavera, Grad 23 Solutions offered a self-paced curriculum. (R142 at 118.) Mother further indicated that 24 Student wanted to take English over the summer at the District. (R107 at B416.) 25 Mother attended the meeting on May 14, where she acknowledged that it had been 26 a “rough year” for Student “both academically and in terms of his mental health.” (R104 27 at A202.) The IEP team discussed Student’s present levels, including reports from each of 28 his teachers that he was not attending, participating, or turning in work. (R104 at A202–03.) 1 The team also observed, as it had at the last IEP meeting, that Student’s struggles were the 2 result of anxiety and that “synchronous class structure was very difficult for him.” (R104 3 at A202–04.) As Mother had indicated that Student would be returning to the asynchronous 4 format where his existing accommodations and services had allowed him to be successful, 5 the May 2021 IEP was nearly identical to the August 2020 IEP, which in turn was very 6 similar to the Primavera IEP. (R142 at 90–91, 112.) Student went on to pass his electives 7 but fail all his core classes. (R104 at A220.) 8 On May 24, Mother notified the District that Student would not be taking summer 9 classes, and the District removed him from the summer school list. (R107 at B425.) On 10 June 7, Mother asked the District to withdraw Student because he would be starting an 11 online school, and the District withdrew him. (R107 at B435.) The District later received a 12 records request from Grad Solutions. (R104 at A293; R142 at 171.) 13 III. Enrollment at Live Strong House 14 On May 30, 2021, Dr. Leehey wrote a letter describing Student’s mental health 15 conditions and immediate “need for a residential treatment-oriented level of care.” (R113 at 16 G1 (emphasis omitted).) Dr. Leehy explained that Student had been diagnosed with major 17 depression, multiple anxiety disorders, ADHD, a learning disorder in reading, low-average 18 intellect, and parent-child problems. (R113 at G1.) He explained that Student’s clinical 19 manifestations included having “given up,” which had led to “his severe and completely 20 incapacitating non-compliance with all aspects of his treatment and his life.” (R113 at G1 21 (emphasis omitted).) Dr. Leehy asserted that Student’s condition was a “crisis” that 22 “require[d] medically (psychiatrically) necessary residential treatment at a facility capable 23 of treating him three to six months.” (R113 at G2 (emphasis omitted).) 24 On July 15, Parents enrolled Student in a wilderness program, Outback Therapeutic 25 Expeditions. (R113 at G27.) While at Outback, Student was evaluated by Dr. Todd Corelli, 26 a licensed clinical psychologist. (R113 at G3–26.) Dr. Corelli authored two reports: an 27 “educational” assessment and a “psychological” assessment. (R113 at G3–26.) In the 28 educational assessment, Dr. Corelli wrote that intellectual and academic testing showed 1 that Student’s IQ and academic achievement were in the average range, but that Student 2 had executive functioning deficits. (R113 at G10.) He diagnosed Student with ADHD and 3 executive functioning deficits and opined that Student would need “specific, practical, step- 4 by-step instructions and guidelines” to overcome such deficits. (R113 at G10.) The 5 psychological assessment includes everything in the educational assessment in addition 6 to detailed information about Student’s psychological condition. (R113 at G11–26.) In the 7 psychological assessment, Dr. Corelli added diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder, 8 social anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder. (R113 at G26.) He “recommended 9 that following his stay at Outback, [Student] go on to a longer-term therapeutic residential 10 school that [could] address each of [his] issues in depth.” (R113 at G26.) He opined that 11 Student “need[ed] structure, skills training, and regular therapy and feedback,” and that 12 “[r]egular individual, group, and family therapy [would] all be important.” (R113 at G26.) 13 Student was discharged from Outback on September 23, 2021, and enrolled by 14 Parents in Live Strong House (LSH) the same day. (R113 at G31; R110 at D95.) LSH is a 15 residential support program that provides wraparound mental health treatment as well as 16 educational services. (R133 at 131–33; R140 at 18.) LSH’s philosophy is that mental health 17 and educational performance are inextricably connected. (R133 at 142–44.) Its treatment 18 modalities “are designed to help with anxiety, depression, ADHD, trauma, substance 19 abuse, communication skills, irrational beliefs, executive functioning, relationships, etc.” 20 (R110 at D73.) Its educational services are provided through Coral Sands Academy, Inc., 21 an online private school, pursuant to an educational services agreement. (R110 at D88; 22 R133 at 233, 235.) Under the agreement, Coral Sands provides LSH with an asynchronous 23 curriculum; teacher support and supervision of courses; individual and group tutoring; and 24 high school diplomas. (R110 at D88; R133 at 235, 239.) While a student can enroll in Coral 25 Sands and complete the program without an in-person teacher, a student at LSH works in 26 a classroom with an LSH teacher and up to seven other students present. (R100 at P1-7; 27 R133 at 200, 245.) In addition, LSH’s academic director, Monica Prusse, works closely 28 with Coral Sands to modify the curriculum to meet LSH students’ individual needs. (R133 1 at 133, 236, 243.) Prusse and Megan Pomeroy, Coral Sands’s academic director, agree that 2 educating LSH students is a “team” effort. (R133 at 183, 242.) 3 Student’s treatment plan at LSH addressed all diagnoses listed in Dr. Corelli’s 4 assessments. (R140 at 20–21; compare R113 at G26, with R110 at D115–16.) Student 5 received, among other things, 2 hours a week of individual counseling and 3 hours a week 6 of group therapy. (R133 at 204.) Student worked in a classroom four days a week, where 7 he had autonomy in completing his asynchronous classes. (R100 at P1-8; R110 at D39.) 8 Student had access to his therapist during the school day and received 6 hours a week of 9 specially designed instruction from an executive functioning coach, special education 10 teacher, and general education teacher. (R100 at P3-22; R140 at 16–17.) 11 IV. The January 2022 IEP 12 A few days after enrolling Student at LSH, Mother contacted the District to request 13 an IEP meeting. (R107 at B438–39.) In response to several questions from Ivonne Olivas, 14 the District’s lead psychologist, Mother explained that Student had been placed at LSH and 15 that LSH was “asking for an IEP meeting from his home school.” (R107 at B438.) In 16 response to several more questions about LSH, Parents responded that they had placed 17 Student there “because he was not able to access school due to his debilitating mental health 18 issues.” (R107 at B437.) Parents criticized the May 2021 IEP, stating that it had “failed to 19 address [Student’s] struggles whatsoever” and that Student “was a sinking ship” while at 20 the District. (R107 at B437.) Parents asserted that Student would remain at LSH unless the 21 District could offer him a FAPE, and that they would seek reimbursement for the costs of 22 placing him there. (R107 at B437.) Finally, Parents repeated their request for an IEP 23 meeting and stated that they wanted the District to consider placing Student at a residential 24 treatment center. (R107 at B437.) 25 The District convened three IEP meetings, attended by Parents; their advocate, 26 David Jefferson; Prusse; Olivas; Nielsen; the District’s director of student services, Tiffany 27 Hodge; and a general education teacher from the District. (R100 at P1, P2, P3.) During the 28 meetings, Prusse provided the IEP team with considerable information about Student’s 1 present levels at LSH. (R104 at A231–33.) Student had a high degree of work completion 2 and had recovered his grade level. (R100 at P1-8, P2-10.) He interacted with teachers and 3 peers and had started advocating for himself. (R100 at P1-7, P1-9; R104 at A232–33.) And 4 every day he was going “up the stairs to the classroom with a smile on his face.” (R100 at 5 P1-7.) Prusse emphasized that Student’s “social/emotional and educational needs [could 6 not] be managed separately,” and that his progress was the product of LSH’s structured 7 environment and wraparound services, which were “critical to provide him access to his 8 education.” (R104 at A232; see R100 at P1-9, P2-7–10, P2-14.) Parents also provided 9 information, including that Student had been placed in the wilderness program because of 10 increasing anxiety, depression, and isolative behavior. (R104 at A231, A234.) Parents also 11 explained that Student had “struggle[d] emotionally across all settings for a long time,” 12 including at school where he “refused to engage with his teachers or peers and disconnected 13 from everything.” (R104 at A234.) 14 The January 2022 IEP included six social emotional goals aimed at Student 15 requesting assistance with nonpreferred tasks, identifying his and others’ emotions and 16 related behaviors, identifying coping strategies for stressful situations, and breaking down 17 complex tasks. (R104 at A236–37.) It included ten accommodations, including provision 18 of a consistent daily routine; use of visual tools to help break down assignments; the ability 19 to break down assignments into smaller parts; frequent monitoring of independent work to 20 ensure completion; extra test time; placement with friends for small-group assignments; 21 teacher prompting to initiate tasks; breaks as needed; testing in a small group environment; 22 and extended time to turn in assignments. (R104 at A238.) The IEP provided for 5 hours a 23 week of specially designed instruction from a special education teacher, an additional 5 24 hours a week in a special education classroom, and 30 minutes a week of counseling. (R104 25 at A244.)1

26 1 Plaintiffs dispute that Student would have been in a special education classroom 10 hours a week. (Reply Br. 18.) The IEP provides that Student would receive 1 hour of 27 specially designed instruction every day, but that Student would be in study support “for more than” 1 hour a day. (R104 at A244.) Olivas testified that each study support class is 28 about 1 hour in length. (R142 at 215.) And Student’s proposed schedule had him in study support both first and seventh period. (R104 at A246–47.) This adds up to 10 hours a week. 1 During the third IEP meeting, Parents and their advocate questioned how the District 2 came up with 30 minutes a week of counseling when Student was receiving 5 hours a week 3 at LSH. (R100 at P3-23.) Olivas responded that, when the District provided counseling, it 4 “typically” started with 30 minutes a week and then determined whether more or less was 5 needed. (R100 at P3-23.) Olivas added that “a lot” of Student’s counseling at LSH was 6 “therapeutic,” and that the District would be addressing only “the school-setting stuff.” 7 (R100 at P3-23.) The prior written notice echoed Olivas’s remarks, stating that Student’s 8 counseling at LSH went “far beyond his educational needs” and was not part of his least 9 restrictive environment. (R104 at A246.) 10 Parents rejected the District’s offer, and Student remained at LSH. (R100 at P3-27; 11 R133 at 145.) Student graduated from high school in August 2022 and remained at LSH in 12 a postgraduate program. (R110 at D252; R133 at 145.) 13 V. Administrative Proceedings 14 In June 2022, Parents filed a due process complaint claiming that the District had 15 failed to offer Student a FAPE and that they were entitled to reimbursement for the costs 16 of his placement at LSH. (R2.) The administrative law judge (ALJ) granted the District 17 summary judgment on the issue of reimbursement, finding that such relief extends only to 18 the costs of nonprofit schools and thus was not available for the costs of LSH, a for-profit 19 entity. (R88.) The matter proceeded to a four-day hearing, where the ALJ heard testimony 20 from numerous witnesses. (R133; R140; R142; R149.) After the hearing, the ALJ issued a 21 decision finding that the District had offered Student a FAPE and thus declining to decide 22 whether LSH was a proper placement. (R131.) This lawsuit followed. (Doc. 1.) 23 Standard of Review 24 “The IDEA empowers federal courts to ‘receive the records of the administrative 25 proceedings,’ ‘hear additional evidence at the request of a party,’ and ‘grant such relief as 26 the court determines is appropriate.’” L.B. ex rel. Morrisey v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 27 168 F.4th 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2026) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)). While this 28 standard of review “is less deferential to the State administrative proceedings than in other 1 cases reviewing administrative decisions,” the district court “will give ‘due weight’ to the 2 ALJ’s decision if it is based on ‘thorough and careful’ findings.” J.B. v. Kyrene Elementary 3 Sch. Dist. No. 28, 112 F.4th 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Capistrano Unified Sch. 4 Dist. v. Wartenberg ex rel. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995)). In general, 5 courts “treat a hearing officer’s findings as ‘thorough and careful’ when the officer 6 participates in the questioning of witnesses and writes a decision ‘contain[ing] a complete 7 factual background as well as a discrete analysis supporting the ultimate conclusions.’” 8 L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. A.O. ex rel. Owens, 92 F.4th 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2024) (alteration 9 in original) (quoting R.B. ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 10 (9th Cir. 2007)). But these factors are not decisive; “the district judge must actually 11 examine the record to determine whether it supports the ALJ’s opinion,” M.C. ex rel. M.N. 12 v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189, 1194 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 13 J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 440 (9th Cir. 2010)), and 14 “[i]n the end . . . the court is free to determine independently how much weight to give the 15 state hearing officer’s determinations,” Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J., 16 588 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009). 17 Discussion 18 Plaintiffs contend that the August 2020, May 2021, and January 2022 IEPs did not 19 offer Student a FAPE; that LSH was a proper placement for Student; and that they are 20 entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placing Student at LSH. The ALJ found that all 21 three IEPs offered Student a FAPE and thus declined to decide whether LSH was a proper 22 placement. The ALJ also found that the regulation providing for reimbursement does not 23 apply to the costs associated with LSH, as LSH is a for-profit entity. For the reasons given 24 below, the Court gives no deference to the ALJ’s findings. The Court finds that all three 25 IEPs denied Student a FAPE, and that Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement for tuition. 26 I. The District denied Student a FAPE. 27 “To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP 28 reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 1 circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 2 386, 399 (2017). Under the “snapshot” rule, review of an IEP is limited to “the information 3 that was reasonably available to the parties at the time of the IEP.” Baquerizo v. Garden 4 Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 826 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Adams v. Oregon, 5 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999)). 6 A. August 2020 IEP 7 At the time of implementation, the August 2020 IEP was not reasonably calculated 8 to provide Student with an educational benefit. It is true that the IEP carried over 9 goals, accommodations, and services that had allowed Student to earn passing grades at 10 Primavera. However, the record shows that the District knew at the time of drafting that 11 Student had anxiety-driven school refusal and access barriers in the synchronous online 12 format. Despite such knowledge, the IEP offered no specialized instruction or supports 13 addressing Student’s barriers. For this reason, the IEP did not provide a FAPE.2 14 Student was missing school at the District because of his anxiety as early as 2017. 15 (R107 at B5.) In April 2020, Mother reminded the District that it had previously considered 16 “options of online with homebound services or a blended option with online classes,” and 17 she asked whether those were still options. (R107 at B132–33.) She emphasized the need 18 “to collaborate” to “help someone like [Student] with anxiety transition from full-time 19 online school to successfully being at school.” (R107 at B137.) She further asked whether 20 Student could be moved to fully online classes if in-person classes did not “work out.” 21 (R107 at B167.) Mother’s emails led the District to review Student’s prior IEP, which noted 22 Student’s treatment “for social anxiety and school anxiety” and related school absences. 23 (R107 at B132.) So, long before the IEP team even met, the District was aware of Student’s 24 ongoing anxiety and the likelihood it would affect his education. 25 The school year began fully online because of the pandemic. (R133 at 30.) At the

26 2 The conclusions in this report are based in part on events that would be barred under the IDEA’s statute of limitation. While Plaintiffs may not seek relief based on those events, 27 the events are nevertheless relevant as to the District’s awareness of Student’s needs. See J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 444–45 (9th Cir. 2010) 28 (adopting the district court’s opinion in full, including the court’s finding that time-barred facts could be considered as to what the school district knew during the limitation period). 1 time of the IEP meeting, on August 24, 2020, Student had been attending classes for a few 2 weeks and already shown signs of struggling with the synchronous online format. His 3 teachers reported that he had not logged into classes, not taken placement tests, and not 4 completed assignments, and his math teacher reported that she had “zero knowledge base 5 of him.” (R104 at A158–59; R107 at B191, B197–98.) At the meeting, the IEP team noted 6 that “[d]ifficulties with anxiety hamper [Student’s] availability for instruction that would 7 typically be expected of his peers, even in an online course setting,” and that “social anxiety 8 may prevent him from attending/participating in his classes.” (R104 at A158–59.) Even 9 more specifically, the team noted that while Student’s “behavior did not impact online 10 learning in the past, he [was] currently struggling with the current online format which 11 require[d] more interaction with teachers and classmates [than his prior asynchronous 12 online classes].” (R104 at A159.) 13 The District knew that Student’s social anxiety and the synchronous online format 14 impeded Student’s attendance, participation, and work completion, yet the August 2020 15 IEP effectively repeated goals and minimal services tailored to Primavera’s asynchronous 16 format. Replicating the Primavera IEP in this context failed to address Student’s unique 17 needs.3 18 The District argues that it was reasonable to make the August 2020 IEP substantially 19 similar to the Primavera IEP, as the latter had “enabled Student to earn As, Bs, and Cs in 20 all of his classes in an online format.” (Resp. Br. 22.) The District further says that because 21 “Parents did not report any new educational or functional concerns” at the IEP meeting, 22 there was “no reason to believe that the accommodations that Student had previously 23 received were no longer sufficient.” (Resp. Br. 22.) The District adds that Student’s 24 “difficulty with the synchronous, online format was not the red flag that Parents make it 25 out to be, because so many other students were having similar struggles” transitioning to 26 3 The IEP modified Student’s social emotional goal so that he would contact his case 27 manager more often. (R104 at A163.) This did not render the IEP adequate. Student’s anxiety led to attendance and participation issues. Without providing specially designed 28 instruction and related services targeted at those issues (e.g., counseling), requiring more check-ins, by itself, would not remove Student’s barriers to accessing his education. 1 online classes because of COVID. (Resp. Br. 22.) 2 These points are not persuasive, as they ignore relevant context discussed above. 3 The District knew Student’s history of anxiety and school refusal, and Mother’s emails 4 months before the IEP meeting put the District on notice that those were ongoing issues. 5 In addition, the District oversimplifies the matter by suggesting that Student’s prior success 6 “in an online format” made it reasonable to repeat his prior accommodations and services. 7 Student, a person with social anxiety, was switching from a format where he had “access 8 to the curriculum 24 hours a day allowing for a more flexible schedule” to a format where 9 he would have live interaction with teachers and classmates. (R104 at A132, A159.) His 10 immediate failure to attend and participate should have signaled to the District that there 11 was a problem. And it did: the IEP reflects that Student’s “social anxiety may prevent him 12 from attending/participating in his classes” and that Student was “struggling with the 13 current online format which require[d] more interaction with teachers and classmates.” 14 (R104 at A159.) In this context, it was unreasonable to think that Student was facing the 15 same problems as other students. This is true even considering Parents’ lack of concern at 16 the IEP meeting. Although that factor supports the District, all other information available 17 strongly indicated a need to address Student’s anxiety, and the IEP did not do so. 18 The District also relies on its expert psychologist, Dr. Janice Sammons, who opined 19 that the August 2020 IEP provided Student a FAPE. (Resp. Br. 22–23; R149 at 23–25.) 20 Dr. Sammons’s opinion is not persuasive, for a few reasons. First, it is based on incomplete 21 information. Dr. Sammons testified that schools must rely on reports from parents about 22 their children, and her opinion is based in part on Parents’ supposed lack of concern with 23 Student’s progress. (R149 at 19, 22–23.) But she did not review any of the email exchanges. 24 (R149 at 76.) Mother advised the District months before the IEP meeting that Student’s 25 social anxiety was ongoing, and it was severe enough that she wanted a plan in place if 26 Student could not attend school in person. (R107 at B137, B167.) Thus, Parents provided 27 the notice that was so important to Dr. Sammons. Second, Dr. Sammons’s opinion is poorly 28 explained. She reviewed the August 2020 IEP and, as just noted, placed significance on 1 Parents’s failure to voice concerns during the IEP meeting. (R149 at 22–23.) But she did 2 not explain her reasons for minimizing the significance of other information in the IEP, 3 which affirmatively pointed to anxiety-related school refusal. 4 Third, and relatedly, Dr. Sammons’s opinion conflicts with her other testimony. She 5 testified that student needs expressed in an IEP’s “functional performance” section must 6 be addressed in the IEP so that the student can access the curriculum. (R149 at 72.) She 7 further testified that schools have an obligation to address a student’s anxiety to the extent 8 necessary to enable the student to access the curriculum. (R149 at 60, 90.) The functional 9 performance section of Student’s IEP contains the following information: Student “is 10 currently struggling with the current online format which requires more interaction with 11 teachers and classmates”; Student “keeps his microphone off due to social anxiety”; 12 “teachers are concerned with [Student’s] lack of participation”; Student’s “social anxiety 13 may prevent him from attending/participating in his classes”; and Student’s “anxiety 14 impacts his ability to advocate for himself.” (R104 at A159.) In short, Student’s IEP 15 reflected anxiety-related barriers to accessing the curriculum. Dr. Sammons’s testimony 16 that schools have an obligation to address such barriers does not align with her opinion that 17 the IEP—which did nothing to address anxiety—provided a FAPE. 18 The ALJ concluded, based on the same analysis offered by the District, that the 19 August 2020 IEP offered a FAPE. (R131 at 28–29.) That analysis ignores important context 20 and relies uncritically on Dr. Sammons’s testimony despite its glaring issues. Therefore, 21 the Court gives the ALJ’s conclusion no deference. The Court finds by a preponderance of 22 the evidence that, at the time of implementation, the August 2020 IEP was not reasonably 23 calculated to provide Student with an educational benefit.4 24 . . . . 25 . . . . 26 4 The parties devote much attention to what occurred after the August 2020 IEP was 27 implemented. (Opening Br. 26-28; Resp. Br. 23–24; Reply Br. 4–8.) Under the snapshot rule, such events are generally not relevant. To the extent Plaintiffs argue that the District 28 violated the IDEA by not updating the IEP during the school year, the Court agrees with the District that Plaintiffs did not properly present that issue. (Resp. Br. 23.) 1 B. May 2021 IEP 2 At the time of implementation, the May 2021 IEP was not reasonably calculated to 3 provide Student with an educational benefit. The plan was implemented two weeks before 4 the end of the school year, when the District had far more information indicating that 5 Student needed a heightened level of services. Following implementation of the August 6 2020 IEP, Student continued to not attend, not participate, and not complete assignments. 7 (See R107 at B207 (September 19: “sporadic” attendance in physics with a 34% grade); 8 B208 (September 26: math teacher “concerned” that Student was not “actually attending 9 class”); B210 (October 8: missing math assignments); B221 (November 9: missing several 10 weightlifting assignments); B261 (November 13: missing homework “since the end of 11 October”); B286 (December 2: failing grade in history); B290 (December 17: missing too 12 many assignments to pass English); B313 (January 22, 2021: not participating in English); 13 B315 (January 23: missing assignments in physics with a 39% grade and missing five math 14 assignments with a 64% grade); B359 (March 1: Nielsen was “very concerned” with 15 Student’s grades); B386 (March 29: Nielsen says Student’s “grade situation” was “pretty 16 bleak”); B398 (April 26: Mother says Student will focus on his electives since he can no 17 longer pass his core classes).) While Student passed all but one class in the fall semester, 18 he did so largely with Cs and Ds. (R104 at A220.) In the spring semester, he was certain to 19 fail all his core classes when the May 2021 IEP was implemented. (R107 at B414.) 20 Despite the foregoing, the May 2021 IEP was effectively a repeat of the August 21 2020 IEP. As the prior plan had already failed to enable attendance, participation, or work 22 completion in the synchronous online format, replicating that plan was not reasonably 23 calculated to confer an educational benefit. In fact, the May 2021 IEP may even have been 24 worse. While Student’s prior social emotional goal was to reach out to his case manager 25 (who presumably could have offered help), his new goal was simply to turn in 80% of his 26 assignments. (R104 at A207.) This goal did nothing to help Student identify triggers or 27 cope with anxiety; it simply shifted compliance obligations onto him without responding 28 to his needs. Given the foregoing, the IEP did not provide Student a FAPE. 1 The record shows that, before the May 2021 IEP was drafted, Mother notified the 2 District that she intended to enroll Student at either Primavera or Grad Solutions, which 3 both use an asynchronous online format. (R107 at B416; R142 at 117–18.) Nielsen drafted 4 the IEP with Student’s future placement in mind. (R107 at B416; R142 at 117.) Based on 5 these facts, the District argues that it was reasonable to make the IEP substantially similar 6 to the August 2020 IEP, which in turn was similar to the Primavera IEP. (Resp. Br. 25–26.) 7 This approach makes sense given Student’s success at Primavera, but the Court sees a 8 couple of problems. 9 To begin, the Court is not aware of authority supporting the proposition that an IEP 10 can be drafted in anticipation of an uncertain, future out-of-district placement. The cases 11 indicate otherwise, stating that “placement [must] be based on the IEP, and not vice versa.” 12 K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 665 F.3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 13 Spielberg ex rel. Spielberg v. Henrico Cnty. Pub. Schs., 853 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1988)). 14 In addition, as Plaintiffs observe, the May 2021 IEP identifies Tanque Verde High School 15 as Student’s school, and the plan was implemented with two weeks of classes remaining. 16 (Opening Br. 29; Reply Br. 9; R104 at A200, A256.) Indeed, the District argues in this case 17 that “each IEP was reasonably calculated to allow Student to have academic success within 18 the District.” (Resp. Br. 39.) Given the foregoing, the Court finds that the May 2021 IEP 19 must be analyzed in the context of Student’s enrollment in the District. 20 The ALJ also took a pragmatic approach on this issue, finding that the IEP offered 21 a FAPE because it was designed with Student’s future placement in mind. (R131 at 29–30.) 22 That logic is not persuasive for the reasons just given. The ALJ also relied on the opinion 23 of Dr. Sammons that the IEP was appropriate. (R131 at 24, 29.) Dr. Sammons’s opinion is 24 not persuasive, though, because it is inconsistent with her other testimony. As noted, she 25 agreed that an IEP should address needs expressed in the functional performance section, 26 and that schools must address students’ anxiety at least to some extent. (R149 at 60, 72, 90.) 27 The performance section of the May 2021 IEP reflects Student’s difficulties with anxiety, 28 school refusal, and the synchronous format. (R104 at 202–04.) Dr. Sammons reviewed this 1 information and somehow concluded that none of it suggested a need for “more intensive 2 educational services.” (R149 at 32.) Her opinion is not consistent with her view of a 3 school’s role in addressing emotional disabilities. 4 For these reasons, the Court gives no deference to the ALJ’s conclusion. The Court 5 finds by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of implementation, the May 2021 6 IEP was not reasonably calculated to provide Student with an educational benefit. 7 C. January 2022 IEP 8 At the time it was offered, the January 2022 IEP was not reasonably calculated to 9 provide Student with an educational benefit. The IEP had six social emotional goals, ten 10 accommodations, and specialized instruction and counseling totaling 5.5 hours a week 11 (with another 5 hours spent in a special education classroom). (R104 at A236–238, A244.) 12 But the IEP predicated Student’s progress on general education attendance at a large public 13 campus in a synchronous system—something he was unable to do in the past—without 14 providing sufficient day-to-day supports. In addition, the record shows that the amount of 15 counseling offered (30 minutes a week) was based on the District’s standard way of doing 16 things rather than on Student’s unique needs. Thus, the IEP did not provide a FAPE. 17 During the IEP meetings, Prusse provided information indicating that Student was 18 doing well in his self-paced classes, which were provided in a classroom with no more than 19 eight students. (R100 at P1-7–8.) She also explained that Student’s emotional disability 20 was inextricably connected with his educational needs, and that his school refusal “was 21 symptomatic of a lot of the social and emotional deficits and the executive functioning . . . 22 deficits.” (R100 at P2-9.) She further explained that the pressures of a large classroom gave 23 Student a lot of anxiety and that, while she had not seen him in that setting, she believed it 24 would cause him to “nosedive” in terms of his ability to interact with peers and self- 25 advocate. (R100 at P2-8, P3-26; R104 at A233.) She also explained that the 5 hours a week 26 of counseling Student was receiving at LSH was necessary to get him into the classroom, 27 and that Student needed a “very structured environment.” (R100 at P1-9, P3-23.) 28 The IEP reflects Student’s history of anxiety-driven school refusal at the District 1 and includes the detailed information provided by Prusse. (R104 at A232–33.) That is, it 2 shows that Student struggled in the regular synchronous classroom and thrived in the small- 3 sized asynchronous classroom. Despite all this, the IEP would have put Student in a regular 4 classroom for 4 hours every day without extra services or supports. 5 To be sure, the District was right to be concerned about Student’s least restrictive 6 environment. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (requiring that disabled students be educated 7 with nondisabled students “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate”). After all, the ground 8 between where he started (minimal services in a regular classroom) and where he ended up 9 (24/7 wraparound services in a residential support program) was expansive. But its decision 10 on that issue had to be “based on the application of expertise and the exercise of judgment,” 11 and it should be able to “offer a cogent and responsive explanation for [its] decisions that 12 shows the IEP [was] reasonably calculated to enable the child to make progress appropriate 13 in light of his circumstances.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404. The District has not met this 14 standard, as the information available did not support the conclusion that Student would 15 gain an educational benefit by spending most of his time in a regular classroom. 16 The District’s decision with regard to counseling is similarly unsupported. At the 17 IEP meeting, Olivas stated that the District “typically” began with 30 minutes of counseling 18 a week. (R100 at P3-23.) She and Hodge added that they believed “a lot” of Student’s 19 counseling was therapeutic and not for the District to address. (R100 at P3-23.) The prior 20 written notice echoed those remarks, stating that the District refused additional counseling 21 because it was concerned about Student’s least restrictive environment and his counseling 22 at LSH went “far beyond” his educational needs.” (R104 at A246.) Again, although it was 23 reasonable to explore whether Student’s least restrictive environment was something less 24 than LSH, the District’s decision on that issue had to be based on “expertise” and sound 25 “judgment.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404. The record shows that the District did not draw 26 the line at 30 minutes based on information specific to Student; instead, it employed a 27 standard approach it used with all students. This means that the IEP was not designed to 28 meet Student’s unique needs. 1 The District does not seriously dispute these conclusions. It takes a different tack by 2 attempting to draw a line between Student’s medical needs and educational needs. It points 3 out that Dr. Leehey endorsed “medically (psychiatrically) necessary residential treatment.” 4 (Resp. Br. 27–28.) And it places significance on the fact that Dr. Corelli’s psychological 5 assessment emphasized the importance of therapy while his educational assessment did 6 not. (Resp. Br. 28.) The District further argues that numerous factors show that LSH was a 7 medical placement rather than an educational one, and that Student’s counseling was purely 8 medical treatment. (Resp. Br. 28–32.) Based on the foregoing, the District argues that “[i]f 9 Student had returned to the District, he would have had all of his educational needs met by 10 the January 2022 IEP, and he could have had his medical needs met through private 11 counseling outside of school hours.” (Resp. Br. 29.) 12 The Court fundamentally disagrees with this approach. “If the problem prevents a 13 disabled child from receiving educational benefit, then it should not matter that the problem 14 is not cognitive in nature or that it causes the child even more trouble outside the classroom 15 than within it”; the question is whether the problem “needs to be addressed in order for the 16 child to learn.” Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C. ex rel. C.C., 258 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 17 2001). The record shows that Student’s emotional disability needed to be addressed so that 18 he could access his education. The District could not avoid its responsibility to address that 19 need merely by labeling it “medical.” Indeed, the evidence relied upon by the District to 20 supposedly distinguish between Student’s medical needs and educational needs actually 21 demonstrates that the two were inseparable. Dr. Leehey wrote that Student’s mental health 22 disorders led to “his severe and completely incapacitating non-compliance with all aspects 23 of his treatment and his life”—including school. (R113 at G1 (some emphasis omitted).) 24 And Dr. Corelli’s psychological assessment suggested a “therapeutic residential school” to 25 address Student’s diagnoses, including “anxiety” and “social anxiety.” (R113 at G26.)5

26 5 The District argues that the fact Dr. Corelli prepared an educational assessment and a psychological assessment shows that Student’s needs can be separated. (Resp. Br. 28.) 27 This argument is not persuasive. All agree (even Dr. Sammons) that Student’s anxiety impeded his ability to access the curriculum. (R104 at A231; R149 at 73.) Yet, Dr. Corelli’s 28 educational assessment says nothing about anxiety. This shows that he did not draw the distinctions the District claims he did. 1 The ALJ’s analysis of this issue is not persuasive. The ALJ correctly identified the 2 issue as whether the “January 2022 IEP denied Student a FAPE.” (R131 at 31.) The ALJ 3 then immediately reframed the “issue [as] whether a residential placement for Student was 4 necessary for educational purposes.” (R131 at 31.) This was improper: even if a residential 5 placement was unnecessary, as the ALJ found, it would not follow that the IEP offered a 6 FAPE. To the extent the ALJ found that the IEP did offer a FAPE, that finding appears to 7 be based largely on the testimony of Dr. Sammons, who shifted responsibility away from 8 the District based on the same line-drawing rejected by the Court above. (R131 at 32–33; 9 R149 at 56, 59–60.) In addition, the ALJ placed significance on Dr. Sammons’s testimony 10 that she had never seen such a high level of service minutes offered in an IEP, which 11 indicated to her that “the school was trying to go above and beyond” in meeting Student’s 12 needs. (R131 at 24–25; R149 at 59.) An IEP is tailored to a student’s unique needs, so one 13 student’s IEP cannot be compared to another’s, and Dr. Sammons’s opinion is irrelevant. 14 Finally, the ALJ’s discussion of the testimony from those who knew Student was highly 15 selective. For instance, the ALJ used Prusse’s “glowing” reports of Student’s progress to 16 find that the IEP offered a FAPE. (R131 at 32.) The ALJ failed to acknowledge, however, 17 that Prusse directly and repeatedly attributed such progress to LSH’s extensive supports. 18 (R100 at P1-9, P2-7–8, P2-10; R133 at 150–52, 176–77.) 19 For these reasons, the Court gives no deference to the ALJ’s conclusion. The Court 20 finds by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time it was offered, the January 2022 21 IEP was not reasonably calculated to provide Student with an educational benefit. 22 II. Live Strong House was a proper placement. 23 Plaintiffs ask the Court to find that LSH was a proper placement for Student, which 24 is a requirement for reimbursement. (Opening Br. 30–36.) The ALJ declined to address 25 this issue based on her finding that the District had offered a FAPE. (R131 at 33.) The 26 District urges the Court to also refrain from deciding this issue, arguing that the ALJ should 27 address it in the first instance if it becomes necessary. (Resp. Br. 32.) However, the Court 28 finds that it may decide the issue, as it has been fully exhausted. See E.D. ex rel. Salata v. 1 Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV-24-01671-PHX, 2026 WL 878875, *6–12 (D. Ariz. Mar. 2 31, 2026) (conducting de novo review of issues presented to, but not decided by, the ALJ); 3 R.G. v. Glen Ridge Bd. of Educ., No. 05-CV-3017, 2005 WL 3274857, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 2, 4 2005) (holding that district courts “are not confined to hearing only those issues ruled upon 5 by the ALJ”). 6 To establish that a placement was proper, the parents “need not show that a private 7 placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child’s potential”; 8 rather, they “need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction 9 specially designed to meet the unique needs of a [disabled] child, supported by such 10 services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction.” C.B. ex rel. 11 Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011) 12 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 365 (2d Cir. 2006)). 13 The placement does not need to satisfy the requirements for a FAPE. Florence Cnty. Sch. 14 Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993). 15 The record shows that LSH provided specially designed instruction and related 16 services needed to permit Student to benefit from his education. Student exhibited school 17 refusal because of social anxiety, depression, and executive functioning deficits. (R133 at 18 146–47; R140 at 27.) LSH met his unique needs by providing him with self-paced classes 19 in a small class environment (R100 at P1-7–8); one-on-one instruction from an executive 20 functioning coach (R100 at P2-19; R133 at 156, 163, 166); one-on-one specially designed 21 instruction from Prusse (a special education teacher) or from a general education teacher 22 under Prusse’s supervision (R100 at P3-22); academic tutoring (R100 at P1-9; P3-20); 23 individual and group therapy multiple times a week, where he worked on dealing with his 24 anxiety so that he could engage in the classroom (R100 at P3-21; R110 at D150; R133 25 at 159; R140 at 16–19); and access to his therapist during school hours to help with periods 26 of anxiety (R140 at 17). The record also shows that Student benefited from LSH’s services, 27 as he recovered his grade level, passed all his classes with As and Bs (and one C), and 28 graduated from high school. (R110 at D244–45, 252; R133 at 172–73, 179.) 1 The foregoing establishes that LSH was a proper placement. See Capistrano Unified 2 Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg ex rel. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 896 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding a 3 placement proper because its small class, behavior management plan, and group counseling 4 met the student’s unique needs and because the student “did better academically”); S.L. ex 5 rel. Loof v. Upland Unified Sch. Dist., 747 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding a 6 placement proper because, in concert with privately hired aids, it provided “instructional 7 materials and curriculum, structure, support, and socialization,” and because the student 8 “became more socially involved” and “received good grades”); Bellflower Unified Sch. 9 Dist. v. Lua, 832 F. App’x 493, 496–97 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding a placement proper because 10 it provided the student with diagnostic testing, one-on-one tutoring, and extra teacher help). 11 None of the District’s arguments to the contrary is persuasive. The District argues 12 first that the placement was not proper because it was “necessary to address medical, social, 13 or emotional problems quite separate and apart from the learning process.” (Resp. Br. 33.) 14 The District further argues that this case is analogous to JG v. Creighton Elementary School 15 District, No. CV-21-00535-PHX, 2022 WL 278501, at *6–9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2022), 16 where the district court drew that distinction in ostensibly similar circumstances. (Resp. 17 Br. 33–34.) As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that there is an incongruity 18 in the District’s argument. (Reply Br. 13.) The District found Student eligible for services 19 based on an emotional disability, and it repeatedly acknowledged that Student’s social and 20 emotional problems impeded his education. The District’s current argument that Student’s 21 problems were separate from the learning process is at odds with these facts. In any event, 22 as explained throughout this report, the record shows that Student’s problems were directly 23 related to his educational performance. That those problems had become so great outside 24 the educational environment as to warrant a residential placement does not make the 25 placement improper. See Edmonds Sch. Dist. v. A.T., 780 F. App’x 491, 495 (9th Cir. 2019) 26 (rejecting an argument similar to the District’s because “[s]tudents who require residential 27 placement to obtain an educational benefit are often experiencing some acute health crisis 28 at the time they are placed—the severity of their condition is precisely why they need 1 residential treatment”). To the extent JG is not distinguishable, that case is neither binding 2 nor persuasive. 3 Next, the District emphasizes that LSH itself is not an accredited school and that it 4 receives its educational services pursuant to a contract with Coral Sands Academy, Inc. 5 (Resp. Br. 35; R110 at D88.) Coral Sands is an online private school with its own teachers, 6 and any student anywhere can enroll in Coral Sands and complete the program without an 7 in-person teacher. (R133 at 233–34, 245.) Student was supervised online by Coral Sands’s 8 teachers, had his work graded by Coral Sands’s teachers, and received his high school 9 diploma from Coral Sands. (R133 at 244–45.) Based on the foregoing, the District argues 10 that LSH is a residential support program that provides therapeutic intervention, not an 11 educational placement. (Resp. Br. 35.) 12 This argument is not persuasive, as it ignores the unique relationship between LSH 13 and Coral Sands. Prusse testified that educating LSH students was a “team” effort. (R133 at 14 183.) Megan Pomeroy, Coral Sands’s academic director, agreed. (R133 at 242.) Pomeroy 15 also testified that “Live Strong House and Coral Sands work really closely together” to 16 “provide the best education [they] can for the students.” (R133 at 242.) Further, the record 17 shows that LSH is deeply involved in its students’ education. LSH has its own general 18 educational teachers (albeit uncertified), and Students at LSH do not have access to the 19 online curriculum unless there is an LSH teacher present. (R133 at 133–34, 202.) Prusse 20 determines what specially designed instruction LSH students need and communicates those 21 needs to Coral Sands so that the curriculum can be modified. (R133 at 133, 236, 243.) In 22 addition, some of Coral Sands’s credits are for participation in LSH therapy, as tracked by 23 LSH clinicians. (R133 at 248–49.) Finally, Pomeroy knew that Student received specially 24 designed instruction from an LSH teacher during offline periods. (R133 at 239, 242–43.) 25 Given the foregoing, the record does not support the District’s attempt to frame LSH 26 as a purely medical placement. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 27 LSH was a proper placement. 28 . . . . 1 III. Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement for tuition. 2 Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for tuition paid to LSH and for related expenses. 3 (Opening Br. 40.) The District argues that reimbursement is barred under the applicable 4 regulations. (Resp. Br. 36–37.) The District further argues that the equities favor denying 5 Plaintiffs relief because of Parents’ unreasonable conduct. (Resp. Br. 38–39.) As discussed 6 below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement for tuition through 7 Student’s graduation, as well as for their related expenses. Plaintiffs have not shown that 8 they should recover for Student’s postgraduation stay at LSH. 9 The District’s regulatory argument is straightforward. One regulation authorizes 10 reimbursement for the costs of a “private . . . secondary school.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c). 11 Another defines “secondary school” to mean “a nonprofit institutional day or residential 12 school.” Id. § 300.36. LSH is a for-profit entity. (R107 at B446.) So, the District argues, 13 LSH is not a “secondary school” whose costs are reimbursable. (Resp. Br. 36–37.) 14 This argument is not persuasive. Prior to enactment of the reimbursement statute 15 and regulation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that reimbursement for private school tuition 16 was available under what is now 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Sch. Comm. of Burlington 17 v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). That statute provides that the court “shall grant 18 such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” The Court held that reimbursement is 19 “appropriate” when the school fails to provide a FAPE and the private placement is proper. 20 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. It further explained that the IDEA “was intended to give 21 [disabled] children both an appropriate education and a free one; it should not be 22 interpreted to defeat one or the other of those objectives.” Id. at 372. The Court later 23 reaffirmed the availability of reimbursement under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) in Florence County 24 School District Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 9–10 (1993). There again, the 25 Court emphasized that the “IDEA was intended to ensure that children with disabilities 26 receive an education that is both appropriate and free,” and it rejected an interpretation that 27 “would defeat this statutory purpose.” Id. at 13–14 (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373). 28 The reimbursement provision was enacted after Carter. It provides: 1 If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll 2 the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the 3 consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if 4 the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free 5 appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment. 6 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (implementing the statute). 7 The Supreme Court examined this provision in Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 8 557 U.S. 230 (2009). There, after the school district determined that the student was not 9 eligible for special education services, the parents enrolled him in a private school and then 10 sought reimbursement. Id. at 233–35. The school district argued that the parents were not 11 entitled to reimbursement under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), as the student had not “previously 12 received special education and related services.” Id. at 241. The Court rejected the school 13 district’s argument, explaining that because the statute “is phrased permissively, stating 14 only that courts ‘may require’ reimbursement in those circumstances, it does not foreclose 15 reimbursement awards in other circumstances.” Id. The Court found that Congress did not 16 intend to abrogate Burlington and Carter when it enacted § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), such that 17 reimbursement remained available under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Id. at 243–44. And the Court 18 reiterated that federal courts should avoid interpreting the IDEA in ways that would render 19 a student’s “right to a free appropriate education . . . less than complete.” Id. at 244–45 20 (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370). 21 These cases establish that Plaintiffs may obtain reimbursement even if they do not 22 satisfy the requirements of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) or its implementing regulation, 34 C.F.R. 23 § 300.148(c). They are entitled to reimbursement under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) so long as the 24 District failed to provide a FAPE and LSH was an appropriate placement. Burlington, 25 471 U.S. at 370. As explained above, those conditions are satisfied, so Plaintiffs may obtain 26 reimbursement. See N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ. v. V.S., No. 10–CV–05120, 2011 WL 3273922, 27 at *16–17 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011) (reaching the same conclusion on similar facts). 28 The District further argues that, even if Plaintiffs are eligible for reimbursement, the 1 equities favor denying them that relief. A district court “enjoys ‘broad discretion’” in 2 fashioning equitable relief under the IDEA. Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 (quoting Burlington, 3 471 U.S. at 369). The District argues that Parents acted unreasonably by not providing 4 notice after the May 2021 IEP meeting that they had rejected the District’s placement and 5 not providing the District with Dr. Leehey’s letter until after Student was placed at LSH. 6 The District argues that such conduct “denied the District the opportunity to draft an IEP 7 that addressed Student’s increased needs before they placed him at LSH.” (Resp. Br. 38.) 8 The Court agrees that Parents could have been clearer about their decisions and the 9 reasons for their decisions. However, the District was well aware of Student’s emotional 10 problems when it drafted the May 2021 IEP, so Parents’ failure to provide additional 11 information at that time was not as obstructive as the District claims. In addition, the 12 District’s conduct with respect to the May 2021 IEP was also unreasonable. From the 13 perspective of Student’s enrollment in the District, the IEP repeated what had already been 14 a complete failure. From the perspective of Student’s future placement, the District violated 15 the law requiring that an IEP not be drafted with the placement already determined. The 16 District further argues that Parents acted unreasonably by not providing Dr. Corelli’s 17 educational assessment until midway through the first meeting for the January 2022 IEP. 18 (Resp. Br. 38.) The Court agrees again. But as the IEP was developed over three sessions 19 spanning a two-month period, Parents’ failure had no effect on the outcome. Such failure 20 therefore is not a reason to deny relief. On balance, the equities support reimbursement.6 21 The last issue, then, is what costs should be reimbursed. Plaintiffs seek $58,360, 22 which is the amount of tuition that they paid out of pocket prior to Student’s graduation. 23 (Opening Br. 40; R142 at 57.) Plaintiffs also seek $7,389.99 in travel, lodgings, and related 24 expenses incurred to visit Student at LSH. (Opening Br. 40; R100 at P7-120.) While the 25 District takes issue with awarding Plaintiffs reimbursement at all, it does not specifically

26 6 The District also argues that it has no responsibility for costs incurred after Student turned 18, since, under state law, he was no longer a resident pupil of the District. (Resp. 27 Br. 38.) However, even if the District is correct about state law, that would not bar the Court from granting federally authorized equitable relief under the IDEA. See Forest 28 Grove, 557 U.S. at 244–45 (rejecting an argument that would render a “child’s right to a free appropriate education . . . less than complete” (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370)). 1 challenge the reasonableness of these figures. In any event, the Court finds that the figures 2 are reasonable. See Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1994) 3 (affirming a grant of “reimbursement for reasonable transportation and lodging expenses 4 . . . as related services”). The Court also finds that the equities favor awarding the full 5 amounts requested. The Court did consider whether Parents’ conduct warrants a reduction. 6 But the District’s overall conduct—recognizing that Student’s school refusal was anxiety- 7 driven but doing nothing to address it in the August 2020 and May 2021 IEPs, and basing 8 the January 2022 IEP on uninformed medical-versus-educational line-drawing—weighs 9 against reducing the award. 10 Plaintiffs also request $61,620 for the cost of Student’s postgraduation program at 11 LSH. (Opening Br. 40.) Their theory is that because the IEPs did not provide adequate 12 transition services (activities designed to facilitate movement from school to post-school 13 life), the District should pay for services provided at LSH after graduation. (R72 at 50.) 14 However, the Court finds that they are not entitled to reimbursement or a compensatory 15 fund for these costs. The District’s obligation to provide a FAPE terminated once Student 16 graduated. 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(i). Further, LSH is a “transitional program,” and the 17 record shows that Student received transition services before graduating. (R100 at P1-13, 18 P2-10.) These included, among other things, development of independent living skills in 19 the community and work with a college advisor. (See R100 at P1-10, P1-13, P3-12.) The 20 award of reimbursement for pre-graduation tuition accounts for any deficiencies in the 21 IEPs’ transition services, and no other relief is warranted. 22 Conclusion 23 The Court recommends that the district judge (1) reverse the ALJ’s decision, (2) 24 find that the August 2020, May 2021, and January 2022 individualized education programs 25 did not provide Student with a free appropriate public education; (3) find that Live Strong 26 House was an appropriate placement; (4) order the District to reimburse Plaintiffs in the 27 amount of $65,749.99; and (5) authorize Plaintiffs’ counsel to file a motion for attorney’s 28 fees. 1 This recommendation is not immediately appealable to the United States Court of 2|| Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The parties have 14 days to file specific written objections 3 || with the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The parties have 14 days to file responses to objections. /d. The parties may not file replies on objections absent the district court’s 5 || permission. A failure to file timely objections may result in the waiver of de novo review. 6 || United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 7 Dated this 10th day of April, 2026.

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