Mross v. United States

186 Ct. Cl. 165, 1968 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 187, 1968 WL 9161
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 13, 1968
DocketNo. 19-67
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 186 Ct. Cl. 165 (Mross v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mross v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 165, 1968 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 187, 1968 WL 9161 (cc 1968).

Opinion

CoweN, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, a retired Navy Commander, sues to recover the portion of his retirement pay which was reduced as a result of a decision by the Comptroller General construing the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 59a (1958), amending Section 212 of the Economy Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 406. The Act is commonly referred to as the Dual Compensation Act and provides as follows:

(a) After June 30,1932, no person holding a civilian office or position, appointive or elective, under the United States Government or the municipal government of the District of Columbia or under any corporation, the majority of the stock of which is owned by the United States, shall be entitled, during the period of such incumbency, to retired pay from the United States for or on account of services as a commissioned officer in any of the services mentioned in title 37, at a rate in [167]*167excess of an amount which, when combined with the annual rate of compensation from such civilian office or position, makes the total rate from both sources more than $10,000; and when the retired pay amounts to or exceeds the rate of $10,000 per annum such person shall be entitled to the pay of the civilian office or position or the retired pay, whichever he may elect. * * *
(b) * * * [Tjhis section shall not apply to any regular or emergency commissioned officer retired for disability (1) incurred in combat with an enemy of the United States, or (2) caused by an instrumentality of war and incurred in line of duty during a period of war * * *.

As a result of the undisputed facts presented in the parties’ cross motions, there is for determination only a question of law — does the exception set forth in Section (b) of the Dual Compensation Act apply under the facts in this case?

On December 7, 1941, plaintiff suffered a perforated ear drum as a result of the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. At the time he was serving Gun No. 7 on the U.S.S. RALEIGH. He continued on active duty until August 1, 1959, when, having over 20 years of military service, he was placed on the Temporary Disability Retired List under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 1202 (1958), by reason of arterio-sclerotic heart disease, which was rated zero percent disabling. Following a number of administrative hearings and reviews, several changes were made in plaintiff’s disability rating with respect to his temporary disability. On December 28,1964, the Secretary of the Navy approved the decision of the Board for Correction of Naval Records that plaintiff’s records be corrected to show that the Physical Evaluation Board, which met in 1959 and found him unfit for duty by reason of arteriosclerotic heart disease rated at zero percent, also found that he was suffering from arthritis of the spine, rated at zero percent, and perforated left ear drum, healed, rated at zero percent.

On July 1, 1964, plaintiff was permanently retired under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 1201 (1958) by reason of arteriosclerotic heart disease, arthritis, and perforation of the [168]*168left ear drum, for all which, disabilities he received a combined rating of 40 percent.

Since October 1961, when plaintiff 'became a civilian employee of the government, his retirement pay has been reduced by reason of defendant’s determination that he is subject to the provisions of Section (a) of the Dual Compensation Act.

Plaintiff contends that he was retired for a heart condition, arthritis, and a perforated ear drum, and that, since the latter was a disability incurred in combat with an enemy of the United States, he is entitled to his salary and full retirement pay. The government does not contest the fact that plaintiff’s perforated ear drum was incurred in combat with an enemy of the United States or was caused by an instrumentality of war, as required by the exception to the Dual Compensation Act. However, defendant 'argues that plaintiff is not entitled to the exemption provided by that Act. Defendant asserts that this must be so, 'because under defendant’s view, plaintiff’s disability retirement was based solely on arteriosclerotic heart disease, which, as plaintiff concedes, was not the direct result of armed conflict or by an instrumentality of war. In rejecting this contention, we rest our decision on the agreed facts, on the provisions of the Dual Compensation Act, considered in connection with the terms of 10 U.S.C. § 1201 (1958), and on certain interpretations of the applicable law by the Navy Department.

Plaintiff’s medical record relating to his permanent disability retirement in 1964, reads as follows:

Findings: Unfit by reason of Arteriosclerotic Heart
Disease, * * * Arthritis, * * * and Perforation, left ear drum, healed, * * * incurred while entitled to receive basic pay and rated at 40% under VA Code Numbers:
7005 Arteriosclerotic Heart Disease_ O CO
6003 Arthritis, cervical and dorsal_ O rH
5003 Arthritis, lumbar 6211 Perforation, left ear drum, healed o &
Combined rating-40%
is permanent.

[169]*169The government contends that because plaintiff’s ear injury was given a zero percentage rating, it was not a basis for his disability retirement. We find this contention to be in conflict with the following synopsis of the opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy Department in the field of disability retirement and separation under Title 10 U.S.C., Chapter 61:

602.5 VA Schedule (All conditions to be rated). Once it has been determined that a party is unfit to perform the duties of his office, rank, grade, or rating, by reason of physical disability, all conditions from which he may be_ suffering which are ratable under the Veterans Administration Schedule must be held to contribute to his unfitness and, if meeting the various other requirements of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended (10 USC, Chapter 61) must be reflected in the percentum of disability assigned the party, [emphasis supplied] (JAG:III:7: WBM:cw, Index No. 5172, approved by the Secretary of the Navy 8 September 1952.)
_ 603.2 VA Schedule (Zero per centum rating permissible). _ Assignment of a zero per centum rating for a condition causing definite ascertainable disability which does not at the time of the determination meet the requirements for a compensable rating is legal irrespective of whether a rating of zero per centum is listed under the appropriate diagnostic code. (JAG: III:7:WBM: cw, Index No. 7049, approved by the Secretary of the Navy 3 August 1953)

In addition, we think a conclusion contrary to defendant’s position is compelled by the following language of 10 U.S.C. § 1201:

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Rieth v. United States
462 F.2d 530 (Court of Claims, 1972)
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451 F.2d 1045 (Court of Claims, 1971)

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Bluebook (online)
186 Ct. Cl. 165, 1968 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 187, 1968 WL 9161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mross-v-united-states-cc-1968.