MRO Software, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County

895 So. 2d 1086, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 14818, 2004 WL 2237711
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedOctober 6, 2004
DocketNos. 3D03-1594, 3D04-2185
StatusPublished

This text of 895 So. 2d 1086 (MRO Software, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MRO Software, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 895 So. 2d 1086, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 14818, 2004 WL 2237711 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

An unsuccessful competitive bidder for a software contract with Miami-Dade County seeks certiorari review of a decision of the Appellate Division of the Eleventh Circuit which transferred its bid challenge to the General Jurisdiction Division. We deny relief on the basis of our agreement that such an award is the exercise of an executive function, rather than a quasi-judicial act subject to certiorari review by the Appellate Division. Charles M. Schayer & Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, 188 So.2d 871 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) squarely so holds. See also Fisher Island Holdings, LLC v. Miami-Dade County Com’n on Ethics and Public Trust, 748 So.2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

As we have already strongly indicated in Miami-Dade County v. Church & Tower, Inc., 715 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), this conclusion is not affected by the procedural process adopted in section 2-8.4 of the Miami Dade County Code.1 See [1087]*1087Church & Tower, 715 So.2d at 1088 n. 4 (“The hearing provides a forum for the orderly presentation and reception of evidence and argument for and against the positions of the opposing parties, and other purposes, not the least of which would be to secure a favorable recommendation from the hearing examiner, and even to allow the protesting bidder an opportunity to convince the county manager to change his recommendation.”); Jennings v. Dade County, 589 So.2d 1337, 1343 n. 1 (Fla. 3d [1088]*1088DCA 1991)(Ferguson, J., concurring) (“If an act is in essence legislative in character, the fact of a notice and a hearing does not transform it into a judicial act. If it would be a legislative act without notice and a hearing, it is still a legislative act with notice and a hearing. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908); Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 14 S.Ct. 1047, 38 L.Ed. 1014 (1894).”), review denied, 598 So.2d 75 (Fla.1992).

Certiorari denied.

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Related

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
154 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1894)
Miami-Dade County v. Church & Tower, Inc.
715 So. 2d 1084 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1998)
Jennings v. Dade County
589 So. 2d 1337 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1991)
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.
211 U.S. 210 (Supreme Court, 1908)
Charles M. Schayer & Co. v. Board of County Commissioners
188 So. 2d 871 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1966)
Fisher Island Holdings, LLC v. Miami-Dade County Commission on Ethics & Public Trust
748 So. 2d 381 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
895 So. 2d 1086, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 14818, 2004 WL 2237711, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mro-software-inc-v-miami-dade-county-fladistctapp-2004.