M.R. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 27, 2020
• Docket: 20A-JV-696
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this FILED Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Jul 27 2020, 9:47 am precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Lisa Diane Manning Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Danville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

M.R., July 27, 2020 Appellant/Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-JV-696 v. Appeal from the Vermillion Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Hon. Jill D. Wesch, Judge Appellee/Petitioner. Trial Court Cause No. 83C01-2002-JD-2

Bradford, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-696 | July 27, 2020 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary [1] While riding on his school bus in February of 2020, then-eleven-year-old M.R.

told the bus driver that he would throw wads of paper in the principal’s face,

blow up the school, and/or bring firearms to school. The State alleged that

M.R. was a juvenile delinquent for committing what would be Level 6 felony

intimidation if committed by an adult, and the juvenile court agreed. M.R.

contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile

court’s delinquency adjudication. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] M.R. was born on February 23, 2008. On February 4, 2020, M.R. was sitting

in the front seat of the school bus on his way home from Ernie Pyle Elementary

School (“the School”) in Vermillion County, with his brother and sister sitting

one seat back. M.R. was throwing paper airplanes at his sister and, despite

being asked to stop by his sister and the bus driver, did not stop. M.R. also

began to wad up pieces of paper, which he placed next to him on the seat. The

bus driver asked M.R.’s brother to report his behavior to their parents and

indicated that if he did not, she would report it to the School’s principal,

Kimberly Kesler. M.R. responded, “I don’t care about that principal. I will hit

her in the face with this paper. I don’t care about that school. I will blow up

that school[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 70; State’s Ex. 1. M.R. also used the word

“bomb[,]” but the rest of this particular statement was unclear. Tr. Vol. II p.

70; State’s Ex. 1. M.R. continued, saying “[w]e have no dynamite. I [will] go

get guns. I [will] shoot one. I will take one to school. I will take all of the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-696 | July 27, 2020 Page 2 of 5 guns.” Tr. Vol. II p. 70; State’s Ex. 1. The transportation director reported

M.R.’s statements to Kesler.

[3] The next day, Kesler reviewed surveillance footage from the bus and brought

M.R. into her office to question him about his statements. M.R. admitted to

having access to firearms at his grandmother’s house and a “.410 at home.” Tr.

Vol. II p. 71. When Kesler questioned M.R. as to whether he knew what it

meant to bomb something, M.R. responded that he did and that “[i]t means

people die[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 70. M.R.’s sister verified to Kesler that M.R. had

made the statements on the bus.

[4] On February 6, 2020, the State filed a delinquency petition in which it alleged

that M.R. had committed what would be Level 6 felony intimidation if

committed by an adult. On February 14, 2020, the juvenile court adjudicated

M.R. a delinquent. On March 3, 2020, the juvenile court ordered M.R. to serve

a one-year commitment suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision [5] When reviewing claims of insufficient evidence in a juvenile case, appellate

courts apply the same standard of review as if it were an appeal of a criminal

conviction. K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612. (Ind. 2013). In reviewing a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or

assess the credibility of witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126. (Ind.

2005). “It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts to assess witness

credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to

support a conviction.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146. (Ind. 2007). We

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-696 | July 27, 2020 Page 3 of 5 look only to evidence in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling and

must affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the

elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126. The

evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Craig v.

State, 730 N.E.2d 1262, 1266. (Ind. 2000).

[6] Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1 provides, in part, that a person who

communicates a threat of a forcible felony with the intent of interfering with the

occupancy of a building commits intimidation, a Level 6 felony. “Whether a

statement is a threat is an objective question for the trier of fact.” E.B. v. State,

89 N.E.3d 1087, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[a]

defendant’s intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, and

knowledge and intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each

case.” Id. (citation omitted).

[7] The record contains evidence that M.R. told his bus driver that he was going to

hit Kesler in the face with wadded-up paper, blow up the School, and/or bring

guns to the School. Kesler also testified that M.R. acknowledged that he had

access to firearms and was aware that bombing the School could result in death.

The juvenile court was free to interpret M.R.’s statements as objective threats.

Additionally, the juvenile court was free to infer that M.R. intended—and knew

or should have known—that his threats would be passed on to Kesler (who

was, after all, included in his threats) and that Kesler would then cause

occupancy of the School to be affected, possibly by closing it or instituting

additional security measures. See, e.g, B.B. v. State, 141 N.E.3d 856, 862 (Ind.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-696 | July 27, 2020 Page 4 of 5 Ct. App. 2020) (in case where B.B. communicated his plan to commit mass

murder at a high school and showed his “manifesto” to a fellow student,

concluding that “a reasonable fact finder could conclude that B.B. knew or

should have known that R.A. would report a plan of mass murder to other

students at the high school”). We conclude that the State produced sufficient

evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s finding that M.R. committed what

would be Level 6 felony intimidation if committed by an adult.

[8] M.R. seems to argue that our decisions in E.B. and B.B. set some special

standard for sufficiency of the evidence in cases where it is alleged that a person

made a threat with the intent to interfere with the occupancy of a school, a

standard that was not met here. Nothing in E.B. or B.B. purports to establish

some sort of minimum standard based on the facts of those cases, and we

decline the invitation to interpret them as doing so. While E.B. and B.B. stand

for the proposition that the evidence was sufficient to prove intimidation in those

cases, they do not stand for the proposition that it was necessary.

[9] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-696 | July 27, 2020 Page 5 of 5