Moyer v. Van de Vanter

29 L.R.A. 670, 41 P. 60, 12 Wash. 377, 1895 Wash. LEXIS 178
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 23, 1895
DocketNo. 1792
StatusPublished
Cited by38 cases

This text of 29 L.R.A. 670 (Moyer v. Van de Vanter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moyer v. Van de Vanter, 29 L.R.A. 670, 41 P. 60, 12 Wash. 377, 1895 Wash. LEXIS 178 (Wash. 1895).

Opinion

[379]*379The opinion of the court was delivered by

Scott, J.

The parties hereto were rival candidates at the last general election for the office of sheriff of King county. The county canvassing board found that respondent was entitled to the office and declared him elected thereto, whereupon a certificate of election was issued to him. Within a few days thereafter appellant filed a statement of contest alleging matters to show that he had received the greatest number of legal votes and was entitled to the office. Issue was taken by the respondent upon certain of the material matters alleged, and a trial was had which resulted in favor of the respondent, and this appeal was taken therefrom.

A number of findings of fact were made by the lower court which with certain conclusions of law based thereon, were duly reduced to writing and made a part of the case. Whereupon appellant excepted as follows: “To these findings of fact and conclusions of law and to each of them the contestant excepts.” An objection was made by the respondent to a consideration of any of the evidence introduced or errors alleged with reference thereto on the ground that no sufficient exception was taken to any fact found by the lower court, and under repeated holdings of this court-heretofore this objection must be sustained. As a consequence thereof the case presented upon appeal is much abbreviated, many of the questions sought to be raised by the appellant are eliminated, and the only question left for our consideration is whether the facts so found by the lower court are antagonistic to the conclusions of law and judgment. Appellant’s main contention in this respect is based upon the 7th finding, which is as follows:

“I find that in Franklin precinct there were 194 [380]*380votes cast and counted for Aaron T. Van de Vanter, the defendant and contestee, and 17 votes for William H. Moyer, the plaintiff and contestant, for said office of sheriff, which said votes entered into and formed a part of the total legal votes hereinbefore found by me to be cast for each of the said contestant and contestee, to wit: on the part of Van de Vanter, entered into and made a part of the 4,380 votes so counted; on the part of Moyer, entered into and became a part of the 4,373 so counted for him. I further find that the election officers of Franklin precinct failed to place upon any of said ballots the initials of the inspector or any judge thereof before the said ballot was deposited in the ballot box. And I further find that a blank ballot was given to each and every elector without either the official stamp or the initials of an election officer thereon; that said elector took said ballqt and the same was marked by said elector and returned by him to the election officers, when in the presence of the elector the inspector of said election placed upon said ballot the official stamp furnished for that purpose by the county auditor in pursuance of law, after which the said ballot was folded and placed within the ballot box, wherein it was kept until at the time of the counting by the election officers and at the close of the polls all of the ballots of said precinct were counted and returned in a sealed box by a special messenger to the county auditor in the manner directed by law. I further find from the evidence and stipulations in this cáse that the ballots voted by the electors in each and every, instance were placed in the said box, and that the said ballots had been safely kept and was produced into this court as an original exhibit as evidence of the said recount. I further find that the election officers of Franklin precinct were in close and watchful attendance at the polls and of the ballot box and ballots during the entire election; that no ballots were used except those received from the election judges or taken under their direction; that the election was.held in an orderly manner; that the votes were counted and returned to the county auditor as required by law, and [381]*381that the vote so returned were the votes actually cast at Franklin precinct at said election.”

The important question to be determined is whether the vote cast in this precinct could be counted, the initials of no one of the election officers having been written on any of the ballots. The law provides that there shall be printed on the back of the ballots with the rubber or other stamp provided for that purpose the designation “ official ballot,” the name or number of the election precinct, the name of the county, the date of the election, the name and official designation of the clerk who furnishes the tickets to the judges of election, and, that the inspector or one of the judges shall also write his initials thereon. Secs. 382 and 384, Gen. Stat. The ballots bore the proper stamp, and the fact that it was not placed thereon before they were delivered to the electors but was done when they were returned to be deposited in' the ballot box, was but an irregularity which could not vitiate them in the absence of any fraud.

Section 391 is as follows:

In the canvass of the votes, any ballot which is not indorsed, as provided in this chapter, by the official stamp and initials shall be void, and shall not be counted, and any ballot or parts of a ballot from which it is impossible to determine the elector’s choice shall be void, and shall not be counted: Provided, That when a ballot is sufficiently plain to gather therefrom a part of the voter’s intention, it shall be the duty of the judges of election to count such part.”

If the language of this section can be given its full force, all the ballots cast in this precinct were rendered void by the failure of the election officers to comply therewith in not having one of their number write his initials thereon, and the effect of it would be to disfranchise all voters in that precinct for that election. [382]*382The Constitution, § 1, art. 6, provides that all male persons of the age- of twenty-one years or over, possessing certain qualifications specified “shall be entitled to vote at all elections,” and § 6 reads as follows:

“All elections shall be by ballot. The legislature shall provide for such method of voting as will secure to every elector absolute secrecy in preparing and depositing his ballot.”

Can the legislature enact a law whereby election officers can practically disfranchise all the electors of a precinct where the electors themselves are not at fault ? If so, the constitutional guarantee is of small consequence. Legislation going to promote the honesty of elections is most beneficial in character, and as a means of securing this end the general policy of the law is that the ballot shall be a secret one, that.it may not be known for which candidate any particular voter voted in order that bribery may be prevented. Provision is also made as to the duties of election officers to the end that a fraudulent canvass of the votes cast may be prevented. There is good ground for recognizing a distinction between the obligations placed upon the individual voter and those matters which relate to the duties of election officers.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
29 L.R.A. 670, 41 P. 60, 12 Wash. 377, 1895 Wash. LEXIS 178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moyer-v-van-de-vanter-wash-1895.