Moyer v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 20, 2020
Docket3:19-cv-00970
StatusUnknown

This text of Moyer v. Commissioner of Social Security (Moyer v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moyer v. Commissioner of Social Security, (S.D. Ill. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SHANE T. M.,1 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-970-GCS2 ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) SECURITY, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff, represented by counsel, seeks judicial review of the final agency decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff applied for disability benefits in May 2016, alleging disability as of September 25, 2014. After holding an evidentiary hearing, an ALJ denied the application on September 27, 2018. (Tr. 25, 35). The Appeals Council denied review, and the decision of the ALJ became the final agency decision. (Tr. 1). Administrative remedies 1 In keeping with the court’s practice, Plaintiff’s full name will not be used in this Memorandum and Order due to privacy concerns. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c) and the Advisory Committee Notes thereto.

2 This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Docs. 10 & 19.

Page 1 of 27 have been exhausted, and a timely complaint was filed in this Court. ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF Plaintiff raises the following points:

1. The ALJ failed to evaluate properly the residual functional capacity.

2. The ALJ failed to evaluate properly step 2 of the sequential evaluation.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the applicable statutes. Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if he has an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). To determine whether a plaintiff is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff presently unemployed?; (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment?; (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations?; (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform his former occupation?; and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

An affirmative answer at either step three or five leads to a finding that the plaintiff is disabled. A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, precludes a finding

Page 2 of 27 of disability. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to the

Commissioner to show that there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the plaintiff can perform. See Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). It is important to recognize that the scope of review is limited. “The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must determine not

whether plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law were made. See Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,

1154 (2019) (internal citations omitted). In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. See Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). However, while judicial review is

deferential, it is not abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010)(citing cases).

Page 3 of 27 THE DECISION OF THE ALJ The ALJ followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He determined that Plaintiff had not worked at the level of substantial gainful activity since

the alleged onset date. He was insured for DIB through December 31, 2019. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of diabetes mellitus, diabetic retinopathy, diabetic neuropathy, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative joint disease of the bilateral shoulders, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, obesity, and depressive disorder.

The ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to do the following: Perform sedentary work . . . except he can occasionally push and/or pull with the bilateral lower extremities, frequently but not repetitively push and/or pull with the bilateral upper extremities, with no ladders, ropes or scaffolds, occasional ramps or stairs, occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, and frequent reaching with the bilateral upper extremities. He cannot perform tasks requiring depth perception due to monocular vision, read printed materials smaller than traditional newsprint, or work with objects smaller than keys. He must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat and avoid all hazards. He is further limited to remembering, understanding and attending to simple, routine tasks.

(Tr. 30). Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work.

Page 4 of 27 THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record is

directed to Plaintiff’s arguments. 1. Agency Forms Plaintiff was born in 1972 and was 46 years old on the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 215). He worked as a “tool measurer” from September 2001 to September 2014. (Tr. 221).

In a Function Report submitted in May 2016, Plaintiff said he has weakened hands and feet, is unable to lift heavy objects, has feet tingling, has trouble sleeping, oversleeps, and his impairments affect his daily personal care. Plaintiff said he cannot stand in the kitchen for long, has difficulties holding utensils, has difficulties with carrying, bending and stooping, and his conditions affect his lifting, squatting, bending, standing, walking,

kneeling, stair climbing, and task completion.

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Moyer v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moyer-v-commissioner-of-social-security-ilsd-2020.