Moye-Lyons v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Instruction

Opinions

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-260

No. COA21-486

Filed 19 April 2022

NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, I.C. No. 18-754456

LEKIA MOYE-LYONS, Plaintiff,

v.

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND SEDGWICK CMS (THIRD PARTY ADMINISTRATOR), Defendants.

Appeal by Plaintiff from opinion and award entered 20 April 2021 by North

Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 February 2022.

Perry & Associates, by Cedric R. Perry, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Matthew E. Buckner, for Defendants-Appellees.

WOOD, Judge.

¶1 Plaintiff Lekia Moye-Lyons (“Plaintiff”) appeals an opinion and award of the

North Carolina Industrial Commission (“the Commission”) denying Plaintiff’s claim

against the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (“Defendant-

Employer”) and Sedgwick CMS (“Defendant-Carrier”) (collectively, “Defendants”)

based on the Commission’s conclusion that Plaintiff failed to file a timely claim under

the Workers Compensation Act and that the Commission did not acquire jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s claim. After careful review, we affirm the Commission’s opinion and

Opinion of the Court

award.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 On April 20, 2007, Plaintiff was employed by Edgecombe County Public

Schools, a school district falling under the authority of Defendant-Employer, as a

temporary part-time math tutor for sixth, seventh, and eighth grade students.

During Plaintiff’s employment as a tutor, Edgecombe County Schools did not require

Plaintiff to take any additional classes to become a licensed teacher. Previously,

Plaintiff worked as an “emergency” teacher for Halifax County Schools and Nash-

Rocky Mount Schools, as she did not possess a teaching license. However, Plaintiff

greatly desired and set as a personal goal to become a licensed math teacher.

¶3 During the course of her employment with Halifax County Schools and Nash-

Rocky Mount Schools, Plaintiff sought to be licensed as a lateral entry math teacher

through the Nash Regional Alternative Licensing Center (“NRALC”). To obtain a

teaching license through NRALC, Plaintiff had to meet a number of requirements.

Although Plaintiff obtained a degree in Business Administration and Management

from Shaw University, she was required to obtain her teaching license through

NRALC because she did not possess a degree in Mathematics. After taking several

courses, Plaintiff believed that she had completed the necessary requirements to

obtain her licensure in 2004.

¶4 On November 3, 2006, Plaintiff received a letter from NRALC indicating her

application for licensure had multiple deficiencies and requiring her to complete

additional steps to clear her lateral entry license. In this letter, NRALC advised

Plaintiff’s only choice in meeting the remaining conditions was to associate with a

college or university that had an approved program in middle grades math and have

that school evaluate Plaintiff’s transcripts and set up a plan of study. This letter

indicated that once Plaintiff completed the needed courses, the university she chose

to attend would then be able to recommend Plaintiff for a clear teaching license. After

receiving NRALC’s November 3, 2006 letter, Plaintiff did not enroll in a college or

university to finish meeting the remaining licensure requirements. As a result of

receiving this letter, Plaintiff testified that she was “devastated” after not being

licensed and felt “depressed” and “overwhelmed.”

¶5 After the denial of her teaching license by NRALC, Plaintiff contends the letter

caused her to have several alleged medical symptoms. Plaintiff alleged that while

working for the Defendant-Employer on April 20, 2007, she suffered a stroke and

subsequently developed Bell’s Palsy due to stress she experienced after the denial of

her teaching license. Plaintiff also alleged she began experiencing auditory

disturbances “a few weeks later,” that eventually lead to her diagnosis of

schizophrenia in April 2009. Despite hearing beeping noises in the weeks following

her alleged April 20, 2007 injuries, Plaintiff continued working for Edgecombe County

Public Schools for an additional nine months to one year. During this time, Plaintiff

continued to drive herself to work and home, took care of her children, made her

meals, and paid her bills.

¶6 Documentation of Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that Plaintiff first

reported signs of mental health issues in 2009. During a medical appointment on

March 17, 2009, Plaintiff described hearing voices coming from the TV, ceiling, and

vents for several months. After being involuntarily committed to Coastal Plain

Hospital on April 5, 2009 and readmitted on April 16, 2009, Plaintiff was diagnosed

with psychosis, which involved a “fixed delusion of a plot against her by the school

system and this is unfortunately likely to be a long-standing delusion which she had

kept well under wraps.” On April 29, 2009, Dr. William Oliver Mann, a board-

certified psychiatrist, began treating Plaintiff for schizophrenia. Between April 4,

2009 and October 29, 2018, Plaintiff experienced issues related to her diagnosis of

schizophrenia. During this period, Plaintiff professed to experiencing auditory

hallucinations and delusions, and was the subject of multiple involuntary

commitment proceedings instituted on April 4, 2009, October 21, 2012, and January

13, 2015. Plaintiff was also placed into inpatient hospitalization due to her mental

health on four separate occasions: from April 5-9, 2009; April 16-29, 2009; October

21-November 2, 2012; and August 26- September 14, 2016. Plaintiff testified that

between 2009 and 2017, she was hospitalized for a total of 250 days.

¶7 During this same period, Plaintiff applied repeatedly for Social Security

Disability benefits through the Social Security Administration (SSA). Plaintiff filed

applications on May 6, 2009, July 22, 2010, September 30, 2011, and March 6, 2013.

In support of Plaintiff’s first application, which was denied on August 14, 2009,

Plaintiff submitted a “Function Report-Adult-Third Party” which was completed by

her parents on July 27, 2009. The report stated that Plaintiff was living with her

parents at the time, described her as “depressed,” unable “to make rational decisions

to care for children, properly without help,” could not hold a job, unable to manage

her checkbook, needed assistance taking her medication, but noted that she was

taking a twice weekly community college course, was able to pay bills, cooked “about

5% of the time,” and when prompted, helped with household chores.

¶8 While applying for disability benefits, Plaintiff executed several medical

release forms to SSA and signed on her own behalf. On June 30, 2014, Plaintiff hired

an attorney to represent her in the Social Security Disability claim and executed

paperwork appointing him as her representative in the matter. On May 7, 2015,

Plaintiff signed an “Advance Notification of Representative Payment,” as SSA had

determined that Plaintiff needed assistance in managing her benefits and designated

Plaintiff’s father as her representative payee. By signing this document, Plaintiff

indicated that she understood she had sixty days to appeal SSA’s appointment of a

representative payee and the identity of the representative payee. Plaintiff was

initially approved for Social Security Disability benefits on April 22, 2015 for

schizophrenia, mood swings, myalgia, and neuralgia, with SSA determining that

Plaintiff became disabled as of October 21, 2012. Plaintiff appealed the date of her

disability to SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review and was ultimately

approved for full benefits on May 11, 2017, with her date of disability modified to

September 1, 2010.

¶9 On October 29, 2018, Plaintiff initiated a claim for workers’ compensation

benefits by filing a Form 18 Notice of Accident to Employer and Claim of Employee,

Representative, or Dependent for her alleged 2007 workplace injuries. At an April 25,

2019 hearing before Deputy Commissioner Kevin Howell on this claim, Plaintiff,

appearing pro se, confirmed that she had not previously filed any workers’

compensation claim for these injuries. At this hearing, a claims adjuster for

Defendant-Carrier confirmed that Defendant-Carrier had not authorized any

payment of indemnity or medical compensation to Plaintiff in relation to this claim.

¶ 10 On June 14, 2019, the Deputy Commissioner issued an opinion & award

dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice, determining that Plaintiff did not file her

workers’ compensation claim in a timely manner. While still proceeding pro se,

Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission. Prior to the matter being heard before the

Full Commission, Plaintiff retained counsel and moved the Commission to amend the

Record and accept new evidence. On December 19, 2019, the Full Commission issued

an order directing Plaintiff to produce to Defendants, and file with the Commission,

the complete set of SSA medical documentation and other records from the 2017

hearing before the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. Plaintiff was also

ordered to subpoena any involuntary commitment records from the appropriate

county clerk of court.

¶ 11 On April 20, 2021, the Full Commission issued its opinion & award, concluding

that Plaintiff’s claim was not timely filed, was not entitled to the tolling of the two-

year limitations period pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24 because Plaintiff was not

mentally incompetent between April 20, 2007 to April 20, 2009, and that the

Commission did not properly acquire jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim. The

Commission further concluded that even “assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff became

mentally incompetent” on April 4, 2009, the date of her first involuntary commitment,

“the Full Commission concludes that she was no longer mentally incompetent by 11

November 2009, the date when her treating psychiatrist deemed her able to return

to work and provide instruction to children as young as twelve years old.” The

Commission’s conclusions were based in part upon a letter Plaintiff provided from Dr.

Mann, dated November 11, 2009, which stated:

You have requested me to determine whether or not you are capable of returning to work on a part time basis. I have been treating [you] since 4/29/2009 for schizophrenia. This condition has improved significantly, and you are stable for the last several months. You have been compliant with treatment. It is my medical opinion that you are capable of returning to part time work at this time. Although it is

difficult to determine if and when you may become sick again, as long as you remain on medication, follow up with your treatment and see me every 6 weeks to monitor for any breakthrough symptoms, I see no reason to keep you from working at this time . . . It is my medical opinion that your condition does not prevent you from tutoring children as young as 12 years old.

The Commission further held that Plaintiff did not present sufficient competent

evidence to establish that she was mentally incompetent at any point after November

11, 2009, so that any tolling of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24 expired as of that date. The

Commission dismissed Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice. Plaintiff filed notice of appeal

to this Court on May 18, 2021.

II. Appellate Jurisdiction

¶ 12 The ruling of the Full Commission dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice

is a final decision and appeal lies to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-29.

III. Discussion

¶ 13 On appeal, Plaintiff contends that despite not filing a workers compensation

claim within two years of April 20, 2007, the Commission erred in its finding of her

claim being time barred and dismissing her claim for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiff

argues her claim should not be barred because Plaintiff became mentally incompetent

after the alleged April 20, 2007 incident, thus qualifying her claim to the tolling of

the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24’s two-year limitation period. Plaintiff’s arguments will

each be addressed in turn.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 14 The primary issue presented to this Court is whether Plaintiff timely filed her

claim, and thereby, invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission over her April 20,

2007 alleged injury. Our Court has established that “the timely filing of a claim for

compensation is a condition precedent to the right to receive compensation and failure

to file timely is a jurisdictional bar for the Industrial Commission.” Reinhardt v.

Women’s Pavilion, Inc., 102 N.C. App. 83, 86, 401 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1991). “Whether

a party timely filed a claim with the Commission is a question of jurisdiction . . . .”

Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 273 N.C. App. 497, 503, 849 S.E.2d 880,

885 (2020). As this Court explained in Capps v. Southeastern Cable, the finding of a

jurisdictional fact by the Commission “is not conclusive upon appeal even though

there be evidence in the record to support such finding. The reviewing court has the

right, and the duty, to make its own independent findings of such jurisdictional facts

from its consideration of all the evidence in the record.” 214 N.C. App. 225, 226-27,

715 S.E.2d 227, 229, (2011) (citation omitted). As such, this Court is tasked to review

the entire record de novo. Morales-Rodriguez v. Carolina Quality Exteriors, Inc., 205

N.C. App. 712, 715, 698 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2010).

¶ 15 “This Court makes determinations concerning jurisdictional facts based on the

greater weight of the evidence” by assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to be given their testimony and by weighing the evidence “using the same

tests as would be employed by any fact-finder in a judicial or quasi-judicial

proceeding.” Cunningham, 273 N.C. App. at 503-04, 849 S.E.2d at 885 (first quoting

Capps, 214 N.C. App. at 227, 715 S.E.2d at 229; and then quoting Morales-Rodriguez,

205 N.C. App. at 715, 698 S.E.2d at 94).

B. The Commission’s Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim.

¶ 16 Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a), a claim is:

forever barred unless (i) a claim or memorandum of agreement as provided in G.S. 97-82 is filed with the Commission or the employee is paid compensation as provided under this Article within two years after the accident or (ii) a claim or memorandum of agreement as provided in G.S. 97-82 is filed with the Commission within two years after the last payment of medical compensation when no other compensation has been paid and when the employer’s liability has not otherwise been established under this Article. The provisions of this subsection shall not limit the time otherwise allowed for the filing of a claim for compensation for occupational disease in G.S. 97-58, but in no event shall the time for filing a claim for compensation for occupational disease be less than the times provided herein for filing a claim for an injury by accident.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a) (2021). This requirement of “filing a claim within two years

of the accident is not a statute of limitation, but a condition precedent to the right to

compensation.” Reinhardt, 102 N.C. App. at 84, 401 S.E.2d at 139 (citation omitted).

The Commission’s dismissal of a claim “is proper where there is an absence of

evidence that the Industrial Commission acquired jurisdiction by the timely filing of

a claim or by the submission of a voluntary settlement agreement to the

Commission.” Id. at 86-87, 401 S.E.2d at 140-41.

¶ 17 Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not file her worker’s compensation claim

with the Commission within the two years after her alleged April 20, 2007 injury,

and in fact, filed her claim in 2018, more than eleven years after the injury. The

Record further reflects that based on the testimony of Defendant’s claims adjuster,

the Defendant-Carrier never paid indemnity or medical compensation to the Plaintiff

in relation to her claim. Additionally, no evidence in the Record reflects Plaintiff and

Defendant-Employer ever submitting a voluntary settlement agreement in

connection to Plaintiff’s claim. Applying N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a) to the facts of this

case, Plaintiff did not meet this condition precedent of a timely filing of her claim for

the jurisdiction of the Commission to be invoked. Therefore, if Plaintiff’s claim does

not qualify for tolling of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24’s two-year limitation period, the

dismissal of her claim is proper and the right to compensation is barred. Id.

C. Mental Incompetency of Plaintiff Affecting Commission’s Jurisdiction

¶ 18 Despite her untimely filing to the Commission, Plaintiff contends that her

claim is not time barred under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a) because she was mentally

incompetent within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-50. In spite of N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 97-24(a)’s two year time limitation, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-50 makes clear that

there is no time limitation “provided in this Article for the giving of notice or making

claim under this Article [that] shall run against any person who is mentally

incompetent.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-50 (2021); Hand v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 85 N.C.

App. 372, 377-78, 355 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1987).

¶ 19 To qualify for the tolling protections of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-50, a mentally

incompetent adult is one “who lacks sufficient capacity to manage the adult’s own

affairs or to make or communicate important decisions concerning the adult’s person,

family, or property whether the lack of capacity is due to mental illness, intellectual

disability, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety, senility, disease, injury, or

similar cause or condition.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101(7) (2021); In re Z.V.A., 373

N.C. 207, 210, 835 S.E.2d 425, 428 (2019). As such, the determination of

incompetency is an adjudication process as Chapter 35A lays out that its provisions

establish “the exclusive procedure for adjudicating a person to be an incompetent

adult.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1102 (2021); In re Dippel, 249 N.C. App. 610, 612, 791

S.E.2d 684, 686 (2016).

¶ 20 Prior to the Full Commission’s hearing, the Plaintiff has never undergone the

mandatory procedure to be adjudged incompetent under the provisions of N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 35A-1101. However, we note that the Commission possesses the authority to

determine whether Plaintiff was mentally incompetent during the two-year time

limitation laid out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a). See Hand, 85 N.C. App. at 378-79,

355 S.E.2d at 145.

¶ 21 In deciding whether someone is incompetent as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. §

35A-1101, “[t]he appropriate test for establishing an adult incompetent ‘is one of

mental competence to manage one’s own affairs.’ ” Soderlund v. Kuch, 143 N.C. App.

361, 373, 546 S.E.2d 632, 640 (2001) (quoting Cox v. Jefferson-Pilot Fire and Casualty

Co., 80 N.C. App. 122, 125, 341 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1986)). In explaining the term

“affairs,” our Supreme Court elaborated that it encompasses “a person's entire

property and business — not just one transaction or one piece of property to which he

may have a unique attachment.” Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm., 275 N.C. 90, 104,

165 S.E.2d 490, 499 (1969). In the adjudication of competency, “[t]he facts in every

case will be different and competency or incompetency will depend upon the

individual's ‘general frame and habit of mind.’ ” Id. at 105, 165 S.E.2d at 500 (citation

omitted). However, “mere weakness of mind will not be sufficient to put a person

among those who are incompetent to manage their own affairs.” Id. (citation

omitted).

¶ 22 Here, the Full Commission concluded that Plaintiff’s claim was jurisdictionally

barred because Plaintiff did not file a claim within two years of April 20, 2007 and

Plaintiff was not mentally incompetent during the relevant time, which would have

qualified her for a tolling of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a)’s two-year timeframe. Plaintiff

challenges findings of fact 27 and 29 as well as conclusion of law 6 concluding Plaintiff

was not mentally incompetent and therefore, not entitled to the tolling of N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 97-50. Plaintiff contends that because she (1) experienced symptoms and her

diagnosis of schizophrenia was the subject of several involuntary commitment

proceedings, and (2) was awarded full Social Security Disability benefits, the

Commission erred when it concluded she had not established mental incompetency

within the required time period to qualify for the tolling exemption.

1. Finding of Fact 27

¶ 23 Plaintiff challenges the Commission’s finding of fact 27 that states:

27. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the Full Commission finds that Plaintiff has not shown sufficient evidence to establish that she was mentally incompetent during the two-year limitations period following her alleged 20 April 2007 workplace injury. Although Plaintiff was involuntarily committed on 5 April 2009 and again on 16 April 2009, the Full Commission finds that these incidents are insufficient, on their own, to show that Plaintiff was incapable of managing her own affairs between 20 April 2007 and 20 April 2009, as involuntary commitment and incompetency proceedings are statutorily distinct and involve different legal standards. The record contains no evidence that Plaintiff has ever been declared incompetent by the General Court of Justice. To the contrary, the records Plaintiff submitted to the Commission indicate that she was undergoing treatment, was taking her medication, and was generally considered to be in stable psychological condition for several years following her 2009 hospitalizations, and indeed was not hospitalized again until 21 October 2012, over three and a half years after her previous involuntary commitment. Moreover, Plaintiff remained legally capable of signing medical records releases and attorney-client agreements as late as 11 August 2014, over five years after her first involuntary commitment.

¶ 24 As we have previously noted, the Record reflects that Plaintiff has never been

adjudicated as mentally incompetent or that there have been incompetency

proceedings instituted against her. In preparation for her hearing before the Full

Commission, Plaintiff submitted 1,289 pages of documents featuring medical records

dating back to 2001. A close review of the Record indicates that in the two years

spanning April 20, 2007 to April 20, 2009, Plaintiff possessed the frame of mind to

manage her own affairs and to make or communicate important decisions regarding

her person, family, or property. See id. at 105-06, 165 S.E.2d at 500. Plaintiff

acknowledged that even after the alleged April 20, 2007 injury, she continued

working for Defendant-Employer for the next nine months to one year. During her

employment, Plaintiff drove herself to and from work, prepared meals, took care of

her children, and paid her bills.

¶ 25 Continuing our review of the Record, we note the absence of any medical

documentation tending to show that Plaintiff suffered from a psychiatric illness

between April 20, 2007 and March 17, 2009. Instead, the Record demonstrates that

Plaintiff underwent treatment for a hypertensive episode following the birth of a child

on April 15, 2007 and on May 28, 2007 for tingling in the teeth and gums

intermittently. Later, on June 29, 2007, the Plaintiff underwent a tubal ligation

surgery. At these medical appointments and procedures, the Plaintiff reported “no

previous psychiatric history” and did not endorse any psychiatric symptoms.

¶ 26 The Record also reflects Plaintiff’s documented experience of having

psychiatric issues on March 17, 2009, where Plaintiff reported auditory

hallucinations to a physician. Plaintiff was assessed to have schizophrenia but was

noted to possess an intellect within normal limits, and to not be a danger to herself

or others. In April 2009, Plaintiff was hospitalized on two separate occasions at

Coastal Plain Hospital, where she received a diagnosis of psychosis. The Record

demonstrates that even during Plaintiff’s involuntary hospitalizations, she actively

participated in her treatment while hospitalized. During Plaintiff’s April 16-29, 2009

hospitalization, Plaintiff expressed concerns of excessive sedation from her

medications, at which point Plaintiff agreed to taking another medication to address

this issue. At her April 30, 2009 discharge, Plaintiff’s medical document stated,

Plaintiff “was felt to be stable medically and psychiatrically at the time of discharge

with the patient exhibiting no behavior consistent with wish to harm herself or

others.” While it is notable that Plaintiff experienced exacerbations of her psychiatric

condition during these periods, Plaintiff still was able to manage her own affairs and

make important decisions regarding her person and her affairs during her inpatient

admissions. The Record tends to show that by November 11, 2009, Plaintiff’s

psychiatric state had improved considerably. As noted previously, Plaintiff’s

psychiatrist, Dr. Mann, found Plaintiff to be stable and capable of returning to work.

¶ 27 The Record shows that Plaintiff’s mental competency continued as she actively

underwent treatment, medication management, physician follow-up and remained in

stable psychological condition for several years following her 2009 hospitalizations.

Between 2009 and 2010, Plaintiff’s mental status exams remained consistent in

reporting normal speech, unremarkable thought content, denying any hallucinations,

and attending individual and group therapy. Plaintiff was not hospitalized again for

her psychosis until October 21, 2012, over three and a half years after her previous

involuntary commitment.

¶ 28 Additionally, Plaintiff executed medical release forms on September 21, 2010,

November 27, 2011, April 1, 2013, June 30, 2014, and August 11, 2014 which

permitted SSA to request medical records on her behalf. On June 30, 2014, Plaintiff

also entered into an agreement with an attorney to represent her in the Social

Security Disability claim. As a result, the undisputed Record evidence tends to show

that Plaintiff remained legally capable of managing her own affairs when entering

into these agreements.

¶ 29 Plaintiff contends that this Court should consider the incompetency

proceedings she underwent between 2009 to 2015 in determining that she was

mentally incompetent during the two-year period after the alleged April 20, 2007

workplace injury. We disagree. Involuntary commitment proceedings and the

determination of mental incompetency are two different proceedings and require

separate legal standards. Involuntary commitment proceedings determine whether

an individual is a danger to themselves or others, or requires treatment in order to

prevent a further disability or deterioration that would result in dangerousness. N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 122C-261(a) (2021); In re Webber, 201 N.C. App. 212, 217, 689 S.E.2d

468, 473 (2009); Gregory v. Kilbride, 150 N.C. App. 601, 612, 565 S.E.2d 685, 693

(2002).

¶ 30 In contrast, an incompetency proceeding determines whether an adult has the

capacity to manage their own affairs or make or communicate important decisions

regarding their person, family, or property. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101(7); In re

Dippel, 249 N.C. App. at 612, 791 S.E.2d at 686; Leonard v. England, 115 N.C. App.

103, 107-08, 445 S.E.2d 50, 52 (1994). Our General Assembly defines the distinction

between the two proceedings as,

[t]he admission or commitment to a facility of an individual who allegedly has a mental illness. . . or an individual who allegedly has an intellectual or other developmental disability under the provisions of this Article shall in no way affect incompetency proceedings as set forth in Chapter 35A . . . of the General Statutes and incompetency proceedings under those Chapters shall have no effect upon admission or commitment proceedings under this Article.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-203 (2021). Therefore, we conclude that the initiation of

involuntary commitment proceedings against Plaintiff in 2009, 2012, and 2015 is not

determinative of her mental competence in her 2007 workers compensation claim.

2. Finding of Fact 29

¶ 31 Next, Plaintiff challenges the Full Commission’s finding of fact that the SSA’s

decisions related to Plaintiff do not establish Plaintiff as being mentally incompetent

during the period of time between the time of the alleged workplace injury and when

she filed the workers compensation claim at issue here. The Commission’s finding of

fact 29 states:

Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Full Commission finds that neither the 2017 SSA Fully Favorable Decision that Plaintiff was disabled as of 1 September 2010 nor the 2015 appointment of a representative payee for Plaintiff’s SSA disability benefits establish that Plaintiff was mentally incompetent under North Carolina state law at any point during the relevant period.

Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred by not placing a greater weight on the

evidence contained in SSA’s documentation pertaining to its 2017 Fully Favorable

Decision. Plaintiff contends that SSA’s decision was based on her “longitudinal

medical history” and her records since 2008, and that these records should serve as

“decisive evidence in this proceeding.” Again, we disagree. The Industrial

Commission has the duty to “consider all of the competent evidence, make definitive

findings, draw its conclusions of law from these findings, and enter the appropriate

award.” Harrell v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835

(1980).

¶ 32 The Record tends to show that the Commission considered and weighed the

fully favorable decision of SSA awarding Plaintiff Social Security Disability benefits

as well as the 1,289 pages of medical documentation from Plaintiff’s packet to SSA

that were submitted to the Commission. The Record indicates that the Commission

addressed in its findings of fact the decision of the administrative law judge from the

Social Security Administration’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, noting

that the Plaintiff successfully appealed the date of her disability so that she was

granted disability benefits as of September 1, 2010. The administrative law judge

found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after September

1, 2010 because of her schizophrenia and that Plaintiff possessed “the residual

functional capacity to perform a full range of work,” but that Plaintiff is unable to

make a successful vocational transition to other jobs that she could perform.

¶ 33 Despite SSA’s fully favorable decision for the Plaintiff and its appointment of

a representative payee for the Plaintiff, Defendant-Employer contends that the

determination of mental incompetency pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101

considers different legal standards and principles than the ascertainment of Social

Security Disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 416(i).

¶ 34 The Commission concluded that although Plaintiff was disabled as of

September 1, 2010, SSA’s determination was based upon federal statutes and

regulations, rather than North Carolina state law. In reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 416(i),

the Commission explained that the determination of whether an individual is

“disabled” and entitled to the benefits of Social Security rests on whether the

individual is capable of gainful employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (2021).

¶ 35 In evaluating the evidence in the Record, the Commission looked to the logic

of this Court’s finding in Hand that while the ability to work may be part of the

determination of mental incompetency under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101, it is not

dispositive and other factors may be considered. See Hand, 85 N.C. App. at 378-79,

355 S.E.2d at 145 (holding that the record contained evidence which supported the

Commission’s finding that Plaintiff was not incompetent and her untimely workers

compensation claim was barred because, among other factors, Plaintiff continued in

her job, which required physical and mental dexterity, understood her pay scale and

contested the amount when she thought it was too low.).

¶ 36 Thus, we hold that the evidence of SSA’s Fully Favorable Decision of Plaintiff’s

disability supports the Commission’s finding that Plaintiff was not mentally

incompetent under North Carolina law during the time in question.

¶ 37 Next, Plaintiff contends the Commission erred in not placing greater weight

on SSA’s assignment of a representative payee for Plaintiff on May 7, 2015, in relation

to Plaintiff’s claim for Social Security Disability benefits. The Record does not,

however, contain any evidence tending to show that the Commission is bound by

SSA’s determination, nor that SSA’s assignment is dispositive evidence of Plaintiff

being mentally incompetent under North Carolina Law. (citing Program Operations

Manual System (POMS) GN 00501.010(B)(8), SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,

https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200501010 (last visited Apr. 10, 2022)).

The Commission found that SSA’s regulations and rules articulate that a

determination of incapability “is a DECISION BY SSA that a claimant is unable to

manage or direct the management of benefits in his/her best interests” and that “an

incapability decision is valid only for SSA matters.” Id.

¶ 38 SSA defines a “legally competent adult” as an individual who “has not been

found to be legally incompetent by a court of law” and “may include an adult who SSA

has determined is incapable of managing or directing the management of funds.” Id.

Although SSA determined Plaintiff is unable to manage her benefits and requires a

representative payee, under SSA’s regulations and in the absence of an adjudication

of incompetence, Plaintiff qualifies as a legally competent adult. See 42 U.S.C. §

405(j)(1)(A) (2021); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1102.

¶ 39 Based on the greater weight of the evidence, we conclude that SSA’s 2017 fully

favorable decision for Social Security Disability benefits and the 2015 Representative

Payee Appointment does not establish that Plaintiff was mentally incompetent under

North Carolina state law.

3. Conclusion of Law 6

¶ 40 Finally, Plaintiff challenges the Commission’s conclusion of law that “[b]ased

on the foregoing findings of fact, the Full Commission concludes that between 20 April

2007 and 20 April 2009, Plaintiff was capable of managing her own affairs and as

such, was not mentally incompetent.”

¶ 41 As previously discussed, the Commission’s function is “to weigh and evaluate

the entire evidence and determine as best it can where the truth lies.” Harrell, 45

N.C. App. at 205, 262 S.E.2d at 835 (citation omitted). In reaching its conclusion, the

Commission relied on its findings discussed herein. The Commission weighed and

evaluated the entire Record, including the 1,289 pages of documentation featuring

Plaintiff’s medical records, the decisions made by SSA in awarding Plaintiff Social

Security Disability benefits, and Plaintiff’s involuntary commitment proceedings and

hospitalizations. For these reasons, we hold that the greater weight of the evidence

demonstrates that Plaintiff was not mentally incompetent during the two-year period

after her alleged work injury.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 42 After a careful examination of the Record before us, we conclude because

Plaintiff failed to file a timely claim and does not qualify for tolling of N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 97-24’s two-year limitation period, Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred and the

Commission did not err when it dismissed her claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Reinhardt, 102 N.C. App. at 86-87, 401 S.E.2d at 140-41. The opinion

and award of the Full Commission in this matter is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Chief Judge STROUD and Judge ARROWOOD concur.