IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCCOA-260
No. COA21-486
Filed 19 April 2022
NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, I.C. No. 18-754456
LEKIA MOYE-LYONS, Plaintiff,
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND SEDGWICK CMS (THIRD PARTY ADMINISTRATOR), Defendants.
Appeal by Plaintiff from opinion and award entered 20 April 2021 by North
Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 February 2022.
Perry & Associates, by Cedric R. Perry, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Matthew E. Buckner, for Defendants-Appellees.
WOOD, Judge.
¶1 Plaintiff Lekia Moye-Lyons (“Plaintiff”) appeals an opinion and award of the
North Carolina Industrial Commission (“the Commission”) denying Plaintiff’s claim
against the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (“Defendant-
Employer”) and Sedgwick CMS (“Defendant-Carrier”) (collectively, “Defendants”)
based on the Commission’s conclusion that Plaintiff failed to file a timely claim under
the Workers Compensation Act and that the Commission did not acquire jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s claim. After careful review, we affirm the Commission’s opinion and MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
Opinion of the Court
award.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 On April 20, 2007, Plaintiff was employed by Edgecombe County Public
Schools, a school district falling under the authority of Defendant-Employer, as a
temporary part-time math tutor for sixth, seventh, and eighth grade students.
During Plaintiff’s employment as a tutor, Edgecombe County Schools did not require
Plaintiff to take any additional classes to become a licensed teacher. Previously,
Plaintiff worked as an “emergency” teacher for Halifax County Schools and Nash-
Rocky Mount Schools, as she did not possess a teaching license. However, Plaintiff
greatly desired and set as a personal goal to become a licensed math teacher.
¶3 During the course of her employment with Halifax County Schools and Nash-
Rocky Mount Schools, Plaintiff sought to be licensed as a lateral entry math teacher
through the Nash Regional Alternative Licensing Center (“NRALC”). To obtain a
teaching license through NRALC, Plaintiff had to meet a number of requirements.
Although Plaintiff obtained a degree in Business Administration and Management
from Shaw University, she was required to obtain her teaching license through
NRALC because she did not possess a degree in Mathematics. After taking several
courses, Plaintiff believed that she had completed the necessary requirements to
obtain her licensure in 2004.
¶4 On November 3, 2006, Plaintiff received a letter from NRALC indicating her MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
application for licensure had multiple deficiencies and requiring her to complete
additional steps to clear her lateral entry license. In this letter, NRALC advised
Plaintiff’s only choice in meeting the remaining conditions was to associate with a
college or university that had an approved program in middle grades math and have
that school evaluate Plaintiff’s transcripts and set up a plan of study. This letter
indicated that once Plaintiff completed the needed courses, the university she chose
to attend would then be able to recommend Plaintiff for a clear teaching license. After
receiving NRALC’s November 3, 2006 letter, Plaintiff did not enroll in a college or
university to finish meeting the remaining licensure requirements. As a result of
receiving this letter, Plaintiff testified that she was “devastated” after not being
licensed and felt “depressed” and “overwhelmed.”
¶5 After the denial of her teaching license by NRALC, Plaintiff contends the letter
caused her to have several alleged medical symptoms. Plaintiff alleged that while
working for the Defendant-Employer on April 20, 2007, she suffered a stroke and
subsequently developed Bell’s Palsy due to stress she experienced after the denial of
her teaching license. Plaintiff also alleged she began experiencing auditory
disturbances “a few weeks later,” that eventually lead to her diagnosis of
schizophrenia in April 2009. Despite hearing beeping noises in the weeks following
her alleged April 20, 2007 injuries, Plaintiff continued working for Edgecombe County
Public Schools for an additional nine months to one year. During this time, Plaintiff MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
continued to drive herself to work and home, took care of her children, made her
meals, and paid her bills.
¶6 Documentation of Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that Plaintiff first
reported signs of mental health issues in 2009. During a medical appointment on
March 17, 2009, Plaintiff described hearing voices coming from the TV, ceiling, and
vents for several months. After being involuntarily committed to Coastal Plain
Hospital on April 5, 2009 and readmitted on April 16, 2009, Plaintiff was diagnosed
with psychosis, which involved a “fixed delusion of a plot against her by the school
system and this is unfortunately likely to be a long-standing delusion which she had
kept well under wraps.” On April 29, 2009, Dr. William Oliver Mann, a board-
certified psychiatrist, began treating Plaintiff for schizophrenia. Between April 4,
2009 and October 29, 2018, Plaintiff experienced issues related to her diagnosis of
schizophrenia. During this period, Plaintiff professed to experiencing auditory
hallucinations and delusions, and was the subject of multiple involuntary
commitment proceedings instituted on April 4, 2009, October 21, 2012, and January
13, 2015. Plaintiff was also placed into inpatient hospitalization due to her mental
health on four separate occasions: from April 5-9, 2009; April 16-29, 2009; October
21-November 2, 2012; and August 26- September 14, 2016. Plaintiff testified that
between 2009 and 2017, she was hospitalized for a total of 250 days.
¶7 During this same period, Plaintiff applied repeatedly for Social Security MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
Disability benefits through the Social Security Administration (SSA). Plaintiff filed
applications on May 6, 2009, July 22, 2010, September 30, 2011, and March 6, 2013.
In support of Plaintiff’s first application, which was denied on August 14, 2009,
Plaintiff submitted a “Function Report-Adult-Third Party” which was completed by
her parents on July 27, 2009. The report stated that Plaintiff was living with her
parents at the time, described her as “depressed,” unable “to make rational decisions
to care for children, properly without help,” could not hold a job, unable to manage
her checkbook, needed assistance taking her medication, but noted that she was
taking a twice weekly community college course, was able to pay bills, cooked “about
5% of the time,” and when prompted, helped with household chores.
¶8 While applying for disability benefits, Plaintiff executed several medical
release forms to SSA and signed on her own behalf. On June 30, 2014, Plaintiff hired
an attorney to represent her in the Social Security Disability claim and executed
paperwork appointing him as her representative in the matter. On May 7, 2015,
Plaintiff signed an “Advance Notification of Representative Payment,” as SSA had
determined that Plaintiff needed assistance in managing her benefits and designated
Plaintiff’s father as her representative payee. By signing this document, Plaintiff
indicated that she understood she had sixty days to appeal SSA’s appointment of a
representative payee and the identity of the representative payee. Plaintiff was
initially approved for Social Security Disability benefits on April 22, 2015 for MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
schizophrenia, mood swings, myalgia, and neuralgia, with SSA determining that
Plaintiff became disabled as of October 21, 2012. Plaintiff appealed the date of her
disability to SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review and was ultimately
approved for full benefits on May 11, 2017, with her date of disability modified to
September 1, 2010.
¶9 On October 29, 2018, Plaintiff initiated a claim for workers’ compensation
benefits by filing a Form 18 Notice of Accident to Employer and Claim of Employee,
Representative, or Dependent for her alleged 2007 workplace injuries. At an April 25,
2019 hearing before Deputy Commissioner Kevin Howell on this claim, Plaintiff,
appearing pro se, confirmed that she had not previously filed any workers’
compensation claim for these injuries. At this hearing, a claims adjuster for
Defendant-Carrier confirmed that Defendant-Carrier had not authorized any
payment of indemnity or medical compensation to Plaintiff in relation to this claim.
¶ 10 On June 14, 2019, the Deputy Commissioner issued an opinion & award
dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice, determining that Plaintiff did not file her
workers’ compensation claim in a timely manner. While still proceeding pro se,
Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission. Prior to the matter being heard before the
Full Commission, Plaintiff retained counsel and moved the Commission to amend the
Record and accept new evidence. On December 19, 2019, the Full Commission issued
an order directing Plaintiff to produce to Defendants, and file with the Commission, MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
the complete set of SSA medical documentation and other records from the 2017
hearing before the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. Plaintiff was also
ordered to subpoena any involuntary commitment records from the appropriate
county clerk of court.
¶ 11 On April 20, 2021, the Full Commission issued its opinion & award, concluding
that Plaintiff’s claim was not timely filed, was not entitled to the tolling of the two-
year limitations period pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24 because Plaintiff was not
mentally incompetent between April 20, 2007 to April 20, 2009, and that the
Commission did not properly acquire jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim. The
Commission further concluded that even “assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff became
mentally incompetent” on April 4, 2009, the date of her first involuntary commitment,
“the Full Commission concludes that she was no longer mentally incompetent by 11
November 2009, the date when her treating psychiatrist deemed her able to return
to work and provide instruction to children as young as twelve years old.” The
Commission’s conclusions were based in part upon a letter Plaintiff provided from Dr.
Mann, dated November 11, 2009, which stated:
You have requested me to determine whether or not you are capable of returning to work on a part time basis. I have been treating [you] since 4/29/2009 for schizophrenia. This condition has improved significantly, and you are stable for the last several months. You have been compliant with treatment. It is my medical opinion that you are capable of returning to part time work at this time. Although it is MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
difficult to determine if and when you may become sick again, as long as you remain on medication, follow up with your treatment and see me every 6 weeks to monitor for any breakthrough symptoms, I see no reason to keep you from working at this time . . . It is my medical opinion that your condition does not prevent you from tutoring children as young as 12 years old.
The Commission further held that Plaintiff did not present sufficient competent
evidence to establish that she was mentally incompetent at any point after November
11, 2009, so that any tolling of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24 expired as of that date. The
Commission dismissed Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice. Plaintiff filed notice of appeal
to this Court on May 18, 2021.
II. Appellate Jurisdiction
¶ 12 The ruling of the Full Commission dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice
is a final decision and appeal lies to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-29.
III. Discussion
¶ 13 On appeal, Plaintiff contends that despite not filing a workers compensation
claim within two years of April 20, 2007, the Commission erred in its finding of her
claim being time barred and dismissing her claim for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiff
argues her claim should not be barred because Plaintiff became mentally incompetent
after the alleged April 20, 2007 incident, thus qualifying her claim to the tolling of
the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24’s two-year limitation period. Plaintiff’s arguments will
each be addressed in turn. MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 14 The primary issue presented to this Court is whether Plaintiff timely filed her
claim, and thereby, invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission over her April 20,
2007 alleged injury. Our Court has established that “the timely filing of a claim for
compensation is a condition precedent to the right to receive compensation and failure
to file timely is a jurisdictional bar for the Industrial Commission.” Reinhardt v.
Women’s Pavilion, Inc., 102 N.C. App. 83, 86, 401 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1991). “Whether
a party timely filed a claim with the Commission is a question of jurisdiction . . . .”
Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 273 N.C. App. 497, 503, 849 S.E.2d 880,
885 (2020). As this Court explained in Capps v. Southeastern Cable, the finding of a
jurisdictional fact by the Commission “is not conclusive upon appeal even though
there be evidence in the record to support such finding. The reviewing court has the
right, and the duty, to make its own independent findings of such jurisdictional facts
from its consideration of all the evidence in the record.” 214 N.C. App. 225, 226-27,
715 S.E.2d 227, 229, (2011) (citation omitted). As such, this Court is tasked to review
the entire record de novo. Morales-Rodriguez v. Carolina Quality Exteriors, Inc., 205
N.C. App. 712, 715, 698 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2010).
¶ 15 “This Court makes determinations concerning jurisdictional facts based on the
greater weight of the evidence” by assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony and by weighing the evidence “using the same MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
tests as would be employed by any fact-finder in a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding.” Cunningham, 273 N.C. App. at 503-04, 849 S.E.2d at 885 (first quoting
Capps, 214 N.C. App. at 227, 715 S.E.2d at 229; and then quoting Morales-Rodriguez,
205 N.C. App. at 715, 698 S.E.2d at 94).
B. The Commission’s Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim.
¶ 16 Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a), a claim is:
forever barred unless (i) a claim or memorandum of agreement as provided in G.S. 97-82 is filed with the Commission or the employee is paid compensation as provided under this Article within two years after the accident or (ii) a claim or memorandum of agreement as provided in G.S. 97-82 is filed with the Commission within two years after the last payment of medical compensation when no other compensation has been paid and when the employer’s liability has not otherwise been established under this Article. The provisions of this subsection shall not limit the time otherwise allowed for the filing of a claim for compensation for occupational disease in G.S. 97-58, but in no event shall the time for filing a claim for compensation for occupational disease be less than the times provided herein for filing a claim for an injury by accident.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a) (2021). This requirement of “filing a claim within two years
of the accident is not a statute of limitation, but a condition precedent to the right to
compensation.” Reinhardt, 102 N.C. App. at 84, 401 S.E.2d at 139 (citation omitted).
The Commission’s dismissal of a claim “is proper where there is an absence of
evidence that the Industrial Commission acquired jurisdiction by the timely filing of MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
a claim or by the submission of a voluntary settlement agreement to the
Commission.” Id. at 86-87, 401 S.E.2d at 140-41.
¶ 17 Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not file her worker’s compensation claim
with the Commission within the two years after her alleged April 20, 2007 injury,
and in fact, filed her claim in 2018, more than eleven years after the injury. The
Record further reflects that based on the testimony of Defendant’s claims adjuster,
the Defendant-Carrier never paid indemnity or medical compensation to the Plaintiff
in relation to her claim. Additionally, no evidence in the Record reflects Plaintiff and
Defendant-Employer ever submitting a voluntary settlement agreement in
connection to Plaintiff’s claim. Applying N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a) to the facts of this
case, Plaintiff did not meet this condition precedent of a timely filing of her claim for
the jurisdiction of the Commission to be invoked. Therefore, if Plaintiff’s claim does
not qualify for tolling of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24’s two-year limitation period, the
dismissal of her claim is proper and the right to compensation is barred. Id.
C. Mental Incompetency of Plaintiff Affecting Commission’s Jurisdiction
¶ 18 Despite her untimely filing to the Commission, Plaintiff contends that her
claim is not time barred under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a) because she was mentally
incompetent within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-50. In spite of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-24(a)’s two year time limitation, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-50 makes clear that
there is no time limitation “provided in this Article for the giving of notice or making MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
claim under this Article [that] shall run against any person who is mentally
incompetent.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-50 (2021); Hand v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 85 N.C.
App. 372, 377-78, 355 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1987).
¶ 19 To qualify for the tolling protections of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-50, a mentally
incompetent adult is one “who lacks sufficient capacity to manage the adult’s own
affairs or to make or communicate important decisions concerning the adult’s person,
family, or property whether the lack of capacity is due to mental illness, intellectual
disability, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety, senility, disease, injury, or
similar cause or condition.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101(7) (2021); In re Z.V.A., 373
N.C. 207, 210, 835 S.E.2d 425, 428 (2019). As such, the determination of
incompetency is an adjudication process as Chapter 35A lays out that its provisions
establish “the exclusive procedure for adjudicating a person to be an incompetent
adult.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1102 (2021); In re Dippel, 249 N.C. App. 610, 612, 791
S.E.2d 684, 686 (2016).
¶ 20 Prior to the Full Commission’s hearing, the Plaintiff has never undergone the
mandatory procedure to be adjudged incompetent under the provisions of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 35A-1101. However, we note that the Commission possesses the authority to
determine whether Plaintiff was mentally incompetent during the two-year time
limitation laid out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a). See Hand, 85 N.C. App. at 378-79,
355 S.E.2d at 145. MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
¶ 21 In deciding whether someone is incompetent as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. §
35A-1101, “[t]he appropriate test for establishing an adult incompetent ‘is one of
mental competence to manage one’s own affairs.’ ” Soderlund v. Kuch, 143 N.C. App.
361, 373, 546 S.E.2d 632, 640 (2001) (quoting Cox v. Jefferson-Pilot Fire and Casualty
Co., 80 N.C. App. 122, 125, 341 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1986)). In explaining the term
“affairs,” our Supreme Court elaborated that it encompasses “a person's entire
property and business — not just one transaction or one piece of property to which he
may have a unique attachment.” Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm., 275 N.C. 90, 104,
165 S.E.2d 490, 499 (1969). In the adjudication of competency, “[t]he facts in every
case will be different and competency or incompetency will depend upon the
individual's ‘general frame and habit of mind.’ ” Id. at 105, 165 S.E.2d at 500 (citation
omitted). However, “mere weakness of mind will not be sufficient to put a person
among those who are incompetent to manage their own affairs.” Id. (citation
omitted).
¶ 22 Here, the Full Commission concluded that Plaintiff’s claim was jurisdictionally
barred because Plaintiff did not file a claim within two years of April 20, 2007 and
Plaintiff was not mentally incompetent during the relevant time, which would have
qualified her for a tolling of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a)’s two-year timeframe. Plaintiff
challenges findings of fact 27 and 29 as well as conclusion of law 6 concluding Plaintiff
was not mentally incompetent and therefore, not entitled to the tolling of N.C. Gen. MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
Stat. § 97-50. Plaintiff contends that because she (1) experienced symptoms and her
diagnosis of schizophrenia was the subject of several involuntary commitment
proceedings, and (2) was awarded full Social Security Disability benefits, the
Commission erred when it concluded she had not established mental incompetency
within the required time period to qualify for the tolling exemption.
1. Finding of Fact 27
¶ 23 Plaintiff challenges the Commission’s finding of fact 27 that states:
27. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the Full Commission finds that Plaintiff has not shown sufficient evidence to establish that she was mentally incompetent during the two-year limitations period following her alleged 20 April 2007 workplace injury. Although Plaintiff was involuntarily committed on 5 April 2009 and again on 16 April 2009, the Full Commission finds that these incidents are insufficient, on their own, to show that Plaintiff was incapable of managing her own affairs between 20 April 2007 and 20 April 2009, as involuntary commitment and incompetency proceedings are statutorily distinct and involve different legal standards. The record contains no evidence that Plaintiff has ever been declared incompetent by the General Court of Justice. To the contrary, the records Plaintiff submitted to the Commission indicate that she was undergoing treatment, was taking her medication, and was generally considered to be in stable psychological condition for several years following her 2009 hospitalizations, and indeed was not hospitalized again until 21 October 2012, over three and a half years after her previous involuntary commitment. Moreover, Plaintiff remained legally capable of signing medical records releases and attorney-client agreements as late as 11 August 2014, over five years after her first involuntary commitment. MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
¶ 24 As we have previously noted, the Record reflects that Plaintiff has never been
adjudicated as mentally incompetent or that there have been incompetency
proceedings instituted against her. In preparation for her hearing before the Full
Commission, Plaintiff submitted 1,289 pages of documents featuring medical records
dating back to 2001. A close review of the Record indicates that in the two years
spanning April 20, 2007 to April 20, 2009, Plaintiff possessed the frame of mind to
manage her own affairs and to make or communicate important decisions regarding
her person, family, or property. See id. at 105-06, 165 S.E.2d at 500. Plaintiff
acknowledged that even after the alleged April 20, 2007 injury, she continued
working for Defendant-Employer for the next nine months to one year. During her
employment, Plaintiff drove herself to and from work, prepared meals, took care of
her children, and paid her bills.
¶ 25 Continuing our review of the Record, we note the absence of any medical
documentation tending to show that Plaintiff suffered from a psychiatric illness
between April 20, 2007 and March 17, 2009. Instead, the Record demonstrates that
Plaintiff underwent treatment for a hypertensive episode following the birth of a child
on April 15, 2007 and on May 28, 2007 for tingling in the teeth and gums
intermittently. Later, on June 29, 2007, the Plaintiff underwent a tubal ligation
surgery. At these medical appointments and procedures, the Plaintiff reported “no
previous psychiatric history” and did not endorse any psychiatric symptoms. MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
¶ 26 The Record also reflects Plaintiff’s documented experience of having
psychiatric issues on March 17, 2009, where Plaintiff reported auditory
hallucinations to a physician. Plaintiff was assessed to have schizophrenia but was
noted to possess an intellect within normal limits, and to not be a danger to herself
or others. In April 2009, Plaintiff was hospitalized on two separate occasions at
Coastal Plain Hospital, where she received a diagnosis of psychosis. The Record
demonstrates that even during Plaintiff’s involuntary hospitalizations, she actively
participated in her treatment while hospitalized. During Plaintiff’s April 16-29, 2009
hospitalization, Plaintiff expressed concerns of excessive sedation from her
medications, at which point Plaintiff agreed to taking another medication to address
this issue. At her April 30, 2009 discharge, Plaintiff’s medical document stated,
Plaintiff “was felt to be stable medically and psychiatrically at the time of discharge
with the patient exhibiting no behavior consistent with wish to harm herself or
others.” While it is notable that Plaintiff experienced exacerbations of her psychiatric
condition during these periods, Plaintiff still was able to manage her own affairs and
make important decisions regarding her person and her affairs during her inpatient
admissions. The Record tends to show that by November 11, 2009, Plaintiff’s
psychiatric state had improved considerably. As noted previously, Plaintiff’s
psychiatrist, Dr. Mann, found Plaintiff to be stable and capable of returning to work.
¶ 27 The Record shows that Plaintiff’s mental competency continued as she actively MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
underwent treatment, medication management, physician follow-up and remained in
stable psychological condition for several years following her 2009 hospitalizations.
Between 2009 and 2010, Plaintiff’s mental status exams remained consistent in
reporting normal speech, unremarkable thought content, denying any hallucinations,
and attending individual and group therapy. Plaintiff was not hospitalized again for
her psychosis until October 21, 2012, over three and a half years after her previous
involuntary commitment.
¶ 28 Additionally, Plaintiff executed medical release forms on September 21, 2010,
November 27, 2011, April 1, 2013, June 30, 2014, and August 11, 2014 which
permitted SSA to request medical records on her behalf. On June 30, 2014, Plaintiff
also entered into an agreement with an attorney to represent her in the Social
Security Disability claim. As a result, the undisputed Record evidence tends to show
that Plaintiff remained legally capable of managing her own affairs when entering
into these agreements.
¶ 29 Plaintiff contends that this Court should consider the incompetency
proceedings she underwent between 2009 to 2015 in determining that she was
mentally incompetent during the two-year period after the alleged April 20, 2007
workplace injury. We disagree. Involuntary commitment proceedings and the
determination of mental incompetency are two different proceedings and require
separate legal standards. Involuntary commitment proceedings determine whether MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
an individual is a danger to themselves or others, or requires treatment in order to
prevent a further disability or deterioration that would result in dangerousness. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 122C-261(a) (2021); In re Webber, 201 N.C. App. 212, 217, 689 S.E.2d
468, 473 (2009); Gregory v. Kilbride, 150 N.C. App. 601, 612, 565 S.E.2d 685, 693
(2002).
¶ 30 In contrast, an incompetency proceeding determines whether an adult has the
capacity to manage their own affairs or make or communicate important decisions
regarding their person, family, or property. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101(7); In re
Dippel, 249 N.C. App. at 612, 791 S.E.2d at 686; Leonard v. England, 115 N.C. App.
103, 107-08, 445 S.E.2d 50, 52 (1994). Our General Assembly defines the distinction
between the two proceedings as,
[t]he admission or commitment to a facility of an individual who allegedly has a mental illness. . . or an individual who allegedly has an intellectual or other developmental disability under the provisions of this Article shall in no way affect incompetency proceedings as set forth in Chapter 35A . . . of the General Statutes and incompetency proceedings under those Chapters shall have no effect upon admission or commitment proceedings under this Article.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-203 (2021). Therefore, we conclude that the initiation of
involuntary commitment proceedings against Plaintiff in 2009, 2012, and 2015 is not
determinative of her mental competence in her 2007 workers compensation claim.
2. Finding of Fact 29 MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
¶ 31 Next, Plaintiff challenges the Full Commission’s finding of fact that the SSA’s
decisions related to Plaintiff do not establish Plaintiff as being mentally incompetent
during the period of time between the time of the alleged workplace injury and when
she filed the workers compensation claim at issue here. The Commission’s finding of
fact 29 states:
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Full Commission finds that neither the 2017 SSA Fully Favorable Decision that Plaintiff was disabled as of 1 September 2010 nor the 2015 appointment of a representative payee for Plaintiff’s SSA disability benefits establish that Plaintiff was mentally incompetent under North Carolina state law at any point during the relevant period.
Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred by not placing a greater weight on the
evidence contained in SSA’s documentation pertaining to its 2017 Fully Favorable
Decision. Plaintiff contends that SSA’s decision was based on her “longitudinal
medical history” and her records since 2008, and that these records should serve as
“decisive evidence in this proceeding.” Again, we disagree. The Industrial
Commission has the duty to “consider all of the competent evidence, make definitive
findings, draw its conclusions of law from these findings, and enter the appropriate
award.” Harrell v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835
(1980).
¶ 32 The Record tends to show that the Commission considered and weighed the MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
fully favorable decision of SSA awarding Plaintiff Social Security Disability benefits
as well as the 1,289 pages of medical documentation from Plaintiff’s packet to SSA
that were submitted to the Commission. The Record indicates that the Commission
addressed in its findings of fact the decision of the administrative law judge from the
Social Security Administration’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, noting
that the Plaintiff successfully appealed the date of her disability so that she was
granted disability benefits as of September 1, 2010. The administrative law judge
found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after September
1, 2010 because of her schizophrenia and that Plaintiff possessed “the residual
functional capacity to perform a full range of work,” but that Plaintiff is unable to
make a successful vocational transition to other jobs that she could perform.
¶ 33 Despite SSA’s fully favorable decision for the Plaintiff and its appointment of
a representative payee for the Plaintiff, Defendant-Employer contends that the
determination of mental incompetency pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101
considers different legal standards and principles than the ascertainment of Social
Security Disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 416(i).
¶ 34 The Commission concluded that although Plaintiff was disabled as of
September 1, 2010, SSA’s determination was based upon federal statutes and
regulations, rather than North Carolina state law. In reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 416(i),
the Commission explained that the determination of whether an individual is MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
“disabled” and entitled to the benefits of Social Security rests on whether the
individual is capable of gainful employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (2021).
¶ 35 In evaluating the evidence in the Record, the Commission looked to the logic
of this Court’s finding in Hand that while the ability to work may be part of the
determination of mental incompetency under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101, it is not
dispositive and other factors may be considered. See Hand, 85 N.C. App. at 378-79,
355 S.E.2d at 145 (holding that the record contained evidence which supported the
Commission’s finding that Plaintiff was not incompetent and her untimely workers
compensation claim was barred because, among other factors, Plaintiff continued in
her job, which required physical and mental dexterity, understood her pay scale and
contested the amount when she thought it was too low.).
¶ 36 Thus, we hold that the evidence of SSA’s Fully Favorable Decision of Plaintiff’s
disability supports the Commission’s finding that Plaintiff was not mentally
incompetent under North Carolina law during the time in question.
¶ 37 Next, Plaintiff contends the Commission erred in not placing greater weight
on SSA’s assignment of a representative payee for Plaintiff on May 7, 2015, in relation
to Plaintiff’s claim for Social Security Disability benefits. The Record does not,
however, contain any evidence tending to show that the Commission is bound by
SSA’s determination, nor that SSA’s assignment is dispositive evidence of Plaintiff
being mentally incompetent under North Carolina Law. (citing Program Operations MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
Manual System (POMS) GN 00501.010(B)(8), SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200501010 (last visited Apr. 10, 2022)).
The Commission found that SSA’s regulations and rules articulate that a
determination of incapability “is a DECISION BY SSA that a claimant is unable to
manage or direct the management of benefits in his/her best interests” and that “an
incapability decision is valid only for SSA matters.” Id.
¶ 38 SSA defines a “legally competent adult” as an individual who “has not been
found to be legally incompetent by a court of law” and “may include an adult who SSA
has determined is incapable of managing or directing the management of funds.” Id.
Although SSA determined Plaintiff is unable to manage her benefits and requires a
representative payee, under SSA’s regulations and in the absence of an adjudication
of incompetence, Plaintiff qualifies as a legally competent adult. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(j)(1)(A) (2021); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1102.
¶ 39 Based on the greater weight of the evidence, we conclude that SSA’s 2017 fully
favorable decision for Social Security Disability benefits and the 2015 Representative
Payee Appointment does not establish that Plaintiff was mentally incompetent under
North Carolina state law.
3. Conclusion of Law 6
¶ 40 Finally, Plaintiff challenges the Commission’s conclusion of law that “[b]ased
on the foregoing findings of fact, the Full Commission concludes that between 20 April MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
2007 and 20 April 2009, Plaintiff was capable of managing her own affairs and as
such, was not mentally incompetent.”
¶ 41 As previously discussed, the Commission’s function is “to weigh and evaluate
the entire evidence and determine as best it can where the truth lies.” Harrell, 45
N.C. App. at 205, 262 S.E.2d at 835 (citation omitted). In reaching its conclusion, the
Commission relied on its findings discussed herein. The Commission weighed and
evaluated the entire Record, including the 1,289 pages of documentation featuring
Plaintiff’s medical records, the decisions made by SSA in awarding Plaintiff Social
Security Disability benefits, and Plaintiff’s involuntary commitment proceedings and
hospitalizations. For these reasons, we hold that the greater weight of the evidence
demonstrates that Plaintiff was not mentally incompetent during the two-year period
after her alleged work injury.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 42 After a careful examination of the Record before us, we conclude because
Plaintiff failed to file a timely claim and does not qualify for tolling of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 97-24’s two-year limitation period, Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred and the
Commission did not err when it dismissed her claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Reinhardt, 102 N.C. App. at 86-87, 401 S.E.2d at 140-41. The opinion
and award of the Full Commission in this matter is affirmed. MOYE-LYONS V. N.C. DEPT. OF PUB. INSTRUCTION
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge STROUD and Judge ARROWOOD concur.