Moya Enterprises, Inc. v. Harry Anderson Trucking, Inc.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Moya Enterprises, Inc. v. Harry Anderson Trucking, Inc.

290 S.E.2d 145, 162 Ga. App. 39, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2005

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedApril 6, 1982

Docket63232

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 290 S.E.2d 145 (Moya Enterprises, Inc. v. Harry Anderson Trucking, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Moya Enterprises, Inc. v. Harry Anderson Trucking, Inc., 290 S.E.2d 145, 162 Ga. App. 39, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2005 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).

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Opinion

Shulman, Presiding Judge.

Defendant-appellee filed a motion for summary judgment supported by a brief which included a statement of facts. Attached to the brief was a document which purported to convert the statement of facts in the brief into an affidavit. The trial court apparently accepted that document as an affidavit since it granted summary judgment to appellee. Our review of the record convinces us that the affidavit was not adequate and the judgment must be reversed.

“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in the evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Code Ann. § 81A-156 (e). There was no statement in the purported affidavit to show that it was made on personal knowledge, nor was it clear from the context that the facts stated were within the personal knowledge of the affiant. Compare Smith v. Ragan, 140 Ga. App. 33 (1) (230 SE2d 89).

Even if we were to assume that the affidavit was made on the personal knowledge of the affiant, there is another fatal defect which would render the affidavit void: it purports to be the affidavit of the corporate defendant. It has long been the law that corporations cannot make sworn statements. Worley Bros. Granite Co. v. Haskins, 105 Ga. App. 444, 448 (124 SE2d 663); Coffee v. McCaskey Register Co., 7 Ga. App. 425, 429 (66 SE 1032).

Since there was no valid affidavit which pierced the allegations of appellant’s complaint, appellee has not shown entitlement to summary judgment. The grant of summary judgment was, therefore, reversible error.

Judgment reversed.

Quillian, C. J., and Carley, J., concur.

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Shulman, Presiding Judge.

Defendant-appellee filed a motion for summary judgment supported by a brief which included a statement of facts. Attached to the brief was a document which purported to convert the statement of facts in the brief into an affidavit. The trial court apparently accepted that document as an affidavit since it granted summary judgment to appellee. Our review of the record convinces us that the affidavit was not adequate and the judgment must be reversed.

“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in the evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Code Ann. § 81A-156 (e). There was no statement in the purported affidavit to show that it was made on personal knowledge, nor was it clear from the context that the facts stated were within the personal knowledge of the affiant. Compare Smith v. Ragan, 140 Ga. App. 33 (1) (230 SE2d 89).

Even if we were to assume that the affidavit was made on the personal knowledge of the affiant, there is another fatal defect which would render the affidavit void: it purports to be the affidavit of the corporate defendant. It has long been the law that corporations cannot make sworn statements. Worley Bros. Granite Co. v. Haskins, 105 Ga. App. 444, 448 (124 SE2d 663); Coffee v. McCaskey Register Co., 7 Ga. App. 425, 429 (66 SE 1032).

Since there was no valid affidavit which pierced the allegations of appellant’s complaint, appellee has not shown entitlement to summary judgment. The grant of summary judgment was, therefore, reversible error.

Judgment reversed.

Quillian, C. J., and Carley, J., concur.

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290 S.E.2d 145, 162 Ga. App. 39, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2005, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moya-enterprises-inc-v-harry-anderson-trucking-inc-gactapp-1982.

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