Movie & Video World, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners

723 F. Supp. 695, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12310, 1989 WL 120556
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedOctober 11, 1989
Docket89-8334-CIV
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 723 F. Supp. 695 (Movie & Video World, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Movie & Video World, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners, 723 F. Supp. 695, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12310, 1989 WL 120556 (S.D. Fla. 1989).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

PAINE, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court upon the Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunction (DE 2 and DE 72), and upon the hearing held on such matter on October 3, 1989 at West Palm Beach. At the hearing, Mr. Mitchell Beers appeared for all of the Plaintiffs except for Plaintiff Phoenix Limited which was represented by Mr. Daniel Aronson. The Defendants were represented by Mr. Bob Banks, who was assisted by Lee Rosenthal and Clark Cone who represented Defendant Yaun.

At the hearing the court granted Plaintiff Phoenix Limited’s Motion to Intervene (DE 72). Mr. Aronson assured the court that his client’s interests were adequately represented at the hearing and, therefore, this order is dispositive of all of the Plaintiffs’, including Phoenix Limited, motions for preliminary injunction.

BACKGROUND

On November 15, 1988, Palm Beach County adopted Palm Beach County Ordinances 88-31 and 88-32. Ordinance 88-31 includes regulations and licensing requirements for adult bookstores and theaters; ordinance 88-32 provides zoning requirements for adult entertainment establishments.

At the onset the court noted that the likelihood of prevailing on the challenge to Palm Beach County Ordinance 88-32, the zoning ordinance, is unlikely in light of the Supreme Court’s approval of a similar zoning system regarding adult entertainment in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). In view of that case, there is no sound basis for an injunction against enforcement of Palm Beach County Ordinance 88-32.

Therefore, the focus of the hearing was the challenge to Palm Beach County Ordinance 88-31, a copy of which is attached hereto. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege:

(1) the door removal requirement is a suppression of free-expression in violation of the First Amendment.

(2) some of the definitions contained in Palm Beach County Ordinance 1(G) are vague and overbroad.

(3) the application process and licensing requirements for adult establishments (contained in Palm Beach County Ordinance 88-31(11)) are underinclusive because non-adult bookstores are not subject to such rigid requirements.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The following four elements must be proved by the Plaintiff in order to prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction:

1) irreparable injury unless an injunction is entered;

2) a substantial likelihood that the Plaintiff will prevail on the merits of the claim;

3) the threatened injury to the Plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm that an injunction may cause to the Defendant;

4) the granting of a preliminary injunction will not be adverse to public interest. Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1983).

Since the Defendant agreed for the purpose of the preliminary injunction that irreparable injury could be presumed, we will begin our analysis with the second prerequisite for a preliminary injunction, to wit: is there a substantial likelihood that the *698 Plaintiff will prevail on the merits of the claim?

LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING ON THE MERITS

A. The Door Removal Requirement

When speech and non-speech elements are combined, government regulation which restricts the time, place and manner of the exercise of First Amendment rights is sufficiently justified if it meets the following 4-prong test set out by the Supreme Court:

[Wjhen “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms ... we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified
[(1)] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
[ (2) ] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
[ (3) ] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
[ (4) ] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) [numbering not in original] (hereafter O’Brien).

More recently the Supreme Court declared that if an ordinance does not ban adult theaters altogether, it is properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) (hereafter Renton). The court further held that such content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial government interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. Renton, 96 S.Ct. at 928. When determining the constitutionality of a statute, the court must look to the predominate concern of the legislature in regulating the ills produced by adult theaters; if the legislature targeted the legislation at the secondary effects rather than at the content of the film themselves, it is “more than adequate to establish that the city’s pursuit of its interests is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and thus the ordinance is to be considered a content-neutral speech regulation.” Id.

While the Defendant argues that these 2 tests are divergent, the court finds that in this case, the result under either of these tests is the same. The O’Brien test is to be applied when the activity/expression includes both elements of speech and non-speech, such as in the present case. The Renton test is to be used to determine if the enacted legislation which addresses such activity is content-neutral or intended to suppress free expression.

We begin with the 4-prong O’Brien test. The first prong is easily satisfied. It is clearly within the constitutional power of Palm Beach County to enact and enforce regulations for the purpose of providing for the health, welfare, and safety of its residents. See Florida Statutes, Chapter 125 (County Government).

The second prong under O’Brien is whether the legislation furthers an important or substantial government interest. This requires a closer look at the facts and data relied upon when enacting ordinance 88-31.

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Bluebook (online)
723 F. Supp. 695, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12310, 1989 WL 120556, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/movie-video-world-inc-v-board-of-county-commissioners-flsd-1989.