MOUZIN BROTHERS FARMS LLC v. DOWDY

M.D. Georgia

MOUZIN BROTHERS FARMS LLC v. DOWDY

DecidedJanuary 6, 2023

Docket7:20-cv-00197

StatusUnknown

This text of MOUZIN BROTHERS FARMS LLC v. DOWDY (MOUZIN BROTHERS FARMS LLC v. DOWDY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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MOUZIN BROTHERS FARMS LLC v. DOWDY, (M.D. Ga. 2023).

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Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA VALDOSTA DIVISION

MOUZIN BROTHERS FARMS, LLC, : : Plaintiff, : : VS. : : 7 : 20-CV-197 (TQL) RANDY DOWDY, and : RANDY DOWDY FARMS, LLC, : : Defendants. :

ORDER

Pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. 65). BACKGROUND Plaintiff Mouzin Brothers Farms, LLC, an Indiana based company, filed this diversity action against Randy Dowdy, raising claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and conversion. (Doc. 1). Randy Dowdy Farms, LLC was added as a Defendant on March 30, 2021 (Doc. 21), and filed a counterclaim on April 9, 2021 (Doc. 22). Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel on May 19, 2022, seeking an order requiring Defendants to produce unredacted telephone bills for certain months in 2020. (Doc. 51). In response to this motion, Defendants sought a protective order as to the confidentiality of the records. (Doc. 56). The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and denied Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order by Order dated July 8, 2022, and permitted Plaintiff to file a Motion for Attorney’s Fees within thirty (30) days. (Doc. 63). ANALYSIS Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,191.00, based on attorney work hours performed by two (2) attorneys totaling 31.9 hours, and 1.1 hours of work performed

by a paralegal. (Doc. 65). Plaintiff maintains that at all relevant times, attorney Alan Townsend’s rate was $490 per hour, attorney Brad Dick’s rate was $435 per hour, and paralegal Sabrina Gill’s rate was $260 per hour. Id. Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5), if a motion to compel discovery is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (a)(5)(A).

However, if the “opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified”, the court must not order this payment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (a)(5)(A)(ii). In response to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendants argue both that the motion should be denied and that the amount of attorneys’ fees should be reduced. (Doc. 66). Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Defendants argue that that the motion should be denied because Plaintiff allegedly

did not actually use the obtained discovery, therefore evidencing that the Motion to Compel was filed for “harassment value”, that Plaintiff did not act in good faith in attempting to obtain the discovery, and that Defendants’ objection to the unrestricted provision of the discovery materials was substantially justified based on Dennis Mouzin’s alleged threats against Randy Dowdy. (Doc. 66). In granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, the Court found that the telephone bills

2 sought by Plaintiff were relevant and that the discovery request was proportional to the needs of the case. (Doc. 63). Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, the Court denied their Motion for Protective Order, finding that Defendants had failed to demonstrate, with particular and

specific demonstrations of fact, the necessity of a protective order (Doc. 63, p. 4). To the extent that Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to attempt in good faith to obtain the discovery prior to filing the Motion to Compel, Plaintiff filed a proper certification of good faith, and no objection was raised thereto by Defendant. (Doc. 53). This certification satisfied Rule 37(a)(5)(A)(i) and Local Rule 37. “A court must impose attorney’s fees and expenses when compelling discovery unless the party was substantially justified in resisting discovery. Substantially justified means that

reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.” Maddow v. Procter & Gamble Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 846, 853 (11th Cir. 1997), internal citations omitted. In opposing Plaintiff’s request for production of the unredacted telephone bills and Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Defendants maintained that the unredacted bills were not relevant to issues in the case, asserting that Plaintiff “wants, what it wants, merely because it wants it”. (Doc. 57, p. 10). Defendants also expressed concern over how Plaintiff, and

Dennis Mouzin, would use the information in the telephone bills, given Dennis Mouzin’s previous threats against Randy Dowdy. (Docs. 56, 57, 62). At some point prior to the Court granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Defendants did provide Plaintiff with redacted copies of the requested telephone bills, and offered to provide the unredacted telephone bills as long as only Plaintiff’s counsel could view the bills. Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may

3 obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant evidence is defined as evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401(a). Defendants’ contention that the unredacted telephone bills were not relevant and discoverable is contradicted by their provision of the redacted version without objection, and their willingness and lack of objection to providing the unredacted version, with certain limitations on who could view the discovery. Defendants argue that the “sole reason” they asked that the unredacted version be viewed only by counsel was that “Dennis Mouzin threatened to destroy Defendants’ farming business”. (Doc. 62, p. 1). Defendants did not

assert any sort of privilege or other protection as to the unredacted telephone bills. Reasonable people could not differ as to the appropriateness of Defendants’ position that the unredacted bills were not relevant to any issue in the case. Defendants’ position was contradicted by their own responses to the discovery request, as Defendants ultimately offered to provide the bills in unredacted form without objection as to relevancy. As found in the Court’s Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, the “scope of discovery is generally

broadly construed”, and Plaintiff’s request for the unredacted telephone bills was relevant to the issues in the case. (Doc. 63); Eckhardt v. United States, 2021 WL 2516555, *2 (M.D.Ga. 2021) (TES). Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants’ position in opposition to Plaintiff’s discovery request was not substantially justified. As Defendants have not established that Plaintiff filed the Motion to Compel prior to attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery, that Defendants’ opposition to the discovery

4 request was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees must be granted under Rule 37(a)(5). Calculation of attorneys’ fees

Defendants argue that any fee award should be reduced to time spent on the actual Motion to Compel, as opposed to the entire spectrum of negotiations surrounding the motion, that Plaintiff has relied on block billing, making it difficult to determine whether the work was necessary or reasonable, and that any lodestar amount should be reduced. (Doc. 66). 1.

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