Mottola v. DeNegre

518 F. App'x 22

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: May 1, 2013
• Docket: 12-2818
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Carol Mottola, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of her complaint alleging state law claims of defamation and infliction of emotional distress, and from the court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

This Court reviews a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint de novo. See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a Rule 60 motion for abuse of discretion. Universal Church v. Geltzer, 463 F.3d 218, 228 (2d Cir.2006). A court abuses its discretion “when its decision rests on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or when its decision, though not necessarily the product of legal error or a clearly erroneous finding of fact, cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Gonzalez, 647 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir.2011). After an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court judge in her thorough June 8, 2012, and August 17, 2012, orders.

Further, Mottola failed to allege facts sufficient to support tolling under New York state law. See, e.g., Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir.2002) (“Although ... we will apply the equitable tolling doctrine as a matter of fairness where a plaintiff has been prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights, we made it clear that we had in mind a situation where a plaintiff could show that it would have been impossible for a reasonably prudent person to learn about his or her cause of action.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 (McKinney’s 2010) (tolling for infancy or insanity); Overall v. Estate of Klotz, 52 F.3d 398, 404 (2d Cir.1995) (duress tolling).

We have considered all of Mottola’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the district court are hereby AFFIRMED.