Motor Vehicle Certificates of Title

19 Pa. D. & C.2d 304
CourtPennsylvania Department of Justice
DecidedAugust 31, 1959
DocketNo. 2
StatusPublished

This text of 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 304 (Motor Vehicle Certificates of Title) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Department of Justice primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Motor Vehicle Certificates of Title, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 304 (Pa. 1959).

Opinion

Elmer T. Bolla, Deputy Attorney General, and Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General,

You have requested our advice on several matters arising under The Vehicle Code of April 29,1959, P. L. 58, provisions which deal with the procedure to be followed when there is an alleged variance between the names on a motor vehicle certificate of title or an application therefor and those on a related security transaction. You ask specifically: (1) If title must be issued in the same names as appear on the security transaction; and (2) what circumstances permit a correction of a title or recordation of a lien thereon without payment of a fee.

1. The typical situation in which an alleged variance occurs is where A’s name appears on the title certifi[305]*305cate or an application therefor and a related security transaction comes to the department’s attention in which A and B, usually husband and wife, are identified as purchasers of the vehicle in question. Normally, the document evidencing the security transaction ■ is not presented to the department; however in cases where a title is returned for the noting or correction of an encumbrance, the department requires the submission of a copy of the accompanying security transaction.

Section 102 of the code, 75 PS §2, defines “owner” as follows:

“A person or persons holding the legal title of a vehicle; or, in the event a vehicle is the subject of a chattel mortgage or an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof or other like agreement, with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement, and with an immediate right of possession vested in the mortgagor, conditional vendee or lessee, then such mortgagor, conditional vendee or lessee shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this act.” (Italics supplied.)

Section 202 (a) of the code, 75 PS §32, provides, in part:

“(a) Application for a certificate of title shall be made upon a form prescribed, and furnished by the department; and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed in this act; and shall contain a full description of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer, the actual or bona fide address and name of the owner, together with a statement of the applicant’s' title, and of any liens or encumbrances upon said motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer, and whether possession is held subject to a chattel mortgage or under a lease, contract of conditional sale, or other like agreement. . . . The secretary shall use reasonable diligence in ascertaining whether or not the facts stated in said application are [306]*306true, and, if satisfied that the applicant is the lawful owner of such motor vehicle, .trailer, or semi-trailer, or is otherwise entitled■ to have the same titled in his name, and that all taxes payable by the applicant under the laws of this Commonwealth on or in connection with, or resulting from, the acquisition or use of the motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer have been paid, the department shall issue a certificate of title, bearing the signature or facsimile signature of the secretary, or such officer of the department as he shall designate, and sealed with the seal of the department.” (Italics supplied.)

You state that your department, relying upon the quoted provisions of the code, has taken the position that A and B, in the illustration above, are the “owners” of the vehicle and that the title should be in both their names. You further state that where such a title, in A’s name only, is returned to the department for corrective purposes, under circumstances which would not otherwise require the payment of a fee, that the department insists upon including B’s name in the title and charging a fee for such correction.

It is our opinion that this practice is unlawful and should be discontinued.

When A and B execute a conditional sale or other type of security agreement for the purchase of a motor vehicle, whether B is identified in the agreement as a “cobuyer” or simply as an obligor, title to the vehicle, for the purpose of The Vehicle Code, does not pass from the seller to A and B. A and B are at liberty to take title in either or both of their names, or, if they wish to make a gift of the vehicle, in the name of C. The designation on the Application For Certificate of Title (Form RVT-1) accomplishes this purpose when the seller, in accordance with the request of the parties, executes the assignment of the certificate. The designee then executes the application. If B, in the case [307]*307under consideration, wants to have her name on the title she must protect her interests, as in all other legal transactions.

This conclusion is not only the logical interpretation of the transaction but is consistent with the statutory purpose of the requirement that a certificate of title be obtained on a motor vehicle. In Official Opinion No. 28, Motor Vehicle Certificates of Title, 13 D. & C. 2d 412, we cited numerous cases to the effect that a certificate of title creates neither ownership of a vehicle nor conclusive evidence of ownership. We concluded by citing the following passage from Majors v. Majors, 349 Pa. 334, 338 (1944) :

“. . . We are aware the primary purpose of the act was not designed to establish the ownership or proprietorship of an automobile, but rather to register the name and address of the person having the right of possession, and to furnish persons dealing with one in possession of an automobile a means of determining whether such possession was prima facie lawful . . .”

On pages 418 and 419 of the opinion we stated:

“. . . it does not logically follow that the legislature intended that all persons identified with the original transaction as conditional buyers, lessees or mortgagors should appear as coowners in the certificate of title.' If the conclusions expressed in the letter of advice are to be followed, the Secretary of Revenue would not be justified in issuing a certificate of title in the first instance, unless he examined the original security device to determine that all parties obligated therein are to be included as owners on the certificate of title ... we cannot allow the policy to continue whereby a certificate of title will be refused where there is an additional party included in the note and security agreement as a joint and several obligor.”

[308]*308Therefore we are of the opinion that a certificate of title need not be issued in the same names as appear in the security agreement. In the example noted above, A would be entitled to receive the title certificate in his own name. Nor need a correction be made where an existing certificate in the name of A is returned for the notation of an encumbrance which arises from an agreement in which A and B are identified as cobuyers.

2. Section 205 of The Vehicle Code, 75 PS §35, states:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Majors v. Majors
37 A.2d 528 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1944)
Automobile Banking Corp. v. Weicht
51 A.2d 409 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1946)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
19 Pa. D. & C.2d 304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/motor-vehicle-certificates-of-title-padeptjust-1959.