Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Barrett

223 A.3d 589, 467 Md. 61

• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
• Decided: January 24, 2020
• Docket: 22/19
• Status: Published

Opinion

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Brian Barrett, No. 22, September Term, 2019

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — DUE PROCESS — RIGHTS AFFORDED TO DETAINEES — The Court of Appeals held that where a motorist refuses a blood alcohol concentration test pursuant to MD. CODE, ANN., TRANS. § 16-205.1(b) (Lexis Nexis Supp. 2018), if an administrative law judge finds that the motorist was fully advised of his or her rights despite being distracted while the Advice of Rights form was being read, that determination will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence. Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No. C-02-CV-18-002886 Argued: October 31, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

No. 22

September Term, 2019

MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION

v.

BRIAN J. BARRETT

Barbera, C.J., McDonald Watts Hotten Booth Harrell, Glenn T., Jr., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) Greene, Clayton, Jr., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

JJ.

Opinion by Barbera, C.J.

Filed: January 24, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

2020-01-24 14:00-05:00

Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk The question before this Court involves application of Maryland’s “implied

consent” statute, MD. CODE, ANN., TRANS. (“TR”) § 16-205.1(b) (Lexis Nexis Supp.

2018). We must decide the proper outcome under the statute when a motorist refuses to

take a blood alcohol concentration test after having been advised via the Motor Vehicle

Administration (“MVA”) DR-15 “Advice of Rights” form and later claims a failure of the

law enforcement officer to “fully advise” the motorist of his rights.

Brian J. Barrett, Respondent, had his driver’s license suspended because he refused

to take a blood alcohol concentration test after being detained for suspicion of driving while

under the influence of alcohol. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) upheld the MVA’s

Order of Suspension after finding that Respondent had been advised in conformity with

MVA form DR-15. The ALJ modified the suspension to allow Respondent to participate

in the Ignition Interlock Program for one year. Respondent’s refusal to take the test

nevertheless resulted in a one-year disqualification of his Maryland Commercial Driver’s

License (“CDL”). On judicial review, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County reversed

the suspension after finding that Respondent was not fully advised of his rights because he

was distracted while the detaining police officer explained the administrative sanctions for

refusing to take a blood alcohol concentration test.

Petitioner, the MVA, appeals that decision. For reasons we explain, we hold that

Respondent was fully advised of his rights per TR § 16-205.1(b)(1) despite two police

officers speaking to him simultaneously—one reading the DR-15 and the other asking

questions. We therefore affirm the determination by the ALJ that the police officers’

simultaneous speaking did not prevent Respondent from understanding his rights and the sanctions for refusing to submit to a blood alcohol concentration test, as outlined in the

DR-15.

The Facts

The Traffic Stop

Respondent is a Maryland resident and possesses a CDL. On April 22, 2018, Officer

Thornton observed Respondent commit multiple traffic violations, including driving above

the posted speed limit and making unsafe lane changes. Officer Thornton executed a traffic

stop, approached Respondent, and detected a strong odor of alcohol; he also noticed that

Respondent’s eyes were bloodshot and he exhibited slurred speech. Officer Thornton

ordered Respondent out of the vehicle and conducted standardized field sobriety tests.

Because Respondent performed poorly on the tests and showed other signs of impairment,

Officer Thornton handcuffed Respondent and placed him in the front passenger seat of a

patrol vehicle.

While Officer Thornton and Respondent were roadside in the patrol vehicle, Officer

Thornton read Respondent the DR-15. Respondent was given a copy of the form so he

could follow along as it was read to him. As the DR-15 advisement of rights was being

read, another police officer, Officer Claytor, approached Respondent. Through the open

window on the passenger side of the patrol vehicle, Officer Claytor asked Respondent

several questions, such as whether he “would blow,” i.e., submit to a blood alcohol

concentration test. Officer Claytor asked those questions while Officer Thornton was

reading the DR-15 aloud. Once Officer Thornton finished reading the form, he and Officer

2 Claytor asked Respondent multiple times whether Respondent would submit to the test.

After asking a seventh time without a response from Respondent, Officer Thornton marked

on the DR-15 that Respondent refused to take the test. Respondent was transported to the

police station for processing.

At the station, Officer Thornton and Respondent signed the DR-15 form. The

acknowledgment on the DR-15 states, “I, the undersigned driver, acknowledge that I

have been read or I have read the above stated Advice of Rights as certified by the police

officer.” Below the acknowledgment, the form asks, “Having been so advised, do you

now agree to submit to a test?” Officer Thornton checked the box below that states, “No

– Alcohol concentration test refused[,]” and Respondent’s signature appears underneath.

As required by TR § 16-205.1, Respondent’s driver’s license was subject to a 270-day

suspension, and his refusal to take the test prompted a one-year disqualification of his CDL.

Administrative Proceedings

Respondent requested an administrative hearing, which took place on July 12,

2018.1 At the hearing, Respondent averred that he was not fully advised of his rights due

to the roadside noise and Officer Claytor’s questioning him while the DR-15 was being

read. The hearing was continued, and the ALJ subpoenaed Officer Thornton. When the

hearing resumed on September 25, 2018, Officer Thornton and Respondent testified about

the incident.

1 Under TR § 16-205.1(f)(1)(ii), a motorist whose driver’s license was suspended for a test refusal may request a hearing before an ALJ. 3 Officer Thornton detailed the events surrounding Respondent’s arrest. He testified

that after Respondent was handcuffed and seated in the patrol vehicle, Officer Thornton

read the DR-15 aloud to Respondent. While reading, Officer Claytor asked Respondent

questions. Respondent testified that he could not hear Officer Thornton over Officer

Claytor and asked Officer Claytor to stop speaking. He further testified, “I could hear him

reading. I only recall a few parts of [the DR-15], very small parts and I could not

understand what [Officer Thornton] was trying to tell me.” After Officer Thornton was

done reading, the officers repeatedly asked Respondent whether he would take the test, and

Respondent asked several times, “what should I do?” After asking a seventh time whether

Respondent would take the test, Officer Thornton interpreted Respondent’s unresponsive

utterances as a refusal.

Based on that testimony, the ALJ concluded that Respondent violated TR § 16-

205.1. The ALJ explained that there was sufficient evidence to determine that Respondent

was apprised of the administrative sanctions that would be imposed if he refused to take

the test. In coming to that conclusion, the ALJ made a credibility determination, stating

“although the officer may have been talking, I just don’t find credible that he could talk so

much that you couldn’t understand the form that was there in front of you.” The ALJ

specifically noted that Respondent had a copy of the DR-15 while Officer Thornton read it

aloud, he asked Officer Thornton several times whether or not he should take the test, and

he later signed the form at the station before his release. Based on those facts, the ALJ

4 ordered that Respondent’s CDL remain disqualified for a year,2 but in lieu of upholding

the 270-day driver’s license suspension the ALJ allowed Respondent to participate in the

Ignition Interlock System Program. TR § 16-404.1(f)(1)(i) (permitting an ALJ to

“[m]odify a suspension and issue a restricted license” to a motorist who qualifies as a

program participant).

The Circuit Court Hearing

Respondent appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel

County pursuant to TR § 12-209(a),3 and a hearing was held on March 18, 2019. At the

hearing, Respondent argued that he was not fully advised of his rights as required by TR §

16-205.1. Respondent argued that he was distracted by Officer Claytor’s questioning and

therefore Respondent could not understand the DR-15 as it was read to him by Officer

Thornton.

The MVA countered that the Advice of Rights need only be made available to the

driver; police officers are not obligated to ensure that motorists understand those rights.

The ALJ made a factual finding that the DR-15 was read aloud to Respondent and he was

2 Under TR § 16-205.1(b)(1)(iii) and § 16-812(a)(3), the MVA disqualifies a CDL for one year if the motorist holding the CDL refuses to take a blood alcohol concentration test. 3 TR § 12-209(a) states:

(1) Any aggrieved party to a hearing may appeal from a decision or order of the Administration in accordance with this subsection. (2) If the matter concerns the license of an individual to drive and the individual is a resident of this State, the aggrieved party may appeal to the circuit court for the county in which the individual resides. 5 given a copy to read himself. The MVA further argued that a police officer cannot fully

ensure that a presumably intoxicated motorist understands the DR-15 form. Based on the

facts presented, the ALJ did not find it credible that Officer Claytor’s questioning inhibited

Respondent from understanding those rights.

On judicial review, the circuit court understood the issue presented in the instant

case to be a mixed question of law and fact. The circuit court found in favor of Respondent

and reversed the decision of the ALJ. The circuit court was concerned about the limitations

on a “compromised human mind . . . to be read and understand something” when another

police officer is simultaneously asking questions. The circuit court reasoned that

Respondent could not be expected to understand and decide whether to take the test while

being questioned by an officer; therefore, the ALJ erroneously decided that Respondent

was fully advised of his rights. The credibility determination of the ALJ was not mentioned

in the circuit court’s ruling. This appeal followed.

As stated at the outset, we reverse the circuit court and affirm the determination of

the ALJ.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews “an administrative agency’s decision under the same statutory

standards as the Circuit Court.” Gigeous v. E. Corr. Inst., 363 Md. 481, 495 (2001). It is

not this Court’s role to “substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who

constitute the administrative agency[.]” United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel for

Balt. Cty., 336 Md. 569, 576–77 (1994). “Therefore, ordinarily the court reviewing a final

6 decision of an administrative agency shall determine (1) the legality of the decision and (2)

whether there was substantial evidence from the record as a whole to support the decision.”

Gigeous, 363 Md. at 496 (internal quotations omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. at 497 (internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

The MVA argues that the circuit court substituted its judgment for that of the ALJ

and misconstrued the law when it concluded that Respondent’s inattention excused his test

refusal. Respondent counters that (1) permitting officers to distract motorists while they

are being read the DR-15 violates due process, and (2) his statutory right to be fully advised

of the sanctions for a test refusal was frustrated by Officer Claytor’s questioning. We

explain below why the MVA has the better part of the argument.

Due Process is Satisfied When the DR-15 is Read to or by the Motorist.

Any person who is detained under suspicion of driving or attempting to drive in the

state while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both has given implied consent to take

a blood alcohol concentration test, per § 16-205.1(a)(2) of the Transportation Article.

Subsection 16-205.1(a)(2) provides that “[a]ny person who drives or attempts to drive a

motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general

in this State is deemed to have consented . . . to take a [chemical breath] test [to determine

blood alcohol concentration] if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or

attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol[.]” The purpose of TR § 16-205.1

7 “is not to provide procedural protections to drivers who are suspected to be impaired by

alcohol, drugs, or both; instead, TR § 16-205.1’s purpose is to protect the public by

deterring drunk and/or drugged driving.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath, 448 Md. 145,

192 (2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

As a prerequisite to the MVA’s suspension of a driver’s license for refusing to

submit to a blood alcohol concentration test, a police officer must advise the driver of the

administrative sanctions attendant to that refusal. TR § 16-205.1(b)(2)(iv). After a test

refusal, a police officer must also inform the driver that he or she has several rights

available, such as the right to request a hearing. TR § 16-205.1(b)(3). The DR-15 is a

standard form created by the MVA that outlines the sanctions for test refusal4 and it

contains all the advice officers are required to provide to detained motorists. See Owusu

v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 461 Md. 687, 691 (2018).

We have repeatedly held that due process is satisfied when the motorist reads or is

read the DR-15 because the DR-15 “accurately and adequately conveys to the driver the

rights granted by the statute” and “the consequences of a test refusal.” Motor Vehicle

Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243, 262 (2008) (citing Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin.,

4 The DR-15 includes a provision regarding test refusals by CDL holders:

If you hold a commercial driver’s license (CDL) and were driving a non- commercial motor vehicle when you were stopped, and you refuse to submit to a test, your CDL or privilege shall be disqualified for 1 year for a 1st offense or for life if your CDL or privilege has been previously disqualified for at least 1 year under Maryland Transportation Article § 16-812(a) or (b), a federal law, or any other state’s law. 8 332 Md. 201, 218 (1993); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 496 (2002)).

“[T]he DR-15 adequately capture[s] the full advisement of administrative sanctions

because the language in the form is unambiguous, with no prejudice or roadblocks to inhibit

a driver’s decision-making process.” Owusu, 461 Md. at 706 (citing Seenath, 448 Md. at

180).

Based on that precedent, Respondent’s due process argument is without merit. As

the ALJ found, Respondent possessed a copy of the DR-15 as Officer Thornton read it to

him, and Officer Claytor’s simultaneous questioning did not inhibit Respondent from

understanding his rights and the sanctions for refusing the test.

Whether There was Substantial Evidence to Support the ALJ’s Conclusion that Respondent was Fully Advised of his Rights.

While reading the DR-15 aloud or giving a copy of it to the motorist to read may

fully advise the motorist of the sanctions for a test refusal, this Court has held that a motorist

is not fully advised if the police officer confuses or misleads the motorist about the

sanctions. See Hare v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 326 Md. 296, 304 (1992) (cautioning that

police officers may not “mislead the defendant or construct road blocks, thus unduly

burdening that decision-making”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Chapter 407 of

the Acts of 1993. In Forman v. Motor Vehicle Administration, this Court addressed

whether a motorist was fully advised of her rights despite the arresting officer encouraging

the motorist to refuse a blood alcohol concentration test and inaccurately explaining the

sanctions for the refusal. 332 Md. at 206. In that case, the officer led the motorist to believe

that if she refused the test, the MVA would be able to modify the suspension of her license.

9 Id. at 210. Additionally, the officer encouraged the motorist to refuse the test by promising

to take her to a friend’s house rather than to the police station so that her husband would

not find out about her arrest. Id. at 209–11.

We held in Forman that a police officer must provide a detained motorist with an

opportunity to make a knowing and voluntary decision to refuse a blood alcohol

concentration test. Id. at 218–19. A detained motorist is deprived of the opportunity to

make a knowing and voluntary decision regarding whether to take the test if the motorist

is not fully advised of the sanctions for a refusal. Id. at 216–17. In reaching that

conclusion, we stated:

“Fully advised” means not only advised initially, but the detaining officer must also take care not to subsequently confuse or mislead the driver as to his or her rights under the statute. Further, the officer certainly must not in any way induce the driver into refusing the test, a result running counter to the statute’s purpose of encouraging drivers to submit to alcohol concentration tests.

Id. at 217 (emphasis in original).

Critical to the case at bar, we went on to explain that whether an officer “has

prevented a detained driver from making a knowing and voluntary decision to refuse the

test is a matter that must be decided by the [ALJ] in view of the facts of the particular case.”

Id. at 219.

Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, Officer Claytor’s questions did not frustrate

Respondent’s understanding of his rights. The ALJ found substantial evidence that

Respondent was fully advised of his rights—Respondent was given a copy of the DR-15,

had it read aloud by Officer Thornton, and he later signed it. Substantial evidence is present

10 if “a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency

reached.” Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. 505, 512 (1978) (internal

quotations omitted). We agree with the ALJ that there was substantial evidence that

Respondent was fully advised of his rights.

Although Respondent testified that he could not hear and understand Officer

Thornton, the ALJ did not find credible Respondent’s assertion that he was not properly

advised because of Officer Claytor’s questioning. “[T]he resolution of conflicting

evidence and inconsistent inferences involves making credibility determinations.” Motor

Vehicle Admin. v. Karwacki, 340 Md. 271, 284 (1995). We have stated “that, in an

administrative proceeding, credibility findings of the agency representative who sees and

hears witnesses are entitled to great deference on further agency review and should not be

reversed absent an adequate explanation of the grounds for the reviewing body’s

disagreement with those findings.” Id.

The circuit court misapplied established standards of proof to overcome a prima

facie case established by the police officer’s sworn statement. The circuit court improperly

substituted its judgment for that of the ALJ by determining that Respondent incur no

sanctions for his violation of the implied-consent statute. Simply put, Respondent was

appropriately asked to take a test for blood alcohol concentration; he refused. The ALJ

credited the facts as asserted by the MVA, and we have no cause to disturb that credibility

determination. The ALJ imposed the required consequence—a 270-day driver’s license

suspension, CDL disqualification, and the opportunity for modification to allow

11 Respondent to participate in the Ignition Interlock Program. It follows that we reverse the

judgment of the circuit court and remand the matter to the MVA for action consistent with

our holding.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.