Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before May 18 2012, 8:22 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, CLERK of the supreme court, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. court of appeals and tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MOTIQUE ORR, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02-1110-CR-954 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Annie Christ-Garcia, Judge Cause No. 49F24-1102-CM-11960
May 18, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge Case Summary
Motique Orr appeals her convictions for Class A misdemeanor possession of
marijuana and Class A misdemeanor dealing marijuana. Orr contends both that her
convictions violate double jeopardy and that there is insufficient evidence to support her
convictions. We find that Orr’s convictions violate double jeopardy under the same
evidence test, so we reverse her possession of marijuana conviction. However, we find
that the State has sufficiently proved the elements of dealing marijuana, so we affirm that
conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
On February 20, 2011, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer
Michael Wright saw Orr driving a vehicle with a cracked windshield and initiated a
traffic stop. Officer Wright asked Orr for her license and registration, and after checking
Orr’s driving status, he learned that Orr’s license was suspended. Officer Wright then
checked the driving status of the passenger of the vehicle and found that his license was
also suspended. Because of the suspended license and the cracked windshield, Officer
Wright issued Orr a citation and impounded the vehicle since neither Orr nor her
passenger possessed driving privileges.
Before having the vehicle towed, Officer Wright conducted an inventory search.
In the center console, along with Orr’s other personal belongings, Officer Wright found a
set of digital scales and a bag of what he suspected was marijuana. Officer Wright
arrested Orr and put her in handcuffs. He advised Orr of her Miranda rights, which Orr
waived. Tr. p. 57-58. Orr admitted that the scales and the bag of marijuana were hers.
2 Orr also told Officer Jason Rauch, who was also at the scene, that she did not smoke
marijuana, she just sold it. Id. at 61-62. The bag of marijuana was subjected to
laboratory analysis and confirmed to be marijuana weighing 10.08 grams.
The State charged Orr with Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana and
Class A misdemeanor dealing marijuana. A bench trial was held, and Orr was found
guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Orr to 365 days on each conviction to run
concurrently, with 321 days of each count suspended to supervised probation.
Orr now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Orr makes two arguments on appeal: (1) her convictions for possession of
marijuana and dealing marijuana violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Indiana
Constitution and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support her convictions.
I. Double Jeopardy
Orr contends that her two convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Indiana Constitution. Whether convictions violate double jeopardy is a question of law
which we review de novo. Grabarczyk v. State, 772 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002).
Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall
be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Two or more offenses are the “same
offense” under Article 1, Section 14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the
challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one
challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.
3 Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ind. 2008). Orr contends that her convictions fail
the actual evidence test.
Under the actual evidence test, the evidence presented at trial is examined to
determine whether each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts.
Id. at 1234. To show that two challenged offenses constitute the “same offense” in a
claim of double jeopardy, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the
evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense
may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged
offense. Id. Application of this test requires the court to identify the essential elements
of each of the challenged crimes and to evaluate the evidence from the fact-finder’s
perspective. Id.
Possession of marijuana is defined at Indiana Code section 35-48-4-11:
A person who: (1) knowingly or intentionally possesses (pure or adulterated) marijuana, hash oil, hashish, salvia, or a synthetic cannabinoid; . . . commits possession of marijuana . . . a Class A misdemeanor.
Dealing marijuana is defined at Indiana Code section 35-48-4-10(a):
(a) A person who: . . . (2) possesses, with intent to: . . . (C) deliver; . . . marijuana, hash oil, hashish, salvia, or a synthetic cannabinoid, pure or adulterated; commits dealing in marijuana, hash oil, hashish, salvia, or a synthetic cannabinoid, a Class A misdemeanor . . . .
The State acknowledges that the same evidence – Orr’s possession of 10.08 grams of
marijuana – was used to establish Orr’s possession of marijuana offense as well as the
4 possession element of her dealing in marijuana offense. Accordingly, the convictions fail
the actual evidence test and violate double jeopardy.
We therefore remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate Orr’s
conviction for Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Orr also contends that there is insufficient evidence to support both of her
convictions, but because we reversed her conviction for possession of marijuana, we only
address her conviction for dealing in marijuana. Our standard of review with regard to
sufficiency claims is well settled. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this
Court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bond v.
State, 925 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We
consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom and affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial
evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Id. Reversal is appropriate only
when a reasonable trier of fact would not be able to form inferences as to each material
element of the offense. Id.
Class A misdemeanor dealing in marijuana occurs when the defendant “(2)
possesses, with intent to: . . . (C) deliver; . . . marijuana, hash oil, hashish, salvia, or a
synthetic cannabinoid, pure or adulterated . . . .” Ind.
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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before May 18 2012, 8:22 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, CLERK of the supreme court, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. court of appeals and tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MOTIQUE ORR, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02-1110-CR-954 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Annie Christ-Garcia, Judge Cause No. 49F24-1102-CM-11960
May 18, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge Case Summary
Motique Orr appeals her convictions for Class A misdemeanor possession of
marijuana and Class A misdemeanor dealing marijuana. Orr contends both that her
convictions violate double jeopardy and that there is insufficient evidence to support her
convictions. We find that Orr’s convictions violate double jeopardy under the same
evidence test, so we reverse her possession of marijuana conviction. However, we find
that the State has sufficiently proved the elements of dealing marijuana, so we affirm that
conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
On February 20, 2011, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer
Michael Wright saw Orr driving a vehicle with a cracked windshield and initiated a
traffic stop. Officer Wright asked Orr for her license and registration, and after checking
Orr’s driving status, he learned that Orr’s license was suspended. Officer Wright then
checked the driving status of the passenger of the vehicle and found that his license was
also suspended. Because of the suspended license and the cracked windshield, Officer
Wright issued Orr a citation and impounded the vehicle since neither Orr nor her
passenger possessed driving privileges.
Before having the vehicle towed, Officer Wright conducted an inventory search.
In the center console, along with Orr’s other personal belongings, Officer Wright found a
set of digital scales and a bag of what he suspected was marijuana. Officer Wright
arrested Orr and put her in handcuffs. He advised Orr of her Miranda rights, which Orr
waived. Tr. p. 57-58. Orr admitted that the scales and the bag of marijuana were hers.
2 Orr also told Officer Jason Rauch, who was also at the scene, that she did not smoke
marijuana, she just sold it. Id. at 61-62. The bag of marijuana was subjected to
laboratory analysis and confirmed to be marijuana weighing 10.08 grams.
The State charged Orr with Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana and
Class A misdemeanor dealing marijuana. A bench trial was held, and Orr was found
guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Orr to 365 days on each conviction to run
concurrently, with 321 days of each count suspended to supervised probation.
Orr now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Orr makes two arguments on appeal: (1) her convictions for possession of
marijuana and dealing marijuana violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Indiana
Constitution and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support her convictions.
I. Double Jeopardy
Orr contends that her two convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Indiana Constitution. Whether convictions violate double jeopardy is a question of law
which we review de novo. Grabarczyk v. State, 772 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002).
Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall
be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Two or more offenses are the “same
offense” under Article 1, Section 14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the
challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one
challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.
3 Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ind. 2008). Orr contends that her convictions fail
the actual evidence test.
Under the actual evidence test, the evidence presented at trial is examined to
determine whether each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts.
Id. at 1234. To show that two challenged offenses constitute the “same offense” in a
claim of double jeopardy, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the
evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense
may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged
offense. Id. Application of this test requires the court to identify the essential elements
of each of the challenged crimes and to evaluate the evidence from the fact-finder’s
perspective. Id.
Possession of marijuana is defined at Indiana Code section 35-48-4-11:
A person who: (1) knowingly or intentionally possesses (pure or adulterated) marijuana, hash oil, hashish, salvia, or a synthetic cannabinoid; . . . commits possession of marijuana . . . a Class A misdemeanor.
Dealing marijuana is defined at Indiana Code section 35-48-4-10(a):
(a) A person who: . . . (2) possesses, with intent to: . . . (C) deliver; . . . marijuana, hash oil, hashish, salvia, or a synthetic cannabinoid, pure or adulterated; commits dealing in marijuana, hash oil, hashish, salvia, or a synthetic cannabinoid, a Class A misdemeanor . . . .
The State acknowledges that the same evidence – Orr’s possession of 10.08 grams of
marijuana – was used to establish Orr’s possession of marijuana offense as well as the
4 possession element of her dealing in marijuana offense. Accordingly, the convictions fail
the actual evidence test and violate double jeopardy.
We therefore remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate Orr’s
conviction for Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Orr also contends that there is insufficient evidence to support both of her
convictions, but because we reversed her conviction for possession of marijuana, we only
address her conviction for dealing in marijuana. Our standard of review with regard to
sufficiency claims is well settled. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this
Court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bond v.
State, 925 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We
consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom and affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial
evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Id. Reversal is appropriate only
when a reasonable trier of fact would not be able to form inferences as to each material
element of the offense. Id.
Class A misdemeanor dealing in marijuana occurs when the defendant “(2)
possesses, with intent to: . . . (C) deliver; . . . marijuana, hash oil, hashish, salvia, or a
synthetic cannabinoid, pure or adulterated . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10(a). Orr
contends that the State failed to show that she possessed the marijuana with the intent to
deliver it. Finding that the State provided sufficient evidence of Orr’s possession of the
marijuana and her intent to deliver it, we disagree.
5 Possession of contraband may be either actual or constructive. Washington v.
State, 902 N.E.2d 280, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Actual possession occurs
when a person has direct physical control over the substance, Walker v. State, 631 N.E.2d
1, 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), and that actual possession does not need to exist at the exact
time as the law enforcement’s discovery of the contraband, Wilburn v. State, 442 N.E.2d
1098, 1101 (Ind. 1982). Constructive possession, on the other hand, occurs when the
defendant has both (1) the intent and (2) the capability to maintain dominion and control
over the subject contraband. Atwood v. State, 905 N.E.2d 479, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),
trans. denied.
Orr was driving her vehicle when the marijuana and scales were found in the
center console, among other items belonging to her. Tr. p. 39-40, 55-56. Also, Orr
admitted to Officer Wright that the marijuana belonged to her. Id. at 58. Based on this
evidence, the trial court found that Orr had knowledge of the presence of the marijuana in
her car, in addition to the intent and capability to maintain control of the marijuana. It
was reasonable for the trial court to find that Orr constructively possessed the marijuana.
It was also reasonable for the trial court to find that Orr had the intent to deliver
the marijuana. The evidence showed that a set of scales was found in the center console
of Orr’s car with the bag of marijuana. Id. at 39-40. Further, Orr admitted to Officer
Rauch that she did not smoke marijuana, she just sold it. Id. at 61-62. Based on this
evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to find that Orr had the intent to deliver the
marijuana that was found in her vehicle.
6 This evidence is sufficient to affirm Orr’s conviction for Class A misdemeanor
dealing marijuana. We therefore affirm the trial court’s conviction on this count.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
CRONE, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.