Mothershead v. Wofford

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided April 29, 2022·No. 3:21-cv-05186·Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 JENNIFER LYNN MOTHERSHEAD, CASE NO. C21-5186 MJP 11 Petitioner, ORDER ON PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 12 v. ORDER 13 DEBORAH J. WOFFORD, 14 Respondent. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion for Entry of a Protective 17 Order. (Dkt. No. 35.) Having reviewed the Motion, Respondent’s Opposition (Dkt. No. 37), the 18 Reply (Dkt. No. 38), and all supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the Motion in part. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Petitioner claims that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal action 21 against her in state court and pursues a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court 22 has scheduled an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 23 Petitioner now seeks a protective order that would allow her to provide discovery and present 24 1 evidence at the upcoming evidentiary hearing without waiving the attorney-client privilege 2 beyond this proceeding. Alternatively, Petitioner asks the Court to quash a subpoena and 3 deposition notice Respondent has served. Respondent opposes this request and, alternatively, 4 requests the Court modify the requested scope of the protective order.

5 ANALYSIS 6 The Court agrees with Petitioner that a protective order provides a legitimate and 7 important means of allowing her to prosecute her ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this 8 proceeding without adversely impacting her ability to maintain the attorney-client and attorney 9 work product privileges outside of this habeas action. 10 As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot 11 be fairly litigated unless the petitioner waives his privilege for purposes of resolving the 12 dispute.” Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). But because this 13 waiver “runs counter to the rationale behind the privilege,” the Ninth Circuit favors a “narrow 14 waiver rule” that does not waive the privilege for all times and all purposes. Id. This narrow

15 waiver is “consistent with the interests of the habeas petitioner in obtaining a fair adjudication of 16 his petition and securing a retrial untainted by constitutional errors.” Id. To ensure the waiver is 17 narrow, “district courts have the obligation, whenever they permit discovery of attorney-client 18 materials as relevant to the defense of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in habeas cases, to 19 ensure that the party given such access does not disclose these materials, except to the extent 20 necessary in the habeas proceeding, i.e., to ensure that such a party’s actions do not result in a 21 rupture of the privilege. Id. at 727–28. In Bittaker, for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 22 issuance of protective order “precluding use of the privileged materials for any purpose other 23 than litigating the federal habeas petition, and barring the Attorney General from turning them

24 1 over to any other persons or offices, including, in particular, law enforcement or prosecutorial 2 agencies.” Id. at 717. 3 The Court here finds that a protective order is necessary to allow Petitioner to prosecute 4 fully her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without broadly waiving any claim of

5 attorney-client and work product privilege. A protective order will allow her to disclose to 6 Respondent materials that are covered by these privileges without waiving the privilege in any 7 subsequent stae proceeding. A limited waiver that applies only to this proceeding will allow both 8 parties to examine the merits of Petitioner’s inaffective assistance of counsel claim without 9 prejudice to any subsequent state proceeding. By not requiring a full waiver, the Court avoids 10 giving the “prosecution a wholly gratuitous advantage” in learning of privileged materials in this 11 proceeding that could be used in any state proceedings that might follow. See Bittaker, 331 F.3d 12 at 724. The protective order also enables Petitioner to preserve her rights under the Fifth and 13 Sixth Amendments, to the extent such issues arise. And the protective order will not prejudice 14 the state in any subsequent action because upon retrial or resentencing, because the state court

15 will “remain free, of course, to determine whether [Mothershead] waived [her] attorney-client 16 privilege on some basis other than [her] disclosure of privileged information during the course of 17 the federal litigation.” Id. at 726. Nor does the protective order bar the state from obtaining “the 18 privileged materials through a source other than” the Attorney General’s office, which the state 19 could then “present . . . to the state court and seek a ruling on their admissibility.” Id. at 726-27. 20 The Court does, however, find that Petitioner’s proposed protective order is overbroad as 21 drafted. Having considered Respondent’s criticisms of the requested protective order, the Court 22 enters the following Order, which seeks to balance the competing interests and ensure a fair 23 process to both parties while also allowing the public reasonable access:

24 1 PROTECTIVE ORDER 2 1. All discovery and testimony obtained by Respondent from Petitioner in this 3 federal proceeding, whether before or after issuance of this Order, that involves subjects and/or 4 documents covered by Petitioner’s attorney-client or work product privileges or Petitioner’s Fifth

5 Amendment privileges (“the Privileges”) may be claimed as privileged. Any such discovery or 6 testimony that is claimed as privileged shall be treated as confidential and protected from 7 disclosure as set forth in this Order. 8 2. To assert a claim of privilege, Petitioner must clearly mark all discovery with the 9 words “CONFIDENTIAL” prior to production. If any discovery has been provided prior to this 10 Order, Petitioner must, within 20 days of entry of this Order, provide Respondent with a list of 11 all such discovery that is covered by one of more of the Privileges and such discovery shall be 12 treated as confidential. 13 3. For any deposition testimony taken before the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner may 14 designate the entire transcript as confidential at any point during the deposition if she reasonably

15 believes the testimony will or does reveal information covered by the Privileges. Within 20 days 16 of receipt of the final deposition transcript, Petitioner shall identify to Respondent the specific 17 portions of the transcript that involve subjects covered by Privileges that shall be treated as 18 confidential. Respondent may then challenge any such confidentiality designations as set forth in 19 Section 8. 20 4. Because Petitioner reasonably believes that the testimony of her prior counsel and 21 expert will likely reveal information covered by the Privileges, the Court shall exclude the public 22 during their testimony, and shall seal the transcript of their testimony and any related exhibits 23 which shall be treated as confidential. Additionally, at any point during the evidentiary hearing,

24 1 Petitioner may request the Court exclude the public from the hearing to avoid the disclosure of 2 any information covered by the Privileges. Upon such a request, the Court shall close the 3 evidentiary hearing to the public and seal the portion of the transcript and exhibits that contain 4 the privileged information that shall be treated as confidential. Petitioner must indicate when she

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