[Cite as Motes v. Motes, 2026-Ohio-307.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
MATTHEW NEAL MOTES, : CASE NO. CA2025-05-047 Appellant, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 2/2/2026 MELISSA SUE MOTES, :
Appellee. :
:
APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. DR14030274
Matthew Neal Motes, pro se.
Ched H. Peck, for appellee.
____________ OPINION
SIEBERT, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Matthew Motes ("Father"), appeals a decision of the Butler
County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, regarding parenting time Butler CA2025-05-047
matters involving his son. Upon review, we conclude that the modification of parenting
time is generally a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trier of fact. However, we find
that remand is warranted in this instance for the limited purpose of addressing Mother's
overnight work schedule and its impact on the parenting time arrangement.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Summary of Events
{¶ 2} Father and Melissa Motes ("Mother") married in 2010 and are the parents
of one child, M.M., born in March 2011. The parties divorced in 2015, at which time Mother
was designated as M.M's residential and custodial parent.
{¶ 3} Since the divorce, the parties have been involved in extensive post-decree
litigation, resulting in modifications of the original decree. Father has served as M.M.'s
legal custodian and residential parent since January 28, 2020. He has moved for
contempt based on Mother's failure to facilitate parenting time. Father has also raised
concerns regarding Mother's erratic behavior and suspected drug abuse.
{¶ 4} In August 2022, the trial court ordered Mother to complete a psychological
evaluation within six months. Although Mother claimed she complied with the order, she
did not. Consequently, in February 2023, the trial court suspended Mother's parenting
time. Despite the suspension, Father continued to allow M.M. to visit Mother. During this
period, however, Mother engaged in repeated outbursts and sent numerous inappropriate
text messages to M.M. The messages were often sent late at night or during school hours
and included statements such as:
Your dad wants you out of my life and the court is helping him.
Why am I paying all this money whenever you could just choose to come over. . . Call me. . . He is playing you
It worries me how much they are playing with your head. I want to protect you but I don't know how.
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Please say a prayer that Jesus helps us in court on Tuesday.
That's it. I'm not freaking calling or texting anymore. . . your being like your dad.
You're a freaking brat. . . I'm so disappointed in you.
It's real nice your over there playing house with everybody else and being everyone else's son but mine.
{¶ 5} The record reflects that on December 14, 2023, Mother completed the
court-ordered psychological evaluation with Dr. Jeffrey Baker, who concluded that she
did not suffer from any mental disorder. On April 9, 2024, Mother filed a motion to reinstate
her parenting time.1 The matter proceeded to a hearing held over two days.
Evidentiary Hearing
{¶ 6} Dr. Baker is a clinical and forensic psychologist. He testified that his
evaluation included a review of the case file and relevant court orders, a clinical interview
with Mother, administration of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-3 ("MMPI-
3"), the Adverse Childhood Experiences Questionnaire, as well as interviews with
collateral sources. Based on this evaluation, Dr. Baker determined that Mother does not
suffer from any mental health disorder. Mother's MMPI-3 produced a valid profile and
revealed no indicators of substance abuse or schizophrenia.
{¶ 7} Dr. Baker further testified that, if he were to make recommendations, he
would suggest that Mother work with a clinician who follows Dr. John Gottman's
methodology to improve relationship management and conflict resolution.2
{¶ 8} Mother testified that she received Dr. Baker's recommendations and was
1. We note that although this matter originated with Mother's motion to reinstate parenting time, the trial court's final order included a modification of the parenting schedule.
2. Dr. Baker stated that Dr. John Gottman is a recognized expert from the University of Washington who specializes in relationships and conflict management. -3- Butler CA2025-05-047
willing to comply with any court order necessary to resume parenting time with M.M. She
stated that she would submit court-ordered drug screens and acknowledged that her
failure to timely complete the psychological evaluation was her own error. When asked
what parenting schedule would be in M.M.'s best interest, Mother proposed having
parenting time from Thursday after school until Saturday morning, consistent with her
work schedule of Sunday through Wednesday from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
{¶ 9} On cross-examination, Mother was confronted with the text messages she
had sent to M.M. She testified that she now recognizes the messages were inappropriate
but explained that being separated from her child caused her to feel as though the "world
was against her." She stated that she believed the only way to alleviate those feelings
was to regain parenting time.
{¶ 10} Samantha Motes ("Stepmother") testified that she has been married to
Father for five years, has known M.M. since he was six years old, and assists in his care,
including transportation to school. She testified that M.M.'s behavior has improved with
reduced time with Mother, noting he is calmer, emotionally stable, and performing well in
school.
{¶ 11} Father testified that he has a strong relationship with M.M. He stated that
prior parenting time orders were difficult to manage because Mother routinely disregarded
the schedule. Father also testified that M.M. misses too much school and extracurricular
activities while in Mother's care.
{¶ 12} Father expressed concerns with Dr. Baker's evaluation, testifying that Dr.
Baker did not contact him and relied on inaccurate information from Mother's family.
Father stated that his concerns regarding Mother's behavior were not reflected in the
evaluation and that the underlying issues remained unaddressed. Father testified that the
parties have been engaged in litigation for approximately seven years, that Mother
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continues the same pattern of behavior and noncompliance with court orders, and that
she does not appear to be making efforts to improve the situation for M.M. Finally, Father
testified that it is in M.M.'s best interest to maintain the existing parenting arrangement—
one overnight every two weeks—which has been in place for approximately one and one-
half years, explaining that flexibility is necessary due to M.M.'s sports schedule and that
forced visitation negatively impacts M.M.
Trial Court's Decision
{¶ 13} The magistrate took the matter under advisement and issued a written
decision ("Magistrate's Decision") which granted Mother parenting time every other
weekend from Friday at 5:00 p.m. until Saturday at 8:00 p.m. (with variations during
summers and holidays) and required Mother to ensure M.M. still was taken to any of his
extracurricular activities. But the Magistrate's Decision prohibited Mother from
approaching, speaking to, or sitting near Father or his family, or from addressing
parenting issues with Father during any of M.M.'s extracurricular activities. The
Magistrate's Decision took Mother's third shift work into account, providing for changes if
she stopped working third shift. But the Magistrate's Decision also placed additional
burdens and guardrails on Mother.
{¶ 14} The Magistrate's Decision ordered Mother to submit to drug testing and
provided for additional parenting time upon verification that Mother was engaged in a
service provider consistent with Dr. Baker's recommendations. Absent an emergency,
Mother could only initiate a call to M.M. once per day, and she was prohibited from
initiating any communications with M.M. during school hours or between 9:30 p.m. and
7:00 a.m.3 Any communications between Mother and M.M. that fit within those orders
3. The Magistrate's Decision specified it did not limit the number of times per day M.M. could contact Mother. -5- Butler CA2025-05-047
could continue as long as M.M. responded to her. But if he did not respond to a
communication from Mother, she must cease communication with him. The magistrate
ordered that Mother "shall not berate, interrogate, or guilt" M.M. during any
communications, nor shall she "discuss Father, court, or any adult issues" with him.
Finally, the Magistrate's Decision detailed several consequences that would occur if
Mother violated conditions contained in it and gave some monitoring control to Father.
{¶ 15} First, if Mother made any unilateral changes to the parents' written
agreement or withheld Father's parenting time, her parenting time would be suspended.
Second, if Mother missed any of the required drug testing, she would be responsible for
submitting to, and paying for, makeup screenings. Finally, the Magistrate's Decision
required Father to review Mother's correspondence with M.M. on a weekly basis. If he
found that Mother had violated any of the magistrate's conditions regarding
communications, Father had to block Mother's number from M.M.'s phone. In addition, if
Mother violated one of the communication restrictions, she would not be permitted to have
any ongoing contact with M.M. outside of her scheduled parenting time. Mother filed
objections to the Magistrate's Decision and Father responded.
{¶ 16} The trial court adopted the Magistrate's Decision in part but modified the
order in several respects, including removing the drug-testing requirement and eliminating
the condition that Mother participate in counseling before receiving additional parenting
time. In addition, the trial court applied some of the restrictions that had only applied to
Mother in the Magistrate's Decision to both parents, such as limiting "media contact" with
M.M. to no more than once per day, restricting hours (absent emergency) for initiating
communications with M.M., and communications or contact during M.M.'s extracurricular
activities. The trial court prohibited either parent from blocking the other parent's phone
number from M.M.'s phone. Neither parent could unilaterally suspend the other's
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parenting time.
{¶ 17} Instead of adopting the Magistrate's Decision regarding parenting time, the
trial court granted Mother "liberal parenting time" and established a default parenting
schedule in the event the parties could not agree. The trial court adopted the parenting
schedule as outlined in the table below.
During the school year
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday Week Father Father Mother Mother to Father Mother Mother One school Mother Mother at 5:00 Father at 5:00 Father at p.m. at 5:00 p.m. 5:00 p.m. p.m.
Week Father Father Father Mother Mother Father Father Two to school Mother at 5:00 p.m. Father at 5:00 p.m.
During the summer
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday Week Father Mother Mother Father Father Mother Mother One
Mother Father at Mother at 5:00 5:00 p.m. at 5:00 p.m. p.m.
Week Mother Father Father Mother Mother Father Father Two
Father Mother at Father at 5:00 5:00 p.m. at 5:00 p.m. p.m.
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{¶ 18} Father now appeals, raising four assignments of error for review.
II. Trial Court's Independent Review
{¶ 19} In his first assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court failed to
conduct a de novo review of the Magistrate's Decision. He contends the court did not
meaningfully analyze the evidence or prior rulings, misconstrued the factual record, and
issued a decision unsupported by the evidence and contrary to M.M.'s best interest.
{¶ 20} Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides:
If one or more objections to a magistrate's decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Before so ruling, the court may hear additional evidence but may refuse to do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that evidence for consideration by the magistrate.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 21} Therefore, Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) imposes a mandatory duty on the trial court
to address and dispose of a party's timely objections. Lynch v. Lynch, 2007-Ohio-7083, ¶
8 (12th Dist.). A trial court is not permitted to "merely rubber-stamp" a magistrate's
decision. Pietrantano v. Pietrantano, 2013-Ohio-4330, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). Failure to rule on
objections and conduct an independent review constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.
{¶ 22} "Ordinarily, a reviewing court will presume that the trial court performed an
independent review of the magistrate's decision." Ohio Bar Liab. Ins. Co. v. CCF Dev.,
L.L.C., 2018-Ohio-3988, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.), citing Kairn v. Clark, 2014-Ohio-1890, ¶ 11
(12th Dist.). Therefore, "the party asserting error bears the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating the trial court's failure to perform its duty of independent analysis."
Pietrantano at ¶ 14.
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{¶ 23} Here, Father has not satisfied this burden. The trial court expressly stated
in its decision that it conducted an independent review of all factual and legal issues
addressed by the magistrate in ruling on Mother's objections. The fact that the trial court
did not cite any specific portion of the transcript or exhibits does not demonstrate that it
failed to conduct the required review. Cottrell v. Cottrell, 2013-Ohio-2397, ¶ 94 (12th
Dist.). "'While citing such material would tend to demonstrate that the trial court conducted
the requisite independent review, there is no requirement in Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) that the
trial court do so.'" Id., quoting Hampton v. Hampton, 2008-Ohio-868, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 24} Absent evidence to the contrary, courts presume the trial court complied
with its obligation under Civ.R. 53. Ohio Bar Liab. Ins. Co. at ¶ 23; Mahlerwein v.
Mahlerwein, 2005-Ohio-1835, ¶ 47 (4th Dist.). Moreover, in this case, the trial court
explicitly stated that it performed an independent review of the "record." While the trial
court also specified it reviewed the "[Magistrate's Decision]; findings of fact and
conclusions of law; trial transcript; argument of counsel; statutes and case law and best
interest factors[,]" it did not state it limited its review of the record to just those items. In
addition, the trial court noted it was "very familiar with the ongoing and seemingly
unending parenting litigation between the parties."
{¶ 25} To be sure, Father disagrees with the conclusions the trial court made
following its review of the record and consideration of the Magistrate's Decision and
Mother's objections thereto. But Father's assertion that the trial court "disregarded key
evidence" and "limit[ed] its review to a recent transcript" is unsupported by the trial court's
own statements in the decision. Our review of the record finds no reason to find the trial
court disregarded the "totality of the circumstances" or failed to conduct a "full and proper
de novo review" of the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Although the
trial court did not specifically discuss each applicable factor in detail, the record supports
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that it independently reviewed the Magistrate's Decision and entered judgment
accordingly. We therefore find no merit to Father's arguments and overrule his first
assignment of error.
III. Parenting Time
{¶ 26} In his second assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court
improperly modified the parties' parenting time without applying the 16 factors set forth in
R.C. 3109.051(D). He further contends that a change in circumstances was required
before any modification could be made and that the parenting time order is not in M.M.'s
best interest. Father raises similar arguments in his third assignment of error, adding that
the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Mother's unavailability during the
week due to her overnight work schedule. With the exception of the issue concerning
Mother's work schedule, we find Father's arguments unpersuasive.
{¶ 27} A trial court possesses broad discretion in matters concerning the visitation
rights of a nonresidential parent. Ghanayem v. Ghanayem, 2020-Ohio-423, ¶ 45 (12th
Dist.). Accordingly, a reviewing court will not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of
discretion. Id. This deference is grounded in the principle that the trial court is best
positioned to fashion an equitable outcome based on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St. 3d 142, 144 (1989).
{¶ 28} Although a change in circumstances is required to modify a custody
determination, that requirement does not apply to modifications of visitation or parenting
time. Shafor v. Shafor, 2009-Ohio-191, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.).4 Rather, R.C. 3109.051 governs
4. Father cites to Gaskin v. Gaskin, 2017-Ohio-8195, for the requirement that "parenting time modifications require strict compliance with R.C. 3109.04." This court could find no such case or such a legal holding from any case. A case with that citation reference exists from one of our sister districts, but the case pertains to a postconviction relief in a criminal matter, not to any parenting time dispute. See State v. Withrow, 2017- Ohio-8195 (2nd Dist.). We caution Father to ensure that any cited cases actually exist and stand for the legal principle asserted. - 10 - Butler CA2025-05-047
parenting time and visitation, and a trial court modifying parenting time must consider the
factors enumerated in R.C. 3109.051(D). Id. The factors include, but are not limited to,
(1) the child's interaction and interrelationship with his or her parents, (2) the geographical
location and distance between the parents' respective homes, (3) the child and parents'
available time, including each parent's employment schedule, (4) the age of the child, (5)
the child's adjustment to his or her home, (6) the health and safety of the child, (7) the
mental and physical health of all the parties, (8) the parent more likely to honor and
facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights, and
(9) "any other factor in the best interest of the child." R.C. 3109.051(D).
{¶ 29} While it is preferable for a trial court to expressly reference the statute, it is
not required to do so, provided the record reflects that the court considered the statutory
factors. Carr v. Carr, 2016-Ohio-6986, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.); Smarrella v. Smarrella, 2015-
Ohio-837, ¶ 53 (7th Dist.) (trial court is only required to determine what is in the best
interest of the child and to consider all relevant factors).
Parenting Time
{¶ 30} Upon review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
modifying the parenting time order. Contrary to Father's position, Mother was not required
to show a change in circumstances. The court was only required to consider the statutory
factors in R.C. 3109.051(D), with the child's best interest as the guiding principle.
{¶ 31} Here, the trial court expressly stated that it considered, weighed, and
balanced the relevant statutory factors in light of the unique facts and circumstances of
the case. The court also referenced the local rules governing parenting time and their
general guidelines. Specifically, the court noted that M.M. was 13 years old at the time of
the final order, participating in multiple competitive sports, and approaching an age
marked by increasing independence, including driving, possible employment, and greater
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peer interaction. For these reasons, the court looked to the guidelines applicable to older
teenagers, which emphasize flexibility and prioritize accommodating a child's school,
social needs, extracurricular activities, and work commitments.
{¶ 32} Although Father argues that the evidence does not support the court's
determination, the trial court expressly relied on the extensive record, its long-standing
familiarity with the case, and its review of the Magistrate's Decision. As the trier of fact,
the trial court was in the best position to weigh the evidence and competing
considerations.
Mother's Work Schedule
{¶ 33} However, while we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding
most of Father's assertions, we find merit to Father's argument regarding the court's
treatment of Mother's work schedule.
{¶ 34} Mother testified that she is employed by Maxim Staffing as a licensed
practical nurse and works an overnight schedule from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on Sundays,
Mondays, Tuesday, and Wednesdays. She also testified that she intends to maintain this
schedule. The Magistrate's Decision accounted for this testimony when allocating
parenting time. The trial court, however, modified the Magistrate's Decision and imposed
a significantly different schedule.
{¶ 35} Under the trial court's order, parenting time during both the school year and
the summer is set by a detailed rotating schedule. However, the schedule fails to
adequately account for Mother's overnight work hours. While the court's goal of creating
an equitable arrangement is evident, the resulting schedule could not have reasonably
considered Mother's availability and therefore constitutes an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 36} Specifically, the order grants substantial parenting time to Mother during
periods when she is working or would reasonably need to sleep after an overnight shift.
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This is inconsistent with R.C. 3109.051(D)(3), which requires consideration of both the
parents' and child's available time, including each parent's work schedule. The order is
especially problematic because it applies by default when the parties fail to reach an
agreement—an outcome that appears likely given their contentious litigation history.
{¶ 37} Accordingly, we remand the matter for further consideration of the
undisputed evidence regarding Mother's work schedule and its impact on parenting time.
Considering the foregoing, we overrule Father's second assignment of error. Father's
third assignment of error, to the extent it relates to Mother's work schedule, is sustained.
IV. DR 610.1 Guidelines
{¶ 38} In his fourth assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court erred by
referencing the DR 610.1 parenting time guidelines to teenagers aged 16 to 18 when
M.M. was only 13. This argument lacks merit.
{¶ 39} The record reflects that the trial court did not apply the DR 610.1 guidelines
for older teenagers as binding authority. Rather, the court referenced them in a contextual
manner to illustrate the general principles associated with a child's increasing age,
maturity, and developmental needs. The court acknowledged that as M.M. grows older,
his needs and schedules will continue to evolve, necessitating greater parental flexibility.
{¶ 40} Moreover, the trial court specifically cited the "Basic Principles" section of
DR 610.1. These principles are intentionally broad and are designed to help parents
navigate the developmental stages of their children. They are not age-specific directives
and do not impose a mandatory or age-inappropriate parenting time schedule. Instead,
they offer general guidance aimed at supporting a child's overall best interest—precisely
the purpose for which the trial court referenced them.
{¶ 41} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in considering these principles as part
of its best-interest analysis. Father's fourth assignment of error is therefore overruled.
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{¶ 42} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the above Opinion.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed 100% to appellant.
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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