Moss v. Wooley

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedAugust 16, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-00008
StatusUnknown

This text of Moss v. Wooley (Moss v. Wooley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moss v. Wooley, (E.D. Ark. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS DELTA DIVISION

LIONELL S. MOSS PLAINTIFF

V. 2:21CV00008 JM

JOHNNY WOOLEY, In His Individual Capacity as the Regional Public Housing Director for the Little Rock Field Office for Housing and Urban Development, ERIC WILKINS, In His Individual Capacity as Inspector with the Office of Inspector General, G. CRAIG ROBBINS, In His Individual Capacity as Financial Member of the Little Rock Office for Housing And Urban Development DEFENDANTS

ORDER Pending is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Docket # 11). Plaintiff has filed a response and Defendants have filed a reply. Plaintiff filed this action on January 22, 2021 alleging violations of his rights pursuant to the Fifth, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff complains that Defendants, in their individual capacities as federal employees, unlawfully conducted an investigation of him that led to his arrest. Plaintiff also alleges state law claims of malicious prosecution and the tort of outrage. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) failure to properly serve the Defendants, (2) failure to state facts on which relief can be granted, (3) lack of subject matter jurisdiction over any tort claims, (4) expiration of the statute of limitations, (5) no cognizable Bivens claim, and (6) qualified immunity. Standard of Review To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Although “specific facts

are not necessary,” the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “give fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. at 562. This standard “simply calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim or element].” Id. at 556. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of his claim.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must assume the factual allegations of the complaint to be true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27(1989). The Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Brief Facts Beginning in February 1993, Plaintiff Lionell Moss was employed by the Helena Housing Authority as the Executive Director. The Helena Housing Authority is an agency that receives federal funds from the United States Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to provide low income housing for the residents of Helena, Arkansas. It also receives federal funds

from HUD’s Public Housing Capital fund to cover operating and management costs. During the summer of 2016, Defendant Eric Wilkins, an employee of HUD Office of Inspector General began an investigation of the Plaintiff. Defendant Johnny Wooley was at the time the Regional Public Housing Director for the Little Rock Field Office of HUD. Defendant G. Craig Robbins worked in the financial department of HUD. On October 5, 2016 the Plaintiff was indicted by a Grand Jury for three counts of theft concerning programs receiving federal funds. Plaintiff claims that the investigation leading to his indictment was reckless and relied on false and fraudulent statements. A warrant for the Plaintiff’s arrest was issued on October 6, 2016. On October 14, 2016 Plaintiff turned himself in

to the FBI Office in Little Rock, Arkansas. On November 17, 2016 a letter was issued to the Plaintiff by HUD notifying him that he was suspended from participation in procurement and governmental transactions as a participant or principal with HUD. Soon thereafter, Plaintiff was suspended from his position with the Helena Housing Authority without pay. On January 24, 2018, the federal indictment against the Plaintiff was dismissed without prejudice. Defendants claim that before the notice of dismissal was filed, the parties signed an Agreement that the Plaintiff agreed to waive and forgo a motion seeking attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. §3006A. Discussion In his response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that his claims are not brought under the Tort Claims Act but are instead claims for constitutional torts. Plaintiff has sued Defendants Wooley, Wilkins and Robbins in their individual capacities as federal

employees. Although Plaintiff’s complaint purports to be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, §1983 is inapplicable to claims for constitutional torts committed by federal actors. See, Jones v. United States, 16 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 1994). Instead, Plaintiff’s claims should have been brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). To proceed with his Bivens claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities as federal employees Plaintiff was required to serve the United States pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1) and also serve the employee under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(3). Personal service is obtained by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the

individual personally; leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). To properly serve the United States, a party must deliver a copy of the summons and complaint to the United States attorney for the district where the action is brought and to the Attorney General of the United States.

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Related

Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Printed Media Services, Inc. v. Solna Web, Inc.
11 F.3d 838 (Eighth Circuit, 1993)
Marilyn M. Marshall v. Mikel Warwick
155 F.3d 1027 (Eighth Circuit, 1998)
Jones v. United States
16 F.3d 979 (Eighth Circuit, 1994)

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