Moss v. Grabill

2003 DNH 163

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 30, 2003
• Docket: CV-01-220-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Moss v. Grabill CV-01-220-M 09/30/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Stephen M. Moss, Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 01-220-M Opinion No. 2003 DNH 163 Robert L. Grabill, Defendant

O R D E R

Having carefully reviewed the memoranda and affidavits

submitted, the court cannot find that defendant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Given the evidence of record, and

depending upon how it is presented at trial, a reasonable jury

could plausibly find that Grabill's statements to Donovan, as he

describes them and as Donovan describes them, substantially

exaggerated the gravity of the complaints actually received,

thereby giving the false impression that Moss had been accused of

serious sexual misconduct. At a minimum, the court cannot

conclude that, as a matter of law, all of the (alleged)

statements attributed to Grabill, considered in context, are

incapable of defamatory meaning. In other words, on this record,

the court is constrained to conclude that a jury might reasonably conclude that the meaning intended (and actually conveyed) by

Grabill's (alleged) statements was that complaints alleging

serious sexual misconduct of some sort had been made against

Moss, when in fact none of the complaints directly accuses Moss

of such misconduct.

The complaints actually received could be construed as

comparatively benign.1 And, Grabill's comments to Donovan about

those complaints might be found to have conveyed, and were

intended to convey, the impression that serious misconduct had

been asserted. For example, while no complaint received seems to

directly accuse Moss of sexual misconduct, Grabill acknowledges

having said to Donovan "that the kind of complaints the camp had

received raised a guestion as to whether they had to be referred

to and processed through, the State of New Hampshire." A

reasonable trier of fact might plausibly conclude that Grabill

was referring to the reporting reguirements set forth in RSA 169-

C:29, relative to incidents of possible child abuse. Moreover,

Donovan alleges that Grabill said that "there are three known

1 Of course, a jury might reasonably view the complaints as implicitly suggesting that Moss had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with campers. That guestion cannot, however, be resolved as a matter of law.

2 charges" and that "the good [Moss] did could not be offset by

what happened here" - statements a jury might plausibly conclude

falsely described the gravity of the complaints actually

received.

While plaintiff's case on the merits appears to be

particularly thin, and the interposed defenses particularly

strong, on this record summary judgment is simply not available.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment (document no. 28) is,

therefore, denied.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

September 30, 2003

cc: Robert R. Lucic, Esg. Marie M. McPartlin, Esg. Russell F. Hilliard, Esg. Martha Van Oot, Esg.